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This study examines the terms and conditions found in the 67 Florida public school 
collective bargaining agreements.  Such collective bargaining agreements are negotiated between 
two parties, the teacher unions and their employers, under Florida Statute 447.  The purpose of 
this mixed-methods study, conducted using both qualitative and quantitative research methods, is 
as follows: 1) to determine the extent to which CBA provisions exist within the master contracts 
of Florida teachers (2016-2017) and; 2) to determine the extent to which, if any, collective 
bargaining provisions vary among school districts (i.e. district size, district performance, district 
locale).  The study finds that none of the eight desirable provisions were present in all 66 
collective bargaining agreements indicating that collective bargaining agreements vary in terms 
of the inclusion of desirable provisions for teachers.  The study also finds that that spatial 
relationship plays a role in determining bargaining outcomes.  The results of this study provide 
insight into the terms and conditions of collective bargaining agreements in Florida; thereby 
providing Florida school districts with information to construct the best possible competitive 
contracts in the future, which would then attract top talent as well as to protect the best interests 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 One of the most important if not the most important set of regulations that govern school 
district policy is the collective bargaining agreement which can run hundreds of pages (Strunk & 
Grissom, 2010).  According to The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935, collective 
bargaining is defined as:  
“the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the 
employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, 
or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contact incorporating 
any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession” (p. 9). 
Congress enacted the Wagner Act, or the National Labor Relations Act in 1935 to protect the 
rights of employees and employers to bargain collectively (National Labor Relations Act, 1935).   
 Collective bargaining in education has since had a profound impact on schools because of 
the difference that collective bargaining agreements or CBAs make with educators regarding the 
conditions of their employment.    
Hornick-Lockard (2015) found that 45 of 50 states were able to use collective bargaining 
for negotiating items such as better wages and improved working conditions.  Florida is one of 
the 45 states which has mandated collective bargaining within the public school system under 
Florida Statute § 447 (2018).  Collective bargaining allows teachers to speak freely for what is 
best for both students and teachers.  According to Florida Statute § 447.309 (2018), Labor 
Organizations, the certified bargaining unit shall bargain collectively with attempt to represent 
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the views of the public employees within the bargaining unit.  An agreement shall not be binding 
until approved by the public employees who are members of the bargaining unit.  When unions 
create better working conditions for their teachers, they are more likely to remain at those 
schools, rather than move on to seek a different school with better conditions.  This may also 
encourage more professionals to enter teaching (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).  A study done 
for the National Bureau of Economic found that financial incentives helped low-performing 
schools attract and keep academically talented teachers (Steele, Murnane, & Willett, 2009).  A 
competitively allocated $20,000 incentive called the Governor’s Teacher Fellowship or GTF was 
offered to attract talented inexperienced teachers in California in 2000 and 2002 (Steelman, 
Powell, & Carini, 2000).  The California study found that without the GTF incentive, teachers 
would have been less likely to teach and/or remain in low-performing schools for at least four 
years (Steele, Murnane, & Willett, 2009).   
It has been shown that highly effective teachers are the most important within-school 
determinant of student success (Gallagher, Goodyear, Brewer, & Rueda, 2012).  Because 
classroom teachers are essential to student success (Gallagher, Goodyear, Brewer, & Rueda, 
2012), it is vital to attract and retain the best possible candidates.  “Researchers finally have 
demonstrated what parents long have known:  teachers differ in effectiveness, and those 
differences can have long-lasting effects on students’ learning and life chances” (Hannaway & 
Rotherham, 2010, p. 111).  One of the key elements in attracting and retaining the most qualified 
teachers is the provision of competitive salaries and fringe benefits, items that are always 
included in a typical collective bargaining agreement (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).  Florida 
Statute § 447.308 (2018) states the bargaining units shall jointly bargain collectively in the 
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determination of the wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment of the public 
employees within the bargaining unit. 
There are different contract terms a teacher may negotiate, such as an annual contracts 
and tenure contracts.  At the time of the present study, all new teachers were being issued annual 
contracts that last for no longer than a school year (Florida Statute § 1012.3).  Teachers who 
already had tenure contracts written before July 1, 2011 have been grandfathered and can 
continue to work under those contracts (Florida Statute § 1012.3).  Tenure contracts are 
continuing contracts that allow teachers to teach in a district for as long as he or she chooses to 
teach unless they are dismissed after due process of legally specified reasons (Johnson et al., 
2008).   
Statement of the Problem 
School reform is directly or indirectly related to teacher collective bargaining (Hannaway 
& Rotherham, 2010).  Such relationship makes collective bargaining such an important topic of 
concern especially in Florida, with its status as a leader in education reform (Bormna & Dorn, 
2007).  Teacher collective bargaining studies largely focus on the potential influence of the 
provisions in collective bargaining agreements on teacher and student achievement (Goldhaber, 
Lavery, & Theobald, 2014).  Other discussions of data are dedicated to what influences which 
provisions end up in these contracts (Goldhaber, Lavery, & Theobald, 2014; Lewin, Keefe, & 
Kochan, 2012).  To date, there has been limited information on Florida educators’ public school 
collective bargaining agreements (CBAs), specifically regarding their similarities and unique 
aspects and content.   
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Considering what research says about the impact CBAs have on school district 
recruitment and performance, research has still overlooked what factors influence the provisions 
that ultimately are found in the CBAs.  For example, one study found that although collective 
bargaining increase school budgets, they ultimately have a negative effect on student 
achievement (Hoxby, 1996).  “Teachers’ unions are primarily rent seeking, raising school 
budgets and school inputs but lowering student achievement by decreasing the productivity of 
inputs” (Hoxby, 1996, p. 711).  Hoxby (1996) refers to “rent seeking” as teachers’ unions 
wanting different inputs than parents do because the unions’ goal is not student achievement.  
Another study by Levin and Quin (2003) found that collective bargaining transfer policies allows 
suburban districts to hire teachers earlier than urban districts can.  “Because of hiring delays, 
these districts lose substantial number of teacher candidates…including the most promising and 
those who can teach in high-demand shortage areas—to suburban classrooms that typically hire 
earlier” (Levine & Quinn, 2003, p. 5).  It is not that teachers are not applying, it is that teachers 
would become frustrated with the late urban hiring timeline and slow processes and accept a 
position in a suburban district (Levine & Quinn, 2003). The impact that collective bargaining has 
may not be clear but what is clear is that collective bargaining agreement provisions shape 
district policy (Strunk, 2011).          
With the influence that collective bargaining agreements can have on a district, unions 
need to ensure that the necessary steps are taken toward improving the process of collective 
bargaining.  Usually teacher contract and the provisions present remain in place for several years.  
In Florida, under Florida Statute 447.309, subsection 5, collective bargaining agreements shall 
not exceed a term of more than three years.  If a contract is lacking provisions, it is brought up at 
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the next set of contract negotiations (Lieberman, 1997).  In order to improve collective 
bargaining agreement provisions in the future, unions need to be aware of the variations in 
collective bargaining from district to district.  “Districts and unions alike may learn from and 
contribute to their neighbors’ bargaining decisions” (Goldhaber, Lavery, & Theobald, 2014, p. 
1279).  The use of specific terms and conditions in one district’s collective bargaining agreement 
may be used in another district however, Goldhaber, Lavery, and Theobald (2014) have found 
that geographical location influences the provisions that end up in CBAs.  
 Exploring collective bargaining agreements may provide a source of valuable information 
for both unions and Florida districts.    
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of the mixed-methods study is as follows: 1) to determine the extent to 
which CBA provisions exist within the master contracts of Florida teachers (2016-2017) and; 2) 
to determine the extent to which, if any, collective bargaining provisions varies according to the 
school district (i.e. district size, district performance, district locale). To that end, the research 
questions are as follows:  
1. To what extent, if any, do collective bargaining agreement provisions differ according 
to eight selected provisions among Florida public school district collective bargaining 
agreements?  
2. How does the presence or absence of the selected collective bargaining agreement 
provisions impact demographical indicators of Florida school districts (i.e. district size, 
district performance, district locale)?   
6 
 
The understanding gained through this investigation provides useful information to policymakers 
and practitioners in the state of Florida and offers ways to more effectively generate collective 
bargaining agreement provisions. 
Conceptual Framework  
 The conceptual framework used to guide this study includes the selected contractual 
provisions involving the collective bargaining agreements (Goldhaber, Lavery, & Theobald, 
2014).  A teacher collective bargaining agreement or CBA is a legal document that covers a wide 
array of school district rules which are legal rights and obligations of the school district and the 
teachers’ union (Lieberman, 1997; Goldhaber, Lavery, & Theobald, 2014).  Items included in a 
teacher collective bargaining agreement govern everything including but not limited to: hiring, 
compensation, teacher transfers, evaluations, professional development, promotion, grievance, 
and termination (Goldhaber, Lavery, & Theobald, 2014).  “Teachers’ union-district collective 
bargaining agreements can be broadly classified into four areas: benefits, working conditions, 
evaluations and grievances, and Association rights” (Strunk & Reardon, 2010, p. 639). 
 “Literature has largely ignored the factors that may determine which provisions appear in 
CBAs in the first place” (Goldhaber, Lavery, & Theobald, 2014, p. 1275).  An assessment of 
collective bargaining agreement provisions, when examined in terms of their presence or absence 
in Florida school district collective bargaining agreements, should provide valuable insights 
especially with the potential relationship that may occur.  Goldhaber, Lavery, & Theobald (2014) 
offer eight collective bargaining provisions as a basis for understanding public school collective 
bargaining agreements in Florida.  To that end, Goldhaber, Lavery, & Theobald (2014) 
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provisions were used as the conceptual framework and can be used for examining the data.  
Table 1 presents both the provision categories and the accompanying questions for consideration 
as part of the broarder componets of the conceptual framework.   
Table 1 : Selected Contractual Provisions and Accompanying Questions 
Accessibility   How many provisions does the CBA contain?  
How many times was the district contacted to 
obtain the CBA?  How long is the CBA? 
Association Is there a no strike/lockout clause/ 
concentrated activities/work stoppage? Does 
the district pay for release time for 
negotiations for union members?  
Hiring and transfers Is seniority used to decide who is voluntarily 
transferred? Is seniority used to decide who is 
involuntarily transferred? Does CBA require 
that district post all certificated 
vacancies/make them available to teachers in 
the district? If position is filled with 
probationary/temporary teacher, will it be 
reopened the following year to members 
seeking transfer/reassignment? Does CBA 
specify the order in which district can 
consider new employees?  
Workload Is there a maximum class size for 4th grade? 
8th grade? 9–12th grades? Is collaboration 
time set aside in CBA for 4th grade? 8th 
grade? 9–12th grades? Does the CBA specify 
a given length of the school day?  
Evaluations Are there consequences for receiving a 
negative/ “unsatisfactory” performance 
evaluation? Are teachers with four years or 
more experience, who meet or exceed 
standards on previous evaluation, evaluated 
on a different schedule from less experienced 
teachers? Does CBA/evaluation rubric define 
the final rating categories? Does the CBA 
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allow for teachers to rebut or appeal a 
negative evaluation? 
Grievance May the teacher grieve disciplinary action? 
Does the grievance go to the board? Does the 
grievance go to mediation? Does the 
grievance go to arbitration?  
Layoffs Is seniority the primary factor that determines 
the order of layoffs? Do factors other than 
seniority determine the order of layoffs? Does 
CBA provide for recall rights after layoffs? 
Does CBA specify how re-employment offers 
are made after layoffs? Does CBA specify 
that re-employment offers are made in reverse 
seniority order after layoffs? Can members 
reject a re-employment offer after layoff?  
Leave Do members receive leave of absence for 
family illness/family care? Do members 
receive parenting/child-rearing leave? Do 
members get additional leave for 
pregnancy/maternity? Does CBA specify 
what members’ rights of return are from this 
leave? 
   
 Table 1 provides 40 provisions which have received considerable amount of attention by 
teacher or media literature (Goldhaber, Lavery, & Theobald, 2014).  The responses of these 
questions are smiliar to answering a yes/no response survey.  More specifically the conceptual 
framework is narrow to include eight selected provisions from the identified 40 collective 
barganing provisions reported by Goldhaber, Lavery, and Theobald (2014).  Those questions are 
as follows:  
 One provision for each of the eight categories was identified based on relevant extant 
research (Goldhaber, Lavery, & Theobald, 2014). That earlier study drew from the extant 
literature to identify 40 salient collective bargaining agreement provisions, grouped into eight 
categories. The researcher selected the provisions based upon the importance and concern of the 
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provisions in instructional collective bargaining agreements.  These provisions reflect 
topics/issues receiving considerable attention in the press and teacher labor literature.  Collective 
bargaining provisions involving policies has been more recently concerned with the potential 
consequences of specific CBA provisions (Goldhaber, Lavery, & Theobald, 2014).  For example, 
the federal government’s Race to the Top grant changed evaluation policies for teachers and 
created a lot of attention in education news (Goldhaber, Lavery, & Theobald, 2014).  
Following below are the identified provisions and the supporting rationale for their 
inclusion in this study:  
Table 2: Rationale for Selected Provisions 
Provision Rationale for selected provisions 
1. Does the district pay for release time for 
negotiations for union members?    
 
For provision one, there were two questions 
from the category of association.  Provision 
one (pay for release time) was selected from 
the two because the other question asks about 
striking and work stoppage.  According to the 
Florida Constitution, section six states, 
Florida is a right to work state meaning that 
Florida has the right to bargain collectively 
through a labor union.  Public employees 
shall not have the right to strike (§ 447.505).  
A public employee who violates the 
prohibition to strike will receive penalties by 
Florida Statute § 447.507 which is why this 
question was not selected. 
2. Does CBA require that districts post all 
certificated vacancies/make them 
available to teachers in the district?  
Association is the category for provision two.  
Senate Bill 736, The Student Success Act, no 
longer allowed Florida teachers to receive 
tenure contracts if they were hired after July 
1, 2011 (§1012.33).  For this reason, the 
questions relating to senority transfers is more 
relevant to continuing contracts hired before 
2011, which is why those questions under the 
category hiring and transfers were not 
selected for this study.  First year teachers as 
well as annual contracted teachers who were 
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not renewed would be interested in certifacted 
vacancies available to teachers in the district.  
3. Does the CBA specify a given length of 
the school day?  
 
Provision three is under the category of 
“workload”.  The question regarding class 
size under this category was not selected 
because of the addition to the Florida 
Constitution in 2011 for public education.  
Maximum class size is outlined along with 
consequences for not meeting class size 
requirements (§ 1003.03).  The other question 
not selected was about collaboration which is 
usually set by the principal of a school or 
voluntarily by teachers.  The decision to 
select the question regarding the length of the 
school day was because of the importance of 
the expectations set for the workload of a 
teacher in a collective barganing agreement. 
The collective bargaining’s final agreement 
limits the employer from changing the terms 
which have been agreed upon in the contract 
and lays out the responsibilities of employees 
(Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010). 
4. Are there consequences for receiving a 
negative/unsatisfactory (needs 
improvement) performance evaluation?  
 
Senate Bill 736 brought about a new annual 
evaluation system for all teachers using four 
distinct levels of effectiveness: highly 
effective, effective, needs improvement, and 
unsatisfactory (FEA, 2016).  This new 
evaluation system has been a topic receiving 
considerable attention in the press & teacher 
labor literature which is why this question 
was selected for a provision.  
5. Does the CBA allow for teachers to rebut 
or appeal a negative evaluation?  
 
According to Steve Perry (2011), one of 
teacher unions’ three main goals is defending 
teachers who have been 
reprimanded/negatively evaluated. For this 
reason, this provision is concerning for union 
members as well as teachers.  Florida Statute 
§1012.34 (Personnel Evaluation and 
Procedure) states that an employee rated as 
unsatisfactory shall be placed on performance 
probation for 90 calendar days. Teachers rated 
as needs improvement or unsatisfactory will 
receive no salary increase (§1012.22).  
Teachers might be interested to appeal a 
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negative evaluation to avoid such 
consequences. 
6. May the teacher grieve disciplinary 
action? 
 
As with provision five (appeal negative 
evaluation) unions and teachers would be 
interested to learn about provision six because 
of the actions that can be taken against a 
teacher.  
7. Is seniority the primary factor that 
determines the order of layoffs? 
 
The topic of seniority is discussed in so many 
aspects of education.  For example, In 
the1960s, Albert Shanker and David Selden 
(AFT organizer), along with their colleague 
George Altomare, forged a compromise 
between elementary and secondary teachers to 
create a pay differential based on seniority 
and level of teacher education rather than on 
the grade level taught (Hannaway & 
Rotherham, 2010).  
     Another example is a study carried out by 
Moe (2006).  Moe (2006) developed an 
analytical framework for exploring the 
behavioral effects of seniority-based transfer 
rights. Anzia and Moe (2014) study is the 
latest study done on collective barganing 
consequences for seniority-based transfer 
rules.   
     Senority is a topic that is metioned 
frequently in the literature review which is 
why provision seven and eight were selected.   
8. Do factors other than seniority determine 
the order of layoffs? 
As with provision seven, provision eight was 
selected for the same reasons because both 
relate to seniority and layoffs.   
 
These provisions are used to guide the analysis related to selected provisions and demographical 
indicators affecting Florida school districts.  
Definition of Terms 
The following terms are defined in accordance with their importance and their contextual 
relevance in this study: 
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Annual contract - An instructional staff employment contract of one school year. 
Bargaining Agent- A union made by a government agency or recognized voluntarily by the 
employer as the exclusive representative of all employees in the bargaining unit.  
Constitution- Fundamental principles according to Florida state government. 
County School Board Rules- Each school board has their own school board policies usually 
documented on the school board website. 
District Grade-  A letter grade of A, B, C, D, or F is assigned to each district annually based in 
11 components.  District grades are operating as an independent variable for the purpose of 
comparing contracts among categories of districts. 
Educator- A person who provides education but does not necessarily teach as a job 
Enrollment-  The 2016-2017 student enrollment was downloaded from the Florida Department of 
Education website.  Enrollment is operating as an independent variable for the purpose of 
comparing contracts among categories of districts. 
Florida State Statute- A Florida written law passed by a legislative body. 
Independent Variables- For this study locale codes, enrollment, and district grades were used to 
create categories for making comparisons. 
Locale Code-  A general geographic classification of U.S. territories into four types of areas, 
city, suburban, town, and rural. Local codes are operating as an independent variable for the 
purpose of comparing contracts among categories of districts.  
Master contract; collective bargaining agreement - A written document which incorporates all 
the items of agreement which were the subjects of the collective bargaining process. 
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Politics- The activities associated with the governance of a school, especially the debate or 
conflict among the staff.  
Teacher- A person who has a job teaching in a school 
Teacher unions; teacher associations - Exclusive representative organization chosen by the 
teachers of a given school district to negotiate on their behalf.  
Tenure; professional service contract (PSC) - An instructional staff employment contract which 
is ongoing or self-renewing. 
Value-added model (VAM) – A statistical model that estimates a schools’ growth and an 
instructional staff member’s growth related to student achievement.  
Significance of the Study 
This study was intended to provide insight into understanding the prevalence of contract 
provisions deemed to be desirable, while also understanding their distribution among varied 
districts in Florida.  The results obtained from the study may help provide Florida school districts 
with information to construct the best possible competitive contracts.  This would aid in 
attracting top talent while also protecting the best interests of the school districts.  Because of the 
significant influence and effect that a teacher can have on student achievement, it is desirable for 
school districts to attract the highest caliber candidates by offering competitive and attractive 
contracts.  This involves understanding the law, provision of contracts, and the common terms of 
those contracts.  Distinctions between the contracts can influence or encourage (in)equity and/or 
(in)equality between districts based upon size, performance and locale.  The study further offers 
an opportunity to understand collective bargaining agreements in a more meaningful way that 
14 
 
generates insight into the various tenets and expectation of fair practice by the union and the 
school board.  Given the lack of information and research on the terms and conditions of 
appointed Florida instructional staff, it was clear to the researcher that there was a need for 
additional information on the subject.   
Limitations of the Research Study 
 Some of the data collected for this study was provided by the respective school districts, 
and other data were obtained from teacher union websites.  The researcher relied on the accuracy 
of the data obtained from these two sources.  Sources of data for the study were also limited to 
2015-2016 public instructional staff collective bargaining agreements from the state of Florida.  
Florida charter schools were not included in this study.  Of the 67 collective bargaining 
agreements, only one was not able to be obtained by searching, calling or e-mailing the local 
school board website and local teacher union website.  Another limitation of the study includes a 
potential change in the researcher’s selection of the eight provisions, particularly given how the 
researcher selected the eight provisions as based on the current trends influencing CBAs.  The 
results of the data does not account for districts that are practicing provisions that are not 
included in the collective bargaining agreement.  Moreover, the data collected does not account 
for the hidden politics involved in collective bargaining or the informal and side bar agreements 
that may exist outside the formal agreement.  Hearing the voices of the people involved in the 
collective bargaining process might have made a difference in the findings.   
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Organization of the Study 
The problem, purpose, and significance of the study, as well as definitions, limitations, 
and organization have been presented in Chapter One.  Chapter Two contains a review of the 
literature and research related to the history of collective bargaining, the Florida context, and 
Collective Bargaining and Contractual Agreements rights using collective bargaining 
agreements.  Chapter Three explains the methodology and procedures used to collect and analyze 
the collective bargaining agreements.  Chapter Four discusses the findings of the study organized 
around the research questions which guided the study.  Chapter Five concludes the study with a 
summary and discussion of the findings and recommendations for further study.  
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CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The review of the literature represents what other authors and researchers have already 
said or done to answer the research questions.  This review was done specifically to give 
background and help answer the research questions proposed and to identify what has already 
been found about them.   
Chapter Two is organized into three sections: (a) Historical Perspective on Teacher’s 
Rights (b) Florida Context and (c) Collective Bargaining and Contractual Agreements.  Table 3 
illustrates descriptions of the aforementioned sections: 
 
Table 3: Literature Review Topics 
 Scholars Reviewed Key Words Used 
Historical Perspective Hornick-Lockard, 2015; 
Levine, Lowe, Peterson, & 
Tenorio, 1995; Guggenheim, 
2011; Ravitch, 2006; Vachon & 
Ma, 2015; Ravitch 2006; 
Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010; 
Compa, 2014; Bascia & 
Osmond, 2012; Moe, 2011; 
American Federation of 
Teachers, 2016; Johnson et al., 
2008; U.S. Constitution, 
Hornick-Lockard, 2015; 
Johnson, Musial, Hall, 
Gollnick, & Dupuis, 2008; 
National Education 
Association, 2016; American 
Federation of Teachers, 2016 
Teachers rights, history of 
teaching, (history of) 






American Federation of 
Labor (AFL), United 
Federation of Teachers 
(UFT) strike, Shanker, A 
Nation at Risk, Senate 
Bill 736, labor movement 
Florida Context United States Census Bureau 
Reports, 2014; Smith & Rayer, 
2013; Student enrolement, 
2017, Weaver-Dunne, 2000; 
Canedy, 2003; Normore & Ilon, 
2006; US Department of 
Public education in 




education in Florida, 
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 Scholars Reviewed Key Words Used 
Education; Aud, 2006; Funding 
for Florida School Districts 
Statistical Report, 2013-14; 
State board of education 2015-
16 legislative budget request, 
2014; Carlo, 2015; Education, 
2007; Bornman & Dorn, 2007; 
Chalk, 2015; Johnson et al., 
2008; Alexander & Alexander, 
2012; Florida Statutue 
§1012.32; Florida Statute, 
2016; Staff, 2011; Senate Bill 
736: How will it affect me?, 
2016; §1012.33; §1012.22; 
Mackenzie, 2015; Vollmer 
2010; Guggenheim, 2014; 
Murray & Murray, 2014; The 
Board of Regents of State 
Colleges v. Roth 1972, 
Lieberman, 2000; Hannaway & 
Rotherham, 2010; Hornick-
Lockard, 2015; Vachon & Ma, 
2015; Florida Statute §447.309; 
Ravitch, 2006; Perry, 2011;  
About FEA, 2016; Florida 
Statute § 44.103; Florida 
Statute § 447.501  
Florida’s growth, Florida 
population, students in 
Florida, class reduction, 
Governor Jeb Bush, 
Amendment 9, Florida 
public school student 





Trust Fund, Florida 
Department of Education, 
A+ program, Florida 
Formula for Education 
Success, No Child Left 
Behind Act (NCLB), 
Florida Comprehensive 
Assessment Test (FCAT), 
Critically Low Schools, 
Sunshine State Standards, 
Florida ranking/grade, 
Florida State Statute, 
Teacher Contract, 
annual/tenure/continuing 
teacher contract, Senate 
Bill 736, the student 
success act, Governor 
Rick Scott, performance 
pay, traditional 
bargaining, Interest-based 
bargaining, role of the 
union, Florida Education 
Association (FEA), NEA, 
AFT 
 
Collective Bargaining and 
Contractual Agreements 
Strunk, 2011; Carini, 2008; 
Munk, 1998; Strunk & 
Grimson, 2010; Goldhaber, 
Lavery & Theobald, 2014; 
Collective bargaining 
research, quantitative 




 Scholars Reviewed Key Words Used 
Moe, 2014; Koshi & Horng, 
2007; Anzia & Moe, 2014; 
Levin & Quinn, 2003; Freeman, 
2012; Anzia & Moe, 2014; 
Hoxby, 1996; Vachon & Ma, 
2015 
effects/relationship of 
collective bargaining  
 
 
Table 3 contains a broad range of sources that are included in Chapter Two’s review of relevant 
literature.  These sources include articles, handbooks, government documents, U.S. Census 
reports, Florida Statutes, empirical studies, journals, and major search engines such as EBSCO 
and Google Scholar.  These sources provided a reasonable comprehensive review of the 
literature necessary for Chapter Two.       
Historical Perspectives of Teacher Advocacy in Education 
This section focuses on the history and influence that teachers and unions have had on 
collective bargaining in education over many years.  The history of collective bargaining is 
fundamental to the union movement (Hornick-Lockard, 2015).  Table 4 illustrates a timeline of 
Teacher Advocacy in Education. 
Table 4: Historical Timeline of Teacher Advocacy in Education 
Year Historical Educational Event Description of Historical Event 
1857 Earliest form of the National Education 
Association (NEA) 
The NEA was established as a 
professional association of 
educators under the control of 
superintendents, principals, and 
other administrators. The NEA 
was not in the business of 
representing teacher interests 
rather was interested in 
transforming the American 
school system.  
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Year Historical Educational Event Description of Historical Event 
1901 Mary Murphy, was charged with gross 
misconduct and fired because she had 
married; however, she sued and was 
eventually reinstated. 
 
1902 The first real teacher union, the Chicago 
Federation of Teachers, joined the American 
Federation of Labor (AFL) 
The emergence of the Chicago 
Federation of Teachers was the 
beginning of many local unions 
such as the AFT. 
1916 American Federation of Teachers (AFT) was 
born.  
Membership consisted 
disproportionately of activists 
rather than teachers who were 
dedicated to representing 
teachers’ special interests 
1960 The United Federation of Teachers (UFT) 
received a pledge from Mayor Robert Wagner 
of New York City in 1960 to hold an election 
for teachers to be able to vote for CB.  
 
1960’s Wisconsin and New York passed legislation 
allowing for collective bargaining for public 
employees 
Collective bargaining was 
prohibited almost everywhere in 
the United States until this 
happened. 
1962 Executive Order 10988 was issued by 
President Kennedy, yielding federal 
employees the right to bargain collectively 
Teachers were not directly 
affected by this.  However, this 
helped the entire collective 
bargaining movement because 
many states started joining this 
movement by enacting legislation 
that allowed public employees, 
including teachers, to organize 
1969 The NEA formally declared itself as a union 
and went head-to-head with the AFT in 
disputes.  
The NEA reversed its views from 
opposing to supporting strikes 
and CB 
1987 Margaret Hall led a group of teachers located 
in Chicago to organize a non-NEA union.  
The Chicago school board was 
antiunion and had union members 
fired, which severely weakened 
the effectiveness of the group 
2011 Florida Teachers start new evaluation system 
under Senate Bill 736 
 
2011 Governor Scott Walker Wisconsin approved 





Table 4 contains historical events in chronological order that have influenced education 
throughout the years.  The historical events included in Table 4 are discussed in Chapter Two’s 
review of relevant literature in the first section, Historical Perspective on Teacher’s Rights.  This 
section will begin by establishing the historical significance of teachers and the evolution of the 
responsibilities of the position and rights that have been obtained.  
Teachers have had a long history of struggle for rights prior to collective bargaining 
(Ravitch, 2006).  Teachers were collectively powerless until they eventually organized and 
formed unions.  At first, teachers would form small organizations, which later led to the start of 
unions and eventually towards collective bargaining in education, and the powerful leverage that 
they provided.  Collective bargaining became a powerful tool for teacher unions to create better 
working conditions for teachers throughout history and to date.  Fair wages and improved 
working conditions are two distributive issues that spawned the labor unions and continue to be a 
topic of discussion.  
In the early decades of public schools in the U.S., teachers had very few standards to 
meet and virtually no rights.  The general requirements to be hired as a teacher were to pass 
locally created trustees’ examinations and to have basic literacy and numeracy skills; moreover, 
teachers were subject to supervisory rules that not only defined what and how to teach, but also 
extended into their personal lives (e.g., placing restriction on dating, marriage, and dress)  
(Levine, Lowe, Peterson, & Tenorio, 1995).  
 Collective bargaining did not exist during the 19th center, and teachers had little 
protection or recourse.  Teachers were regularly harassed by administration and often dismissed 
at any given time (Vachon & Ma, 2015).  In 1901 a teacher, Mary Murphy, was charged with 
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gross misconduct and fired because she had married; however, she sued and was eventually 
reinstated. (Ravitch, 2006).  There was also the issue of women being paid less than their male 
counterparts based on the idea that men, unlike women, had a family to support (Guggenheim, 
2011; Ravitch, 2006).  This created a divide, wherein elementary school teachers, who were 
mostly women, supported equal pay, but high school teachers, mostly men, supported a large pay 
differential.  Teachers fought amongst themselves because of differences of race, ethnicity, and 
where they taught (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).  The differences between teachers created a 
divide that prevented them from working together and instead created disunity and fighting 
within the teaching profession making teacher organization powerless to collective bargaining 
(Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).  Administrators used these divisions to their advantage by 
turning teachers against one another so that they would not cooperate in contract negotiations. 
(Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).  Negotiators such as administrators trying to change the 
feelings of the other party to get what they want out of the negotiation is an example of 
attitudinal structuring (Walton & McKersie, 1991).  Teachers were powerless when they were 
not united, creating another obstacle to collective bargaining (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010). 
Something needed to be done to eliminate pay disparities, so in 1906, the Interborough 
Association of Women Teachers started a campaign to wipe out the gender salary differentials 
(Ravitch, 2006).  The Association Bill for Equal Pay was oringally vetoed by Governor Hughes 
on 1907 but the fight for equal pay was finally won in 1912 (Ravitch, 2006). 
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The Rise of Teacher Associations 
Teachers wanted to ensure they had protection and rights; however, during the 19th 
century collective bargaining was viewed as a criminal conspiracy; it was not until the 20th 
century that collective bargaining would be enabled and protected by legislation (Compa, 2014).  
The origin of collective bargaining in education began with the rise of teacher unions, also 
known as teacher associations.  With the rise of standardized public education and teacher unions 
at the turn of the 20th century, came the earliest form of the National Education Association 
(NEA) in 1857 (Bascia & Osmond, 2012).  Even though most of its members were teachers, the 
NEA was not always controlled by teachers as it is today.  The NEA was established as a 
professional association of educators under the control of superintendents, principals, and other 
administrators.  The NEA was not in the business of exclusively representing teacher interests 
(as the teachers understood them) or righting their grievances.  Rather, it was in the business of 
carrying out what, by the turn of the century, would be regarded as the progressive 
transformation of the American school system.  This was anticipated to occur by removing 
schools from the clutches of party machines and patronage (and thus from existing forms of 
neighborhood and community control, which were highly politicized) and placing them under 
the control of professionals in more centralized, more rule-governed organizations run by experts 
by the administrators themselves. (Moe, 2011).  The act of placing schools under the control of 
administration was yet another obstacle to collective bargaining especially because the NEA was 
against collective bargaining (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).   
Margaret Hall led a group of teachers located in Chicago in 1987 to organize a non-NEA 
union but the Chicago school board was antiunion and had union members fired.  This severely 
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weakened the effectiveness of the group (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).  Local administrators 
encouraged and sometime required teachers to join the union, but businesses fought against them 
(Moe, 2011).  School boards were often controlled by businesses leaders who would at times fire 
teachers who joined unions (Moe, 2011).  The majority of teachers were women who could not 
vote at the time, making them less of a threat to the politicians who opposed them (Moe, 2011).  
For this reason, women were less likely than men to join a union (Moe, 2011).  Also, teachers 
were reluctant to join a union because, at that time, because unions were considered to be geared 
more for blue-collar workers without degrees while teaching was considered to be a white-collar 
profession (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010). 
At the end of the 19th century, professionally organized teacher associations began to 
emerge (Vachon & Ma, 2015), and by 1902 the first real teacher union, the Chicago Federation 
of Teachers, joined the American Federation of Labor (AFL).  The emergence of the Chicago 
Federation of Teachers was the beginning of many local unions such as the American Federation 
of Teachers (AFT) which was founded in 1916 (American Federation of Teachers, 2016).  The 
AFT membership consisted disproportionately of activists rather than teachers who were 
dedicated to representing teachers’ special interests and was struggling while the NEA was 
quickly becoming the leading organization (Moe, 2011).  This trend would soon be reversed, as 
the NEA would later struggle when teacher unions grew stronger (Hannaway & Rotherham, 
2010).  The first person to receive an AFT membership card was the union’s intellectual guru, 
John Dewey who encouraged teachers to attend school board meetings to make requests for 
salary increases (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).   
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In the strictest sense, when collective bargaining between unions and school boards did 
not exist, union members participated in what they instead called “collective begging” 
(Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).  Public employees formed associations that would lobby 
legislatures for improved working conditions and salaries, two conflict theory items (Compa, 
2014; Walton & McKersie, 1991).  Teachers in the classrooms had huge responsibilities and they 
were told what they were required to do with little protection or recourse.  This eventually forced 
teachers to organize into formal labor unions to obtain the political power to voice their 
concerns.  They were eventually forced to take matters into their own hands by meeting 
informally with boards of education and with the superintendent to discuss salaries and other 
teacher welfare provisions (Johnson et al., 2008).  The First Amendment of the Bill of Rights 
states that people have the right to peaceably assemble (U.S. Constitution).  The Norris-La-
Guardia Act of 1932 and The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935 ensured that public 
employees were able to exercise their First Amendment right (Hornick-Lockard, 2015).   
At all levels, the government opposed teacher unions and argued that collective 
bargaining was an improper delegation (Moe, 2011).  It is interesting that President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, who was a supporter of collective bargaining in the private sector, opposed it in the 
public sector (Moe, 2011).  Roosevelt wrote in a 1937 letter, “actions looking towards the 
paralysis of government by those who have sworn to support it are unthinkable and intolerable” 
(Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010, p. 9).  There was a rationale behind all of this called “sovereign 
authority” which posited that the government should have complete control over public sectors 
(Moe, 2011).  This idea was created under the old patronage system in which government jobs 
were controlled by party bosses and public officials (Moe, 2011).  While the people in control 
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would use these jobs as political currency to maintain their political machines (Moe, 2011), 
employees were always at the mercy of the government system, and unions were in direct 
conflict with the government system.   
 As time went on, the public education system in America grew and became more 
standardized (Bascia & Osmond, 2012).  This helped the teacher labor movement grow, first in 
the 1930s in major urban centers, and then in the 1960s in 32 states when teachers started 
working to pass collective bargaining legislation (Bascia & Osmond, 2012).  During the mid-
20th century, there were events that occurred that created a push for collective bargaining.  As 
the private-sector labor movement started winning collective bargaining for wage increases, 
teachers’ pay was still poor, especially considering that most teachers held college degrees.  The 
average factory worker made $400 more per year than the average teacher in America 
(Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).  This is a shocking disparity of pay considering the majority of 
teachers had college degrees (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).    
Another push came from teachers’ frustrations over poor working conditions.  Teachers 
were given non-educational job responsibilities beyond their regular educational job tasks such 
as raking snow off school grounds and lunch duty during their own lunch breaks (Hannaway & 
Rotherham, 2010).  Administrators were able to ask this of teachers, along with other tasks, 
rewarding compliant teachers with better class assignments and penalizing resistant teachers with 
tougher classes and more challenging students (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).  Without 
collective bargaining agreements providing for grievance proceedings, administrators were free 
to continue this treatment of teachers (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).    
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Collective bargaining was prohibited almost everywhere in the United States until the 
1960s, when states such as Wisconsin and New York passed legislation allowing for collective 
bargaining for public employees (Vachon & Ma, 2015).  To address teacher disunity and pay 
discrepancy, the Teachers Guild merged with high school teachers to create the United 
Federation of Teachers (UFT) (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).  Albert Shanker and David 
Selden (AFT organizer), along with their colleague George Altomare, forged a compromise 
between elementary and secondary teachers to create a pay differential based on seniority and 
level of teacher education rather than on the grade level taught (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010). 
The UFT asked for and received a pledge from Mayor Robert Wagner of New York City in 1960 
to hold an election for teachers to be able to vote for collective bargaining.  However, Mayor 
Robert Wagner eventually failed to follow through on this promise (Hannaway & Rotherham, 
2010).   
Strike for Union Power 
The UFT needed to decide what its next move would be.  Striking, a powerful union 
weapon that was used to fight for union power and win contracts, was made illegal under the 
1947 Condon-Waldin Act (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010; Moe, 2011).  Shanker believed it was 
necessary to strike if the UFT was to be taken seriously, so he staged a one-day walkout with the 
UCT and the local members of the AFT in response to Mayor Wagner’s backsliding on his 
promise (Moe, Special Interest: Teachers Unions and America's Publib Education, 2011).  It was 
dangerous to strike with such small numbers; approximately 10% (5,000 of 50,000) of teachers 
walked out, however, they did not lose their jobs because it was impractical to fire all the people 
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involved (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).  The strike was therefore deemed to be a success.  
Mayor Wagner allowed an election, and the teachers voted to support collective bargaining with 
the United Federation of Teachers acting as their exclusive representative (Moe, 2011). 
The NEA was against the use of strikes, criticizing them as unprofessional and a bad 
example to students (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).  They believed that when teachers went 
out on strike, they were breaking the law and setting a bad example to the students, (e.g., seeing 
their teachers using illegal tactics to get what they wanted) (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).  
The UFT and AFT differed considerably in their views.  Shanker argued striking is breaking the 
law on principal and that a “teachers’ strike involves public inconvenience rather than an 
endangerment of public health and safety, as strikes among other public employees, like police 
or firefighters, might” (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010, p. 11).  Although the NEA was against 
strikes, the strikes effectively worked and helped in the fight for collective bargaining.   
The effectiveness of striking resulted in more and more frequent strikes over the years 
and by 1975-76, a record number 203 teacher strikes (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).  Strikes 
were effective because they disrupted schools, putting pressure on public officials to come to an 
agreement.  As time went on and unions became more firmly established, the political climate 
towards unions changed, the number of strikes declined as they damaged unions’ image 
(Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010, p. 15).1  
The threat to union power continued into the twenty first century with Governor Scott 
Walker’s 2011 Wisconsin Act 10, also known as Wisconsin Budget Repair Bill (Hauer, 2018).  
                                                 




Act 10 was proposed as a budget bill to remedy a projected multibillion-dollar deficit (Hauer, 
2018).  The bill dramatically curtailed collective bargaining for most public employees, 
including teachers, when it was passed in 2011The unions say Act 10 has caused and continues 
to cause irreparable injury to the unions (Hauer, 2018).  Before Act 10, unions in Wisconsin 
could bargain over wages and a wide variety of items relating to conditions of employment (Ford 
& Ihrke, 2018). 
Political Involvement in the History of Collective Bargaining  
In 1962, Executive Order 10988 was issued by President Kennedy, yielding federal 
employees the right to bargain collectively (Hornick-Lockard, 2015).  Teachers were not directly 
affected by this.  However, this helped the entire collective bargaining movement because many 
states started joining this movement by enacting legislation that allowed public employees, 
including teachers, to organize (Hornick-Lockard, 2015).  This was a milestone for workers who 
were not previously protected by the old laws. 
Teachers now being allowed to bargain collectively opened the flood gates, and teachers 
organized together to address the unprofessional and unfair ways administration had treated them 
(Vachon & Ma, 2015).  The unions began pressuring the city for 147 or more items dealing with 
teachers’ concerns (Moe, Special Interest: Teachers Unions and America's Publib Education, 
2011).  Items included substantial pay raises, free lunch periods, check-off for union dues and 
other items dealing with workplace conditions (Moe, 2011).  Shanker called for another strike 
and was successful yet again, winning the nation’s first major collective bargaining contract in 
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public education.  Items included in the contract were large pay increases, a responsibility-free 
lunch, and other workplace concessions (Moe, 2011).   
Unions then began to expand the scope of bargaining to also include educational quality.  
“In 1963 the UFT pushed for a reduction in class size and the establishment of a special 
enrichment program for ghetto schools, which the union helped design, called More Effective 
Schools” (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010, p. 13).  Some were opposed to the idea of negotiating 
educational quality.  Myron Lieberman felt it was ridiculous to explain the scope of bargaining, 
saying it is like the United Auto Workers negotiating over the “price of cars, their color, and 
safety features” (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).  Shanker responded by saying that “unlike 
autoworkers, teachers are blamed when things go wrong” (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010, p. 
13).  It became difficult to determine what would and would not be negotiable.  The UFT went 
on strike for 14 days over educational quality issues with the unions’ slogan boasting, “Teachers 
Want What Children Need” (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010, p. 14).  To this day, the issue has 
never been fully resolved, yet it continues to resurface (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).   
The collective bargaining contract was a huge win for the union and created a shift in 
power.  “The NEA was put on notice that, if it didn’t convert itself into a union and compete for 
teachers, the AFT was going to win over the entire constitution” (Moe, 2011, p. 47).  The NEA 
formally declared itself as a union in 1969 and went head-to-head with the American Federation 
of Teachers in disputes (Moe, 2011).  The NEA reversed its views from opposing to supporting 
strikes and collective bargaining (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).  Because of its nationwide 
presence, the NEA was able to maintain its stature as the leading force in American public 
education (Moe, 2011). 
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 A second revolution was called by Shanker in 1980 in which teachers would bargain for 
improved education (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).  Ronald Reagan was a candidate for 
election to the U. S. presidency at that time and was very vocal about being anti-union and anti-
public education (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).  Regan’s administration sponsored the report, 
A Nation at Risk, which critiqued America’s public schools (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).    
Shanker decided to use A Nation at Risk as a way to push collective bargaining to new heights.  
Shanker felt that the only way to preserve public education in the United States and improve the 
status of teachers as professionals was to go beyond collective bargaining (Hannaway & 
Rotherham, 2010).  As part of his second revolution plan, Shanker came up with ideas for a few 
changes in education.  He endorsed a controversial program in which teachers peer reviewed one 
another (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).  This program caught on because some of Florida’s 
school districts had implemented peer review into teacher evaluations as part of Senate Bill 736’s 
new evaluation system (Senate Bill 736: How will it affect me?, 2016). 
 Unions have come a long way from the Shanker era and union reforms.  By the early 21st 
century, public sector union employees outnumbered private ones.  35.9 percent of public 
employees belonged to unions in 2012 while only 6.6 percent of private employees. (Johnson, 
Musial, Hall, Gollnick, & Dupuis, 2008).  The National Educational Association (NEA) is the 
largest teacher organization with over 3.2 million members to date (National Education 
Association, 2016).  The American Federation of Teachers (AFT) is the second largest today 
represents 1.6 million members in more than 3,000 local affiliates nationwide (American 
Federation of Teachers, 2016).  The number of union members in the NEA and AFT alone shows 
just how powerful these unions have become.   
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 There are over 3,000 local affiliates of the AFT and 83 NEA affiliated unions (AFT, 2017 
& NEA, 2017), engaged in collective bargaining throughout the 20th century which expanded the 
scope of rights, protections, and benefits contained within collective bargaining agreements 
(Bascia & Osmond, 2012).  “Today there are 32 states that mandate collective bargaining, 5 that 
expressly prohibit it, and 13 that allow it (if both teachers and managements agree to it)” 
(Vachon & Ma, 2015, p. 394).   
Summary of Teacher Rights 
The history of teacher unions reveals the progress teachers have made with the assistance 
of unions.  Teachers were once poorly paid, fired for being married or pregnant, and victimized 
in other unprofessional and unfair ways which is what led unions to fight for job security and 
higher pay.  Teachers needed to ensure that they had protection from unfair and arbitrary 
treatment.  Collective bargaining and strikes were illegal, however, making it difficult to 
leverage school boards. Shanker reminded all concerned when he said, “there would be no 
teachers’ unions today if we did not defy the law” (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010, p. 15). 
Unions started illegally striking to put pressure on public officials to come to an agreement. 
Collective bargaining started taking root in 1960 when states started to pass legislation 
permitting bargaining (Vachon & Ma, 2015).  As the growth of collective bargaining increased, 
so did the growth of teacher unions and union membership.  Unions engaging in collective 
bargaining expanded the scope of rights of collective bargaining agreements and will continue to 
do so today and in the future.  “The labor movement built by workers in the United States over 
the past century is still a strong base for working class advances and strengthening of collective 
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bargaining in years to come” (Compa, 2014, p. 98).  Collective bargaining in the 21st century and 
in the future, rests upon the foundation built by the struggles and advances of the labor 
movement fought by workers over the last 100 years.   
The Florida Context 
 This section focuses on public education in Florida by reviewing Florida’s unique 
characteristics and policy context.  Given the scale and scope of public schooling in Florida, as 
well as its status as a leader with regards to educational reform, the state represents an ideal 
context within which to examine the issues of concern to this project (Bormna & Dorn, 2007).  
The first part of this section will give a general overview of public education in Florida 
discussing the state and its student population, state funding, and education reform.  The second 
part of this section will be an overview of the policy context in Florida discussing teacher 
contracts and collective bargaining.    
Demographic and Policy in Florida 
 Florida became the third most populous state in the nation by adding an average of 803 
new resident a day between 2013 and 2014, passing New York (United States Census Bureau 
Reports, 2014).  Florida’s growth, which enabled it to surpass New York, was fueled by a 
growing economy and housing market (Smith & Rayer, 2013).  As of 2016, the U.S. Census 
estimated the population in Florida to be 20,612,439 people which was 341,167 more people 
than the 2015 population estimate.  Population growth in Florida is forecasted to continue 
strengthening, showing increasing rates of growth averaging 1.4% between 2015 and 2020 (The 
Florida Legislator office of economic and Demographic Research).   
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 The number of students enrolled in Florida public schools has been growing every year 
since 2012 with a diverse student enrollment.  For the 2016-2017 school year, out of 2,816,824 
students that were enrolled in a public school, 61.3% were members of a race other than white, 
58% were considered to have an economic disadvantage and 10.4% were considered English 
language learner (ELL) status (Student enrolment, 2017).  School enrollment of Hispanic 
students at all levels grew 35.5% in the 10 years from 2005 to 2015.  Immigration has been a 
major factor for the rapidly expanding school population and higher percentage of minority 
students (Weaver-Dunne, 2000).  This is especially true in Miami-Dade County, one of the 
largest school districts in the country, where 41% of the county’s schools are overcrowded 
(Weaver-Dunne, 2000).  
 Class size reduction has been a focus in Florida since the passing of Amendment 9 to 
Florida’s Constitution in 2002.2  Amendment 9 states that the number of students assigned to 
each public school teacher shall be no more than: (a) 18 for pre-K to grade 3 (b) 22 for grades 4 
to 8 (c) 25 for grades 9 to 12.  Three months after Florida voters approved the class size 
reduction, Governor Jeb Bush requested spending of $3 billion a year to meet the new 
requirements and to be used for building new schools, allowing more students to transfer 
schools, recruiting and adding more teachers, retention, professional development for teachers, 
and anything else to help meet the required mandate (Canedy, 2003; Normore & Ilon, 2006).   
 For the 2014-2015 school year, there were reportedly 180,442.27 full-time public school 
teachers in Florida with the US average being 61,419 teachers (US Department of Education).  
                                                 
2 Per the Florida’s state constitution in Section 1, Article IX, establishes final goals as noted for the beginning of the 
2010 school year.  
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For that same year, 2,756,944 total public students were enrolled making the pupil/teacher ratio 
for 2014-2016 school year 15.28 (US Department of Education).  Reducing class size is the most 
expensive state input that affects student achievement (Normore & Ilon, 2006).  Despite this 
being the case, the state of Florida ranks near the bottom among states in per-capita education 
spending (Canedy, 2003).   
 Florida has a state funding formula that is lengthy and complex making it difficult for the 
public to understand facts about education funding without having accounting knowledge (Aud, 
2006).  Taxpayers want to know where their tax money is going but have little knowledge of 
how education funding is spent, what portions of the money are raised from which sources, and 
how the funding is distributed among diverse types of students (Aud, 2006).   
 “About 10 percent of tax revenue for Florida schools comes from the federal government, 
45 percent from the state and 45 percent from local sources.  A small amount comes from non-
tax sources” (Aud, 2006).  About two-thirds of all funding were distributed through the Florida 
Education Finance Program (FEFP) (Aud, 2006, p. 3).  The Florida Legislature established the 
Education Enhancement Trust Fund, which includes the net proceeds of the Florida Lottery and 
the tax proceeds from slot machines in Broward and Miami-Dade counties (Funding for Florida 
School Districs Statistical Report, 2013-14).  The FEFP is based on actual student enrolment and 
is used as the primary means of funding the operating costs of Florida school districts  (Funding 
for Florida School Districs Statistical Report, 2013-14).   
 Spending on education Florida has steadily risen in the past decade since 2006 (Aud, 
2006).  For the 2016-2017 school year, the Florida Department of Education appropriated 
35 
 
$7,178 per student, the highest FEFP funding level in Florida history (State board of education 
2015-16 legislative budget request, 2014).  The legislative budget request for the 2015-16 school 
year was $12.82 billion which was a $346.278 million increase from the year before (Funding 
for Florida School Districs Statistical Report, 2013-14).  Only Medicaid receives a larger portion 
of the budget and has a greater cost to the state than K-12 education (Mann & Calabro, 2017).  A 
couple of the 2015-2016 budget request priorities were a $40 million funding increase for digital 
classrooms, and additional funds for repair and maintenance of public school facilities (Funding 
for Florida School Districs Statistical Report, 2013-14).  After Governor Jeb Bush took office in 
Florida in January 1999 expenditures went from $5,701 per student in 1999 to $6,450 in 2002 
which is a $300 per student or 5.3 percent growth (Aud, 2006).  
 Throuout the late 1900s and 2000s, Florida implemented new education reforms 
commonly known as the “Florida Formula for Education Success” or simply, the “Florida 
Formula”, also known as the  “A+ Program” (Carlo, 2015). Govenor Jeb Bush enacted a set of 
education reforms emphasizing increased test-based accountablity, competition, increased 
standards, and school choice (Carlo, 2015).  Govenor Bush’s “Formula” includes: (1) A grading 
system from “A” to “F” that holds schools accountable,  (2) Allows parents to have school 
choice programs and scholarship options for students at “F” school,s (3) Higher standards for 
graduation and grade promotions, (4) Allows schools to have more flexibility in their spending 
of performance pay, (5) New teacher evaluations and alternative teaching certifications, (6) 
Schools must be child centered as opposed to school or district centers (Carlo, 2015; Horne, 
2004).  Florida became one of the first states to adopt its own school grading system, which is 
now ubiquitous throughout the nation (Carlo, 2015).  In addtion, the Florida Comprehensive 
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Assessment Test (FCAT) was expanded to include Sunshine State standards-based and norm-
referenced assessments of reading and math in grades 3 through 10; students who scored low on 
the FCAT were placed on an improvement plan (Carlo, 2015).  The bar was raised in 2003 to 
include students with disabilities and English Language Learners (ELL) (Horne, 2004).  There 
has been a push to advocate for a similar implementation in other states (Carlo, 2015).   
 Jeb Bush’s brother George Bush became President two years into his brother’s term and 
promoted some of the same policies of the A+ program at the federal level with the “No Child 
Left Behind Act” (NCLB) of 2001 (Bormna & Dorn, 2007).  The NCLB requires states to 
evaulate the performances of all public school students in order to determine Adequate Yearly 
Progress (AYP) (Horne, 2004).  Florida’s approved accountablity plan uses the same FCAT 
scores and defintions of “grade level” used in the A+ plan (Horne, 2004).  The growth model in 
the A+ program allowed Florida to incorporate student growth in determining AYP (Horne, 
2004).  Florida’s school grading system contained the components of annual learning gains, an 
orginial component of the A+ program.   
 Prior to the NCLB and A+ program, in 1995, the Florida school accountability system 
was named “Critically Low Schools” (Horne, 2004).  Florida identified 158 schools as criticlaly 
low performning schools in reading, math, and writing for two years in a row (Horne, 2004).  
These critically low schools received additonal assistance and most schools did not remain on the 
list because of their improvement in just one subject area, writing (Horne, 2004).  In 1996, 
Florida adopted the Sunshine State Standards, Florida’s curriculm framework.  In 1998, the first 
FCAT was administered to students (Horne, 2004).  School results were reported yet not used for 
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accountability in 1998 (Horne, 2004).  The FCAT helped shape education reform in Florida by 
raising standards with increased accountability.      
 Florida ranked 28th overall with a grade of C compated to the grade of D+ that the nation 
as a whole earned on the Quality Counts state of American Education report card (Chalk, 2015).  
It was found that minority students in Florida perform better than and have a smaller 
acheivement gap from white students as compared to other states.  Florida was ranked poorly in 
educational spending with a grade of F (Chalk, 2015; Canedy, 2003).             
Rights and Responsibilities of Florida Teachers 
The rights and responsibilities of Florida teachers are codified in federal and state statutes 
and regulations, local laws, and school district contracts (Johnson, Musial, Hall, Gollnick, & 
Dupuis, 2008).  Of most direct relevance to this study are the rights and responsibilities of 
teachers as specified in teacher contracts.  The following sub-sections highlight relevant aspects 
of teacher contracts in general and of collective bargaining and unions (including discussion of 
conflict resolution and unfair labor practices). 
Contracts, agreements, and statues give teachers certain rights beyond the constructional 
rights and state statute and are considered property interests of teachers (Alexander & Alexander, 
2012).  The superintendent will recommend terms for contracting employees, and all 
instructional staff will receive contracts with a provision for an emergency exception (Florida 
Statutue §1012.32).  There are different contract terms a teacher may attain, such as an annual 
contracts and tenure contracts.  At the time of the present study, all new teachers were being 
issued annual contracts that last for no longer than a school year (Florida Statute § 1012.3).  
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Teachers who have had tenure contracts written before July 1, 2011 have been grandfathered and 
can continue to work under those contracts (The 2016 Florida Statute, 2016).  Tenure contracts 
are continuing contracts that allow teachers to teach in a district for as long as he or she chooses 
to teach unless they are dismissed after due process of legally specified reasons (Johnson et al., 
2008).   
Senate Bill 736, the Student Success Act, no longer allowed Florida teachers to receive 
tenure contracts if they were hired after July 1, 2011.  The Student Success Act was the first bill 
that Governor Rick Scott signed to fix Florida’s economy as part of his 7-7-7 plan, seven steps to 
create 700,000 jobs in 7 years (Staff, 2011).  Governor Scott considered that tenure is a costly 
decision with lifetime employment estimated to cost $3 million (Curtis & Wurtzel, 2010).  
Senate Bill 736 brought about a new annual evaluation system for all teachers using four distinct 
levels of effectiveness:  highly effective, effective, needs improvement, and unsatisfactory (FEA, 
2016).  Teachers were evaluated in two parts, classroom evaluation and student learning growth 
data.  Also, teachers hired on or after July 1, 2014 were paid an evaluation performance rating 
salary (§1012.33).  With the performance salary schedule or merit pay, teachers were expected to 
get pay increases based on performance rating (Staff, 2011).  An Annual Contract teacher rated 
as effective must receive a salary increase at least 50% but not greater than 75% of that of a 
highly effective teacher (§1012.22).  Teachers rated as needs improvement or unsatisfactory 
would receive no salary increase (§1012.22). The new salary schedule only applied to annual 
teachers unless a tenured teacher gave up their tenured contracts to be eligible to receive the new 
pay schedule (§1012.33).  For this reason, there were two salary schedules, one for tenured 
contracted teachers and another for annual contracted teachers (§1012.33).   
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Although in theory the idea of teachers being rewarded for their hard work was 
appealing, some school districts have not been financially able to keep up with the new 
performance salary pay (Mackenzie, 2015).  As an example, in Brevard County, a half-cent sales 
tax was passed, and teachers hoped that they would be able to use the money to pay for their 
performance scale.  The proceeds were used instead for critical improvements to school facilities 
and educational technology needs as described in a school board resolution adopted in 2012 
(Ballot Language, 2012).  Teachers were frustrated with their school system for not reopening 
compensation negotiations after not receiving a salary increase in light of the passage of the half-
cent sale tax  (Mackenzie, 2015). 
Some would argue that the pay-for-performance model is business-like and that schools 
are not businesses.  Vollmer (2010) argued against treating schools like businesses and he 
believed that teachers were too protected by tenure and that teachers needed accountability to get 
them motivated.  He changed his mind, however, when he realized that unlike business’ products 
in a store, schools cannot send back kids or trade them in, schools must take what the parents 
send (Vollmer, 2010).  Under the present evaluation plan, a teacher teaching high-needs students 
or those with disabilities is evaluated the same as a teacher that happens to have gifted students.   
 Teachers not only do not have direct control over the type of students they receive, they 
also cannot directly control their students’ attendance or attrition patterns.  It is not possible to 
teach to students who are not present. “High levels of student turnover exacerbate the problem of 
quality control.  This constant churning undermines the validity of any accountability system, 
that tracts the progress of groups as opposed to individuals” (Vollmer, 2010, p. 22).   For this 
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reason, Volmer (2010) has expressed the opinion that teacher evaluations are unreliable and 
should not have any value at all.   
 Having every teacher, including tenured teachers, evaluated can also be an advantage.  
Tenured teachers rated unsatisfactory two consecutive or two of three years will be placed on an 
annual contact and then dismissed if not rated higher (Senate Bill 736).  In this respect, the new 
evaluation system is proactive in striving to remove unsatisfactory teachers from tenured rolls 
who should not be teaching students. 
An example of unsatisfactory teachers teaching students can be seen in the documentary, 
Waiting for Superman (Guggenheim, 2014).  Tenured teachers have been shown neglecting 
students, not teaching, and reading newspapers during class (Guggenheim D, 2010). 
Superintendents have tried firing neglectful teachers but have been unsuccessful (Guggenheim, 
2010).  Another issue that has given tenure a bad reputation, is dubbed the “lemon dance”, that 
schools do with one another (Guggenheim, 2010). Schools essentially swap their poor 
performing tenured teachers for other schools’ poor performing tenured teachers in the hope that 
they will be an improvement (Guggenheim, 2010).  Tenure contracted teachers have security 
with their job from capricious action or political motive with the right to protection from 
dismissal, and the right to prescribed procedures (Johnson et al.,2008).  Annual contracted 
teachers do not have this sort of protection. 
 Annual teacher in Florida can be rated highly effective yet still may  not receive a 
renewed contract or the right to know reasons for their nonrenewal (Johnson et al., 2008 ; Senate 
Bill 736, 2016).  The Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth (1972) case involved the issue 
of property rights of non-tenure teacher contracts.  In this case, a teacher had been hired for a 
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school year and was given no particular reason for their non-renewal because the teacher did not 
have a property interest.   
Understanding state statutes, county school board rules, collective bargaining agreements, 
and the Constitution will help teachers to determine and protect their rights and responsibilities 
as teachers. Freedom of expression, academic freedom, and freedom of association, and due 
process rights are important rights a teacher has and should be aware of.  Freedom of expression 
is implicit in the First Amendment and is a Constitutional right for public school teachers; 
however, this freedom is not absolute.  The expression of teachers has been limited, in that 
teachers must have some public concern and not just personal with expression (Murray & 
Murray, 2014).   
Public school elementary school teachers have little say on what will be taught in the 
classrooms and therefore little academic freedom.  “Academic freedom is the opportunity for a 
teacher to teach without coercion, censorship, or other restrictive interference” (Johnson et al., 
2008, p. 207).  Given the pressure of high-stakes tests and standards, teachers may feel that they 
have little control over what will be taught in the classroom.  Everything a teacher plans in the 
classroom must align with state standards therefore, teachers do not have “unlimited liberty” 
(Alexander & Alexander, 2012).  One area where elementary public school teachers actually do 
have academic freedom is in their teaching methods.  Teachers all have different ways of 
delivering lessons to students.  It is common to see teachers teach the same subject matter 
differently.   
Teachers have some freedom with their own personal appearance because it falls under 
the umbrella of freedom of expression, however counties usually set guidelines for employees to 
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follow.  For example, teachers desire to express this freedom of expression via their clothing, but 
if the teacher comes to school wearing an inappropriate outfit and it creates a disruption in the 
class, the teacher can be told to wear something else.  As inferred in the Bill of Rights First and 
Fourth Amendments, teachers have the right to privacy with personal matters such as 
relationships, family, religion, and other factors of their personal lives outside of work unless it 
violates state interests.  If teachers’ rights are revoked, they would then have the right to due 
process of law under the Fifth Amendment.  Federal, state, and county laws must all abide by a 
teacher’s rights afforded to them by the Constitution.  All laws of the state and rules of the 
county should never contradict the United States Constitution.   
Collective Bargaining and Unions in Florida  
A Collective bargaining agreement is a legal document that governs the relationship 
between employers and employees.  In the case of teacher collective bargaining, the two 
negotiating parties are the school board and the school board union.  The school board is legally 
responsible for representing the taxpayers’ interest while also balancing the interest of the 
parents, students, employees and the districts’ educational program (Lieberman, 1997).   The 
other negotiation party is the teacher union or labor organization which represents the interest of 
the employees and is the exclusive bargaining agent of the teacher bargaining unit (Lieberman, 
1997).  
A contract negotiated by a teacher union means that bargaining topics such as salaries, 
working conditions, and other matters within the scope of the collective bargaining agreement 
can no longer be decided unilaterally by the school administrator and board of education.  
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Instead, the contract outlines how the teacher union and its members will participate in 
formulating the school policies and programs under which they work. (Johnson et al., 2008).  
Collective bargaining can be integrative if the union and the school board can a find common 
interest in the groups and solve issues by benefiting both parties (Walton & McKersie, 1991).  
The final agreement limits the employer from changing the terms which have been agreed upon 
in the contract and lays out the responsibilities of employees (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010). 
Hornick-Lockard (2015) found that 45 of 50 states were able to use collective bargaining 
for negotiating items such as better wages and working conditions. Florida is one of the 45 states 
which has mandated collective bargaining within the public schools under Florida Statute § 447. 
The Bureau of Labor and Statistics has 199 teacher collective bargaining contracts on file with 
the average length of the contracts in this sample being 105 pages long (Hannaway & 
Rotherham, 2010). 
 Collective bargaining generally falls within two categories, traditional bargaining, also 
called zero-sum bargaining, and collaborative-based bargaining (CBB), also called interest-based 
bargaining (IBB) (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).  In traditional bargaining, there are two 
parties with conflicting positions which, in the end, make some type of agreement (Hannaway & 
Rotherham, 2010).  In interest-based bargaining, communication is key to success, along with 
flexibility, problem-solving between the two groups, and discovering common ground 
(Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).  In interest-based bargaining the two parties discuss their 
concerns with one another to come up with a mutual ground (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).  
Interest-based bargaining works because teachers and the school board can each benefit from 
certain things like high-performing schools.  Thus, the two parties can work together to figure 
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out their shared concerns (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).  It is common for negotiations to 
encompass both traditional bargaining and collaborative bargaining (Hannaway & Rotherham, 
2010).  With the union and the school board having conflicting interests it is not a surprise that 
most interactions that occurs at the bargaining table between the union and the school board are 
those involving cooperation and conflict (Lieberman, 1997)  
 Vachon and Ma’s (2015) multilevel random intercept models have been used to examine 
the effects of professional union items and industrial union items, both of which have been 
commonly involved in labor negotiations.  The industrial or economic models of unionism “are 
believed to influence the supply of teachers.  For example, greater compensation should attract 
and retain more highly qualified teachers” (Vachon & Ma, 2015, p. 392).  The professional or 
noneconomic models of unionism deals with issues of class size and teacher autonomy which 
can affect the learning environment created by teachers (Vachon & Ma, 2015).  Union topics 
negotiated fall either into the professional or industrial models of unionism. 
An existing bargaining unit usually begins the bargaining with the board a few months 
prior to the expiration date of an existing agreement (Murray & Murray, 2014).  The bargaining 
parties are usually teams between 3 to 10 persons including a chief negotiator for each party who 
usually does the speaking, and sometimes an actual employee as part of the union team (Murray 
& Murray, 2014).  A state affiliate local employee organization aid is sometimes selected over an 
actual employee to help because of their experience, expertise and willingness to serve on the 
bargaining team (Murray & Murray, 2014).     
At the first negotiation meeting, the two parties will usually discuss rules of procedure 
and attempt to explain their proposals (Murray & Murray, 2014).  The rules of procedure include 
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all the ground rules such as how many people allowed on each negotiating team, a schedule of 
when and where to meet, and how press releases will be handled (Murray & Murray, 2014).  The 
union usually presents their wage, benefits, and conditions of employment in their initial 
proposal (Murray & Murray, 2014).  The school board will usually try to avoid including 
benefits and wages in their proposal, and instead will usually focus on language items that are 
included in public employer’s rights (Murray & Murray, 2014).   
After the first meeting, the parties will prepare for the negotiation for their next meeting 
by reviewing the proposals that were presented to them (Murray & Murray, 2014).  Items that are 
approved by each side will be marked TA (for a tentative agreement) so that these items can be 
re-negotiated at a later time with items such as wages and benefits, which are usually the last 
details to be finalized (Murray & Murray, 2014).     
 While the union team is in the process of negotiating, they report the progress that is 
being made to their members and to the executive committee of the union (Lieberman, 1997). 
The report includes what the board is opposing and agreeing to so that union members are 
prepared for defeat or compromise in areas (Lieberman, 1997).  The union reporter should utilize 
the board’s argument during negations to explain the unattainable items to union members 
(Lieberman, 1997).  Reporting to union members not only shows members their efforts, it also 
sets realistic expectations.  “A skillful union team, just like its board counterpart, is aware that 
negations are marked by slow, incremental movement, shaped by compromise, timing, and 
political reality” (Lieberman, 1997, p. 13).  
As the bargaining process progresses and an agreement is finally reached between the 
two parties over the entire collective bargaining contract, the tentative agreement is then 
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presented in written form, signed by both the CEO and the bargaining agent, for ratification by 
both the public employer and the public employees (Florida Statute §447.309).  Florida Statute 
§447.309 states that the employers and employees must approve the tentative agreement with a 
majority vote.  The statue states that if it is not approved by both parties, they are to return to the 
negotiating table.  Once accepted by both parties, the tentative agreement then becomes a 
working master contract. 
The Role of Unions in Collective Bargaining  
The union is the driving force in collective bargaining and its performance in this mode is 
the crucial test for its value to the members of the union (Lieberman, 1997).  The main purpose 
of teacher unions is to protect the interests and rights of their members, the teachers, from 
arbitrary exercise of power by heavy-handed administration (Ravitch, 2006).  According to Steve 
Perry (2011), teacher unions’ three main goals are, “(1) negotiating working conditions through 
contracts with the municipalities, (2) defending teachers who have been reprimanded/negatively 
evaluated, and (3) supporting political candidates and legislation that will make it easier for them 
to do (1) and (2)” (p.145).  Unions give teachers that voice and a way to get teachers involved in 
politics.  Teacher unions are intended to improve working conditions for teachers in the advance 
of public education.  
There are national, statewide, and local union organizations.  The National Education 
Association (NEA) and American Federation of Teachers (AFT) are the nation’s two largest 
teacher unions with a combined membership of 4.6 million (Hornick-Lockard, 2015).  Local 
teacher unions are almost always affiliated with the national union’s NEA and AFT as well as 
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with a statewide union (Lieberman, 2000).  In Florida, the statewide union is the Florida 
Education Association (FEA) which is affiliated with both the NEA and the AFT (FEA, 2016).  
The FEA works with local unions “to provide a comprehensive range of member benefits and 
services, including legislative advocacy, legal services and professional development” (About 
FEA, 2016).  Local unions often utilize state associations professional negotiators (Lieberman, 
2000).   
 Even though bargaining varies widely from school district to school district, local unions, 
school boards, and teachers will often compare their contracts to other local union contracts 
(Lieberman, 1997).  If the majority of other associations in the area has successfully negotiated 
for dental plans, for example, then achieving dental will be of upmost importance to the other 
associations that do not have it (Lieberman, 2000).  The union that is the forerunner of benefits 
will try to maintain its status as the pioneer of local unions (Lieberman, 2000).  When unions set 
contract goals, they usually take into consideration what other local unions have achieved 
(Lieberman, 2000).  The school board takes the union’s proposal and then compares it to other 
school districts’ benefits.  If the school board decides to offer smaller benefits, there is a good 
chance that the union will focus on negotiating those issues (Lieberman, 2000). 
The accomplishments of other unions are important only if the membership accepts them 
as some of their own goals because the union goals are an expression of its members 
(Lieberman, 2000).  “The union’s bargaining team often initiates the process of achieving unity 
before it enters into negotiation” (Lieberman, 2000, p. 13).  Unions face challenges by rival 
unions and pressure to achieve teacher benefits (Lieberman, 2000).  Unions will often poll the 
membership to determine what are the most popular changes wanted and then negotiate for it 
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(Lieberman, 2000).  The board will also figure out who will be affected by the proposal and what 
influence they have within the bargaining unit (Lieberman, 2000).  The union is looking for 
approval from their members by studying and understanding the membership diversity 
(Lieberman, 2000). 
Each employee has different needs based on their job description and on their personal 
lives.  For example, teachers, librarians, nurses, and high school teachers will all have different 
working conditions as well as unique problems that are not shared by all the other members in 
the union (Lieberman, 2000).  For example, senior teachers may want better retirement benefits 
while younger teachers may want higher salaries.  What needs to happen to resolve these 
differences is for the union leadership and its bargaining team to create unity amid the diversity 
(Lieberman, 2000).  The more their diverse needs are met in the tentative settlement, the more 
likely the union members will approve it (Lieberman, 2000).  This is important because under 
Florida Statute § 447.309, employees voting in the unit must approve the tentative settlement by 
a majority vote.  
While the unions’ main purpose is to improve the terms and conditions of teacher 
employment, the unions’ “true objective” is the unions’ continued existence as an effective 
organization (Lieberman, 2000).  Of course, while this objective is usually consistent with 
teacher best interests, when there is conflict between the teacher welfare and the union welfare, 
the union welfare will trump the teacher welfare most of the time (Lieberman, 2000).  For 
example, if there is only room in the budget for either salary increases for teachers or an agency 
fee clause for the union, the union will choose the agency fee clause (Lieberman, 2000). 
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An understanding of the mind frame that the school board and the union have when 
coming to the negotiation table helps in understanding how negotiations are handled.  It is 
especially important for the school board to have this understanding for the school board to be 
able to set realistic bargaining expectations, plan effective bargaining strategies, and to develop a 
school board and union relationship that will aid in the bargaining process (Lieberman, 2000). 
Conflict Resolution  
If an agreement cannot be made, the two sides would then enter into the conflict 
resolution process which is a rare because most conflicts are actually settled before this process 
starts (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).  However, it does happen when one or both sides declare 
themselves at impasse (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).  Districts, at this point, usually extend 
the terms of the existing contract because, under the Florida Constitution, Article 1, section 6, 
Right to Work, teachers are prohibited from striking as long as the contract is in effect.   
Florida Statute § 447.403 provides various methods for conflict resolution including 
mediation, fact-finding, and binding arbitration.  Mediation is the mostly widely used impasse 
resolution procedure.  This is when both parties present their positions to a neutral third party, a 
mediator, for assistance in resolution of an impasse.   Florida Statute § 447.403 states that one or 
both parties appoint a mediator to assist in the resolution of an impasse.  
According to Florida Statute § 447.403 if mediation is unsuccessful, the two parties 
would then present, at length, the facts of their dispute to a special magistrate to determine a 
formal non-binding recommendation.  Fact-finding is something that neither party wants to end 
up with because the process is grueling and costly for both sides as well as tedious because of the 
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large amount of preparation that is needed (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).  The magistrate’s 
determination is typically only advisory, however, and if the two parties still do not agree, the 
disputed impasse is finally resolved by the legislative body (§447.403).   
Binding arbitration is used in a few states as the method of last resort for contract 
negotiations, and then only rarely (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).  Florida uses a similar 
method except is considered as non-binding arbitration under Florida Statute § 44.103.  Florida 
Statute § 44.103 states that the hearing will be conducted informally with presentation of 
testimony and evidence kept to a minimum.  Putting the agreement in someone else’s hand is 
something that both parties try to avoid, however, but can be used as a tool if there are no other 
better options available.  The threat of having to go through fact-finding and then binding and/or 
non-binding arbitration can force the two parties to come to some sort of agreement so that they 
can avoid going through the harrowing process of arbitration (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).  
Once the two parties have come to terms and have created a contract, the contract is then 
sent to the school board and to the teachers for ratification (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).  If 
the bargaining team is unsuccessful in persuading the membership that the tentative agreement 
represents the best achievable agreement, the settlement will not be ratified (Lieberman, 2000).  
However, if the union is successful in persuading the membership, once ratified, and an 
agreement has been made, the two parties set a time frame that the agreement will remain 
effective, usually three to four years (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).  Longer contracts often 
specify salaries for only a year or two, and then provide for the parties to reopen the salary 
negotiation after that time (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).   
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If for some reason, a contract needs to be reopened prior to its expiration, it is usually 
only for minor changes in which impact bargaining occurs (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010; 
Lieberman, 2010).  Unlike a full contract, impact bargaining is not formally ratified, however it 
still needs to be approved by the school board and the governing body stipulated in the union’s 
constitution just like a full contract (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010). 
Unfair Labor Practice and the Status of Right to Strike  
Florida school board negotiators must avoid all unfair labor practices that are listed under 
Florida Statute § 447.501.  A failure to bargain in good faith is illegal but it is important to note 
that “hard bargaining” is completely legal (Lieberman, 2000).  In hard bargaining, each party 
tries to get as much as they can from the weakness of the other party while still wanting to reach 
terms that are not outrageous (Lieberman, 2000). 
Public school teachers in Florida do not have the right to strike.  Some believe that 
teachers who strike are exhibiting extreme unprofessional behavior and create a disruption to 
education by not allowing a school to run efficiently (Johnson et al., 2008).  Others have 
supported striking as a last resort after other routes have been tried and fail.  Regardless of one’s 
viewpoint, striking in Florida is still illegal and teachers will incur severe consequences such as 
termination or probation if they decided to participate in a strike (§ 447.507).   
Collective Bargaining and Contractual Agreements  
Contractual agreements were once offered to teachers on a “take it or leave it” basis 
(Lieberman, 1997).  Teacher unionization has helped change that and one of the ways was 
through collective bargaining (Lieberman, 1997).  Collective bargaining is a process to create a 
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contractual agreement that outlines the rights and obligations of teachers and the school board 
(Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).  Contractual agreements range from a simple short document 
to long detailed agreements with all different duration dates (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010; 
Lieberman, 1997).  When a change to the education workplace is wanted, collective bargaining 
is an indispensable tool for the union to use to benefit every Florida educator.    
Collective bargaining is a newer topic of research of which we know little about (Anzia 
& Moe, 2014; Lewin, Keefe, & Kochan, 2012).  There is a small amount of quantitative 
literature involving collective bargaining agreements which tend to focus more on the 
relationship between collective bargaining and social outcomes (Carni, 2008; Freeman, 2012; 
Anzia & Moe, 2014; Nelson & Rosen, 1996; Vachon & Ma, 2015).  The influence that is usually 
questioned in most of these studies is to determine if there is a correlation between collective 
bargaining and student achievement (Anzia & Moe, 2014).  Recent research on collective 
bargaining agreements now focuses more on the potential influence of the provisions in 
collective bargaining agreements (Goldhaber, Lavery, & Theobald, 2014).  Anzia and Moe 
(2014) cite 14 studies dedicated to quantitative studies and state that the literature is scarce, 
uneven in quality, diverse in methods and mixed in findings.  Vachon and MA (2015), Carini 
(2008), Munk’s (1998), Goldhaber and Theobald’s (2014), Koshi and Horng (2007), Freeman 
(2010), Hoxby (1996)  have found conflicting evidence on whether unions impact school 
districts and students. 
 Carni (2008), Nelson and Rosen (1996), Steelman, Powell, and Carini (2000) studies 
focus on the relationship between teacher unions and student achievement, Vachon and Ma 
(2015) research the channels or mechanisms through which unions might actually impact 
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achievement.  Their study examines the effects of two commonly negotiated categories in 
collective bargaining agreements, industrial and professional union items, on student math scores 
by using a multilevel random intercept model.  The authors claim that this study is the first to test 
student achievement empirically at a national level.  The sample includes 6,791 students from 
799 public schools.  Vachon and Ma (2015) found that teacher unions are most beneficial to 
middle and high achieving students.  Through collective bargaining, teachers have higher 
salaries, credentialing, and greater autonomy which lead to improve student (Vachon & Ma, 
2015).   
 Another study that utilizes the hierarchical linear modeling to examine the union-
achievement effect was done by Vachon and Ma (2015).  Carini (2008) and Vachon and MA 
(2015) state that this is the only other study they have found that with that objective.  This study 
uses the same data source as Vachon and Ma (2015) study by using a national data source called 
the National Education Longitudinal Study (NELS) from 1990 and 1988 when students were in 
the tenth and eighth grades (Carni, 2008).  Vachon and Ma’s study only looks at math scores, the 
data base, reading, history, and science.  The study found that bargaining was not associated with 
lower student achievement (Carni, 2008). 
Munk’s 1998 study at the Mackinac Center for Public Policy, a non-profit think tank, 
claims to be the first ever in to systematically analyze the hundreds of collective bargaining 
agreements for every school district in a state (Munk, 1998).  This study examines the impact 
that collective bargaining has on Michigan’s K-12 public education.  To improve education for 
students, the study gives recommendations for the union to add into their collective bargaining 
contracts (Munk, 1998).  The study identifies eight key provisions that commonly hinder the 
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educational process and can be improved and then reviews seven court rulings on collective 
bargaining agreement.  The purpose of this study, just like most studies on collective bargaining 
agreements, is to promote students and teachers by making recommendations to improve 
contract language.  Teacher salary, seniority, fringe benefits, are reviewed in contracts and then 
the study was ultimately reviewed by professionals working in education to ensure accuracy.    
Goldhaber and Theobald’s (2014) more recent study has also examined every collective 
bargaining agreement in Washington State.  Using every collective bargaining agreement in 
Washington, Goldhaber and Theobald (2014) explore the relationship between the restrictiveness 
of a bargaining contract in one district and the restrictiveness of contracts in nearby districts.  
Unlike most studies on collective bargaining that question the potential influence of the 
provisions in collective bargaining contracts on achievement, this study asks what factors 
influence the provisions that end up in these agreements.  Goldhaber and Theobald (2014) coded 
each collective bargaining contract from the 2010-2011 school year using a rubric developed by 
Strunk and Reardon (2010).  Goldhaber and Theobald (2014) followed the authors by using a 
partial independence item response (PIIR) model that treats each provision in a contract as if it 
were a response to a survey.  The absence of a given provision within a contract indicated a 
negative response to the question (Strunk & Reardon, 2010). The authors found that spatial 
relationship plays a major role in determining bargaining outcomes.   
Strunk and Reardon (2010) explore the restrictiveness of California contracts in their 
study to determine union strength.  Determining the restrictiveness of contracts is rather common 
for collective bargaining studies.  It is less common to find literature that questions union 
members’ strengths in impacting important decisions which affect collective bargaining 
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agreements.  This is mainly due to the difficulty researchers face in measuring union strength.  
Strunk and Reardon (2010) use collective bargaining agreements negotiated between unions and 
school board to determine union strength compared to the employer.  39 out of 334 contract 
items were used as a response to a survey to measure contract restrictiveness.  Contracts that 
contain outcomes that are more union-friendly indicated that those unions are stronger than 
management (Strunk & Reardon, 2010).  The goal of this study is to create a measure of contract 
restrictiveness for future researchers to examine documents with (Strunk & Reardon, 2010).  
What is different about Strunk and Reardon’s (2010) research is that instead of using survey 
data, collective bargaining agreements are used to measure union strength rather than ability or 
trait.   
Strunk and Reardon (2010) conclude that one district’s collective bargaining agreement 
influences the terms and conditions in other districts bargaining especially when the districts 
have proximity to each other.  A finding is that low poverty school districts are not significantly 
correlated with contract restrictiveness (Goldhaber, Lavery, & Theobald, 2014).  Another study 
done by Strunk and Grimsom (2010) finds that stronger unions lead to less flexibility than do 
contracts in districts with weaker, less active unions.   
A study carried out by Moe (2006), developes an analytical framework for exploring the 
behavioral effects of seniority-based transfer rights.  Just like the Goldhaber and Theobald 
(2014) study and most studies on contracts, coding is used on the collective bargning agreements 
for a large sample of California elementary school districs and then emerical tests are conducted.  
This is considered to be a fixed-effects econometric approach (Moe, Bottom-Up structure: 
Collective bargaining, transfer rights, and the plight of disadvantaged schools, 2006).  It is found 
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that seniority-based transfer rights do indeed affect the way teachers get distributed across 
schools with disadvantaged schools receiving the most inexperienced teachers (Moe, Bottom-Up 
structure: Collective bargaining, transfer rights, and the plight of disadvantaged schools, 2006).  
Koshi and Horng (2007) use Moe’s study as a starting point and model their study by 
using the same basic framework to analyze data from a newer and larger sample.  The sample 
also includes Los Angeles’ middle schools making this study roughly three times larger than that 
of Moe’s study (Anzia & Moe, 2014).  There are some differences in the study such as a 
different coding scheme and a hierarchical linear model approach by Raundenbush & Byrk.  As 
noted earlier, Vachom and Ma (2015) also use a hierarchical linear modeling approach.  Another 
difference is that Koshi and Horng (2007) have an entirely different outcome than Moe (2007).  
What is found is that seniority-based transfer rights do not influence the distribution of 
inexperienced teachers across schools with disadvantaged students (Koski & Horng, 2007).  The 
explanation for two contrasting outcomes could be because of the different approaches that are 
taken:  Koshi and Hong (2007) use a linear model approach but the Moe (2014) study uses a 
fixed-effets econometric approach.   
Anzia and Moe (2014) study is the latest study done on collective barganing 
consequences for seniority-based transfer rules.  As Anzia and Moe (2014) state, “researchers 
have almost never carried out quantitative studies of the contents of labor contracts, their 
implications for organization, and their broader behavioral consequences” (p.100).  Their  
research wants to move in this direction.  This study takes an even more different approach to the 
topic than the previous two authors have taken.  The focus is entirely on teacher experience 
rather than analyzing experience and credentials separately (Anzia & Moe, 2014).  Koshi and 
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Horng’s hierachical linerar model is used with original data sets and all of their original variables 
(Anzia & Moe, 2014).  The sample is slightly different as it is restricted to elementary schools 
and excludes Los Angeles (Anzia & Moe, 2014).  The aim of the study is to clarify the models 
and methods used in other studies and demonstrate that they all actually lead to the same basic 
conclusion about senority-based transfer rights, which is that senority-based transfer rights lead 
to more inexperienced teachers at disadvantaged schoools (Anzia & Moe, 2014).  A similar study 
by Levin and Quinn (2003) finds that transfer policies in collective bargaining agreements causes 
urban districts to hire teachers much later than districts in the suburbs.  These conclusions could 
possibly be an explanation for the unequal and unfair distribution of experienced teachers.   
Freeman (2010), studies the impact of two distinct types of bargaining styles on faculty 
salaries, benefits and work relationships.  This study was conducted in Illinois using interviews 
and contract comparisons of salaries.  The qualitative part of this study is the 13 interviews 
which participate in both types of bargaining styles.  The interviews were conducted person-to-
person with open-ended questions about perceptions or experiences.  The quantitative part of the 
study is the comparison of six contracts from three districts spanning a twelve-year period 
bargained under each style.  It is found through the interviews that most the participants prefer 
interest-based bargaining because of the communication at the bargaining table (Freeman, 2012).  
It is also found that participants had more negative commentary about traditional bargaining 
(Freeman, 2012).  Additionally, there is a very slight increase in the cost of the language tied to 
the interest-based process (Freeman, 2012).    
The exsisting studies investigating collective barganing agreements show commonalities 
and differences among the studies such as, the analyetical framework, coding, content analysis, 
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varaibles, sample sizes, and type of study.  The studies tend to build upon one another with a 
basic analytical framework that is similar in some studies.  Moe’s (2006) analytic framework is 
rooted in agency theory, transaction cost economics, and related theories of collective action and 
cooperation.  It seems to be common for the authors to code their contracts in some way and do a 
content analysis of agreements.  There is a difference with the measure of the key independent 
varaibles,  the range of coding their labor contracts, and the different samples sizes (Anzia & 
Moe, 2014).  The studies range from qualitative, quantatiative, and mixed methods.  Some 
studies use surveys and content analysis of collective barganing agreements while other studies 
soley use collective barganing agreements for analysis.  For example, Nelson and Rosen (1996) 
used statewide averages for the National Assessment of Education Progress to compare student 
performance between states that have high, medium, and low levels of union impact (as 
determined by the researchers).  Freeman (2010) solely uses collective bargaining agreements to 
study the impact of bargaining styles on faculty salaries, benefits and work relationships.   Some 
studies focus on elementary school while others add middle school as well.  The findings from 
collective bargaining agreement studies are rather mixed as to the degree to which collective 
bargaining agreements inhibit school operations and reforms.  For example, studies including 
Vachon and Ma (2015), Carni (2008), Nelson and Rosen (1996), Steelman, Powell, and Carini 
(2000), identify a positive relationship between teacher unions and student achievement.  Hoxby 
(1996) on the other hand finds that collective bargaining has a negative effect on student 
performance.     
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Walton and McKersie (1991) Four Subprocesses of Negotiation  
 Collective bargaining in education is a social interaction between groups of people such 
as the unions who represent their employees and the school board.  Walton and McKersie (1991) 
used the following terminology to define collective bargaining: “labor negotiations as an 
example of social negotiations, by which we mean the deliberate interaction of two or more 
complex social units which are attempting to define or redefine the terms of their 
interdependence” (Walton & McKersie, 1991, p. 3).  Instructional staff do their work guided by a 
set of predetermined rules, to which they agree, that are written in their contracts for 
employment.  Collective bargaining happens when “one or both parties place high priority on 
changing the basic social contract between labor and management” (Walton & McKersie, 1991, 
p. xxi).  Teacher unions focus on the needs of instructional staff during collective bargaining and 
collaborate with school districts to come to an agreement in the contract. “Labor negotiations 
usually contain a mixture of conflictual and collaborative items” (Walton & McKersie, 1991, p. 
3).  Complication can arise as the union and the school board both negotiate for their own self-
interest because in the end they have to come to a mutual agreement.  
 Walton and McKersie (1991) created “four systems of activity, each with its own 
function for the interacting parties, its own internal logic, and its own identifiable set of 
instrumental acts or tactics” (p. 4).  As illustrated in Table 5, Collective Bargaining Subprocesses 







Table 5: Collective Bargaining Subprocesses and Negotiation Framework 
Lenses of Negotiation Definition 
Distributive Bargaining  Competitive negotiation for limited resources.  
Each group has its own interest and goals in 
obtaining limited resources 
Integrative Bargaining When both parties benefit from a solution to a 
problem.  Both parties gain available 
resources. 
Attitudinal Bargaining Negotiators try to change the feelings and 
attitudes of the other party in order to attain a 
desired goal in negotiation. 
Intraorganizational Bargaining  The negotiator achieving consensus with their 
group 
 
 Collective bargaining is rooted in social sciences because of its elements of conflict, 
behavioral, game, and social theory (Walton & McKersie, 1991).  It can be seen through four 
different systems or sub-processes that collective bargaining is a complex negotiation process 
that can involve frustration, mediation, disputes, and aggression.  Disputes in negotiation can 
lead to the feeling of frustration which can lead to aggression, in which case mediation may then 
be needed in order to help the parties in a disagreement. 
 The first sub-process, distributive bargaining, is most familiar to people who have ever 
had the occasion to negotiate for anything (Walton & McKersie, 1991).  Distributive bargaining 
calls for competitive negotiation between groups in hopes of obtaining limited resources by use 
of persuasion (Walton & McKersie, 1991).  Game theorists would refer to distributive bargaining 
as fixed-sum games, observing that one person’s gain is another person’s loss (Walton & 
McKersie, 1991).  This sub-process is similar to conflict theory in that each group has its own 
interests and goals in obtaining the limited resources in direct conflict with the other group.  The 
conflict can involve allocation of any resources from economic to noneconomic values.   
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 Integrative bargaining is the second sub-process of negotiation for collective bargaining.  
It solves both parties’ problems by finding a common interest between the groups (Walton & 
McKersie, 1991).  Integrative bargaining occurs when both parties benefit from a solution to a 
problem, and both parties gain available resources.  “Integrative bargaining refers to the system 
of activities which is instrumental to the attainment of objectives which are not in fundamental 
conflict with those of the other party and which therefore can be integrated to some degree” 
(Walton & McKersie, 1991, p. 5).  Having a solution to a problem that benefits both negotiating 
parties or at least when the gains of one party do not represent equal sacrifices by the other is 
when integrative bargaining exists (Walton & McKersie, 1991).  
 The third sub-process, attitudinal structuring, “influences the relationships between 
parties; in particular, such attitudes as friendliness-hostility, trust, respect, and the motivational 
orientation of competitiveness-cooperativeness” (Walton & McKersie, 1991, p. 5).  All these 
attitudes and feelings and even the tone that is used by individuals can affect the relationship of 
the parties involved which can then influence the labor negotiation (Walton & McKersie, 1991). 
A Negotiator tries to change the feelings and attitudes of the other party in order to attain a 
desired goal in negotiation. During the negotiation process, relationship bonds can be altered 
between the two groups.  The purpose of attitudinal structuring in negotiations is to manipulate 
and change the feelings and attitudes of the parties toward each other, and this can change the 
relationship (Walton & McKersie, 1991).  These relationships and the attitudes that define them 
have implications for both parties in the negotiation process (Walton & McKersie, 1991).  The 
first two processes, distributive and integrative bargaining are joint decision-making processes, 
but attitudinal structuring is intended to manipulate attitudes and relationships, making it a 
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socioemotional interpersonal process (Walton & McKersie, 1991).  The issues involved in 
collective bargaining can be sensitive subjects that heighten the attitudinal structure. The 
direction of change of behavior can subsequently influence changes in decisions. 
 The final sub-process, intraorganizational bargaining is an integral aspect of the 
interparty negotiations and is the function of achieving consensus within each of the interacting 
groups (Walton & McKersie, 1991).  During intraorganizational bargaining, the chief negotiator 
receives two sets of demands, one from his own organization and one from the company.  The 
job of the negotiator is to come to a consensus.  Even though not all parties affected by 
negotiations will be at the bargaining table, they are still concerned as to what will transpire 
(Walton & McKersie, 1991).  “The union negotiator is probably subject to more organizational 
constraints than his company counterpart” (Walton & McKersie, 1991, p. 6).  Stakeholders of 
education are very interested in the outcomes of collective bargaining and potentially can 
influence what occurs at the bargaining table.  
 Collective bargaining typically begins with a desire to change a predetermined set of 
rules.  “We also accept as not requiring explaining the existing set of rules which governs their 
continuous interface but then ask what the process is by which these rules are changed 
periodically” (Walton & McKersie, 1991, p. 2).  The negotiators in bargaining live by a set of 
unspoken rules that they use for negotiating yet they never question why this is commonly 
accepted.  For example, “The need to defend one’s self interest and at the same time engage in 
joint problem solving vastly complicates the selection of bargaining strategies and tactics” 
(Walton & McKersie, 1991, p. 3).  It can be difficult to collaborate when the conflict is 
negotiation for your own group’s agenda (Walton & McKersie, 1991).  Thus, defining the four 
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sub-processes of negotiation helps with understanding the complexity of collective bargaining.  
These sub-processes are interrelated and can affect one another. 
 Walton and McKersie’s (1991) four sub-processes of collective bargaining can be used as 
a basis for understanding public school collective bargaining agreements in Florida.  The 
framework shows how a complex interaction occurs between the union and school board during 
the collective bargaining process.  Walton and McKersie’s (1991) framework helps in 
understanding this interaction and how it can influence the outcome of collective bargaining.  To 
that end, the four sub-processes serve as lenses that can be used in examining collective 
bargaining agreements studies and understanding how to more effectively determine the 
integrate processes related to collective bargaining agreement processions in Florida schools and 
their implications for negotiation.  
Together, the studies on collective bargaining agreements provide a useful foundation for 
exploring what factors influence these contracts as well as what the effects of the provisions in 
the contracts have on schools.  Continuous research on this new literature will help bring clarity 
and consistency to collective bargaining studies.  Further research on teacher collective 
bargaining can only provide more information for unions interested in improving schools 
(Vachon & Ma, 2015).   
Summary of the Literature Review 
In conclusion, this investigates the historical perspectives of teacher advocacy in 
education, the Florida context, and collective bargaining and contractual agreements that are 
articulated as background for this study.  The review of literature begins with a section on the 
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historical perspective on teacher rights, teacher unionism and collective bargaining in education.  
The history of teacher unions reveals the progress that teachers have made through the assistance 
of unions.  Collective bargaining in the 21st century and in the future rests upon the foundation 
built by the struggles and advances of the labor movement fought by workers over the last 100 
years.  The history of teacher unionism has led to today’s unresolved issues in Florida, a leader 
of education reform (Bormna & Dorn, 2007).  The second section, the Florida context focuses on 
the public education in Florida by reviewing Florida’s unique characteristics and policy context.   
The last section is a review of literature relating to the extant research investigating teacher rights 
using contracts.  Together, the studies on collective bargaining agreements provide a useful 
foundation for exploring what factors influence these contracts as well as what the effects of the 
provisions in the contracts have on schools.  Continuous research on this new literature will help 
bring clarity and consistency to collective bargaining studies.  Further research on teacher 
collective bargaining can only provide more information for unions interested in improving 




CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODS 
The primary goal of this mixed-methods study was to investigate the prevalence among 
Florida school district collective bargaining agreements of provisions identified in extant 
research as desirable for teachers, and to describe their distribution among different categories of 
school districts in Florida.  The decision to focus on Florida collective bargaining agreements 
was based on the state’s unique characteristics and the diverse nature of its counties.  Florida’s 
67 counties vary greatly in their size and socioeconomic status. School reform is directly or 
indirectly related to teacher collective bargaining (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).  Such 
relationship makes collective bargaining such an important topic of concern. This study sought to 
answer the following research questions:  
1. To what extent, if any, do collective bargaining agreement provisions differ according 
to eight selected provisions among Florida public school district collective bargaining 
agreements?  
2. How does the presence or absence of the selected collective bargaining agreement 
provisions impact demographical indicators of Florida school districts (i.e. district size, 
district performance, district locale)?   
These research questions provided direction for the study to guide the researcher’s dissertation.  
The questions arise after realizing they remained unanswered in the current literature.  The first 
question determines the presence of collective bargaining agreement provisions in Florida 
collective bargaining agreements.  The second question examines whether differences exists 
between the collective bargaining agreement provisions present and their school district’s 
demographics.  Each question is examined using qualitative and quantitative methodology.     
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 Chapter Three is organized into six sections: research procedures, school district 
background, research design, data collection measures, data analysis, and summary.  Research 
procedures explore the way data was used in this mixed-methods study.  Florida’s diversity and 
unique characteristics help data users make connections about the school district such as district 
size, district locale, and district grade which will all be explored in the section on background of 
the school districts.  Research design discusses the mixed-methods theory used to design the 
research.  Data collection describes what was done to obtain the 67 Florida public school’s 
collective bargaining agreements, the enrollment, locale, and district grades.  Data analysis 
describes the way in which the research questions were addressed.  The final section of Chapter 
Three, the summary, is a wrap up of all the sections presented in Chapter Three.   
Procedures in the Research Study 
For this mixed-methods study, collective bargaining agreements from 2015-2016 in 66 
out of 67 regular3 public school districts in Florida were examined.  Sixty-one of the 67 
collective bargaining agreements were available on either the school districts’ website or the 
school districts’ local teacher association website.  Five of the 67 collective bargaining 
agreements were obtained by calling and/or e-mailing either local teacher associations or school 
boards.  One of the 67 collective bargaining agreements was not able to be obtained by internet 
search, phone call, or e-mail. For this study, particularly it was decided to look only at Florida 
collective bargaining agreements from 2015-2016 school year.  The decision to focus on the 
                                                 
3 There are seven additional schools not governed by traditional CBAs: Four lab schools (operated by, Florida A & 
M University, Florida Atlantic University, Florida State University, and the University of Florida), the Florida 
School for the Death and Blind, Florida Virtual School, and Okeechobee Youth Development Center    
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collective bargaining agreements being used during the 2015-2016 year came from the fact that 
all of Florida’s 67 instructional collective bargaining agreements are multiyear contracts.  The 
duration of the collective bargaining agreement varies from district to district between two to 
three years.  Negotiations over a successor contract takes months and there is very little chance 
that any important agreements will be reached during the first five to six months before the 
contract expires (Lieberman, 1997). 
All the collective bargaining agreements were downloaded and saved for analysis.  To 
determine the frequency of the provisions, present in each collective bargaining agreement, an 
Excel chart was used to tally up the occurrence of eight (8) provisions in each of the 66 
collective bargaining agreements.  The eight provisions were placed across the top of the chart 
and the 67 districts were placed along the side of the chart.  The dissertation proposal was 
submitted to the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of Central Florida (UCF) for 
approval.  Upon approval, the researcher implemented the study as defined.  To protect the 
anonymity of the school districts involved, the researcher identified the districts as DIS #1, DIS 
#2, etc.  
Background of the School Districts 
The population for this study was the 67 public school districts in the state of Florida.  
The average district enrollment for the state of Florida is 42,045 students.  Districts range in size 
from 734 to 357,311 students.  Of these 67 districts six (6) are City, thirteen (13) are town, 
twenty (20) are Rural, and twenty-eight (28) are Suburban (National Center for Educartion 
Statistics, 2016).  These four types of areas, City, Town, Rural, and Suburban, represent four of 
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the school locale code classification of all territory in the U.S. determined by The National 
Center for Education Statistics (NCES) (National Center for Education Statistics, 2017).  School 
locale codes characterizes the type of community where a school is located (National Center for 
Education Statistics, 2017).  Each area is divided into three subtypes, City and Suburban is based 
on population size while Town and Rural is bases on proximity to urban areas (National Center 
for Education Statistics, 2017).  All the types of locales are either completely rural or urban by 
definition of the U.S. Census Bureau (National Center for Education Statistics, 2016).  The four 
areas are divided into three subtypes.  This information allows data users such as policymakers 
support for analysis of the relationship between schools and the community which can potential 
affect education (National Center for Education Statistics, 2017).  Additionally, each school 
district is assigned a letter grade of A, B, C, D, or F annually by the Florida Department of 
Education, based on the district’s full-year enrolled students (Florida Department of Education, 
2017).  The district’s grade is measured using the same components as school grades.  School 
grades also use a scale of A, B, C, D, or F and includes up to eleven components (Florida 
Department of Education, 2017).   
A school grade may include up to eleven components.  There are four achievement 
components, four learning gains components, a middle school acceleration component, as well as 
components for graduation rate and college and career acceleration (Florida Department of 
Education, 2017).  The four achievement components include student performance on statewide 
standardized assessment in English Language Arts, Mathematics, Science, and Social Studies.  
The four learning gains components are in English Language Arts, mathematics, as well as 
learning gains for the lowest performing 25% of students in English Language Arts and 
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Mathematics (Florida Department of Education, 2017).  The middle school acceleration 
component is based on the percentage of “eligible students who passed a high school level EOC 
assessment or industry certification” (Florida Department of Education, 2017).  The graduation 
rate is based on an “adjusted cohort of ninth grade students and measures whether the students 
graduate within four years” (Florida Department of Education, 2017).  The college and career 
acceleration component is based on the “percentage of graduates from the graduation rate cohort 
who earned a score on an acceleration examination or a grade in a dual enrollment course that 
qualified students for college credit or earned an industry certification” (Florida Department of 
Education, 2017).  Each component can earn up to 100 points each which is added together and 
divided by the total number of points to determine the percentage of points earned (Florida 
Department of Education, 2017). 
Research Design  
A mixed method study uses both qualitative and quantitative approaches in the same 
study (Frankel, Wallen, & Hyun, 2015; Gay, Mills, & Airasian, 2009).  The purpose of using a 
mixed method approach is to build upon the data by gathering more data than was able to by 
using a single approach (Frankel, Wallen, & Hyun, 2015; Gay, Mills, & Airasian, 2009).  Going 
beyond one approach method allows the two approach to work together and build upon the 
strengths of each (Frankel, Wallen, & Hyun, 2015; Gay, Mills, & Airasian, 2009).  The key to a 
mixed method study is to combine the elements of methods in a way that makes the best sense 
for the study (Gay, Mills, & Airasian, 2009).   
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There are three types of common mixed research design: The Qual-quan model, the 
QUAN-qual model, and the QUAN-QUAL model (Gay, Mills, & Airasian, 2009).  In the 
exploratory mixed methods design or QUAL-quan model, qualitative data is considered more 
deeply and collected first, then quantitative data is collected (Gay, Mills, & Airasian, 2009).  The 
explanatory mixed methods design or QUAN-qual model is opposite of the QUAL-quan.  
Quantitative data is considered more deeply and collected first, then qualitative data is collected 
(Gay, Mills, & Airasian, 2009).  The last method is the triangulation mixed methods design or 
QUAN-QUAL model.  The data is weighed evenly and collected simultaneously (Gay, Mills, & 
Airasian, 2009).  
This study most closely resembles the QUAUL-quan model.  Qualitative data was 
collected first through content analysis.  Qualitative research looks deeply into phenomena to 
determine the patterns of meaning that emerge from data gathered (Lunenburg & Irby, 2008).  
Content analysis is a qualitative research technique that was used in this study to help interpret 
meaning from the content of text data to determine the patterns of meaning.  “Research using 
qualitative content analysis focuses on the characteristics of language as communication with 
attention to the content or contextual meaning of the text” (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1278).   
The purpose of qualitative content analysis is to classify text into shared categories by extend 
beyond counting words and examining language intensely (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005).  This is 
referred to as coding.  Coding in qualitative studies is “The analytical process through which data 
are fractured, conceptualized and integrated to form theory…When coding a sentence or 
paragraph, the coder tries to capture succinctly the major idea brought out by the sentence or 
paragraph” (Frankel et al., 2015, p. 434).  This study aligns with those perspectives by 
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classifying large amounts of text (collective bargaining agreements) into eight provisional 
categories.  To that end, content analysis involved seven specific steps to be taken for analyzing 
qualitative data. Table 6 is as follows: 
Table 6: Key Aspects of Qualitative Content Analysis 
Content Analyses’   Action Taken in Research 
Formulating research questions Two questions were formulated to be 
answered in this study: 
1.To what extent are collective bargaining 
agreement provisions present in Florida’s 
collective bargaining agreements?  
2. How does the presence of collective 
bargaining agreement provisions impact 
demographical indicators of Florida school 
districts (i.e. district size, district 
performance, district locale)? 
Selecting a sample 67 Florida regular public school collective 
bargaining agreements were analyzed 
Defining categories Eight (8) provisions were applied 
Outlining the coding process Codes or themes emerged while reading the 
67 collective bargaining agreements 
Implementing the coding process Frequency count of the eight (8) provisions in 
the 67 collective bargaining agreements 
Determining trustworthiness  Credibility of the collective bargaining 
agreement attained 
Analyzing the results of the coding process Quantifying and/or qualifying the eight (8) 
provisions present and absent as well as 
crosstabulations on these eight (8) provisions 
 
There are three distinct approaches to content analysis, conventional, directed, and summative 
(Hsieh & Shannon, 2005).  In conventional content analysis, coding categories emerge directly 
from the text data (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005).  Directed approach analysis uses an existing theory 
or relevant research findings as guidance for initial codes (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005).  Summative 
content analysis involves counting and comparison (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005).  Determining 
which of the three approaches to use varies based on the interests of the researcher and the 
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problem being studied (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005).  This study most closely resembles summative 
content analysis.      
    Summative content analysis starts with identifying and tallying certain words or 
content in text with the purpose of understanding (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005).  This study aligns 
with the perspectives offered by Hsieh and Shannon (2005) as it is inclusive of eight selected 
provisions to identify and quantify in Florida’s collective bargaining agreements to explore usage 
rather than infer meaning.  This is referred to as a manifest content analysis because words were 
reviewed without having to decode their meaning (Frankel, Wallen, & Hyun, 2015).  This starts 
with a qualitative study because it is summative in nature and goes beyond quantifying to include 
latent content analysis.  “Latent content analysis refers to the process of interpretation of 
content” (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1283).  If the analysis stopped at the frequency of 
provisions then this research would be quantitative, however the analysis goes on to examine the 
provisions based on district size, district performance, and district locale.  Hence this research 
design used a summative approach to qualitative content analysis.   
Once the qualitative data has been collected, the next phase of collecting quantitative data 
is then collected.  With the Qual-quan method, quantitative techniques are used with the data 
derived from the qualitative analysis (Gay, Mills, & Airasian, 2009).  Once the data is analyzed 
qualitatively, the data is reported based on the frequency of the eight selected provisions.  
Crosstabulations were run to determine how the presences of desirable collective bargaining 
agreements provisions vary according to district size, district performance, and district locale.    
Cross-tabulation, also known as a contingency table or cross tabs, is a method to 
quantitatively analyze variables that are grouped together to understand the correlation between 
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multiple variables (Frankel, Wallen, & Hyun, 2015).  A cross-tabulation matrix table allows for 
descriptively presenting the relationship between two variables (Green & Salkind, 2008).              
Descriptive statistics was used as a data analysis technique to meaningfully describe data in a 
numerical graph (Frankel, Wallen, & Hyun, 2015).   
 The understanding gained through this investigation will provides useful information to 
policymakers and practitioners in the state and provide the framework to determine ways to more 
efficiently and effectively generate collective bargaining agreement provisions.  This purpose of 
the study aligns with the goal of content analysis, which is to “provide knowledge and 
understanding of the phenomenon under study” (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1278). 
Data Collection Measures 
As part of the data collection measures, collective bargaining agreements from sixty-
seven Florida school districts from the 2015-2016 school year were used. Sixty-one of the 67 
collective bargaining agreements were available on either the school districts’ website or the 
school districts’ local teacher association website.  Five (5) of the 67 collective bargaining 
agreements were obtained by calling and/or e-mailing either local teacher associations or school 
boards.  DIS #40 does not have a teacher association website and the DIS #40 district school 
board website did not have the collective bargaining agreement available.  The researcher 
attempted to call and e-mail using the information from the FEA website and human resources of 
DIS #40 District School Board but was unsuccessful.   
The school districts’ locale codes for common core data were downloaded from the 
National Center for Education Statistics website (National Center for Education Statistics, 2016).  
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There were 12 locale codes: large, midsize, and small city, large, midsize, and small suburban, 
fringe, distant, and remote town, and fringe, distant, and remote rural (NCES Locale 
Classifications and Criteria, 2018).  For the purposes of this study, the researcher collapsed the 
12 locale codes into their 4 major categories and assigned numerical values to them to aid in 
analysis.  For analysis purposes, the locale codes were recoded as 1 (city), 2 (suburb), 3 (town), 
and 4 (rural).  
 The 2016-2017 state assigned districts grades were downloaded from the Florida 
Department of Education website (Florida Department of Education, 2018).  For analysis 
purposes, the school district grades were recoded as 1 (school district grade D), 2 (school district 
grade C), 3 (school district grade B), and 4 (school district grade A).  The 2016-2017 enrollment 
was downloaded from the Florida Department of Education website (Florida Department of 
Education, 2018).  Frequencies for enrollment were computed to identify four equal-sized 
quartiles for re-coding enrollment values into a categorical variable.  For analysis purposes 
enrollment was categorized into four quartiles: 1 to 4,905 (quartile 1), 4,906 to 12,929 (quartile 
2), 12,930 to 43,039 (3rd quartile) and 43,0040 to 35, 7311 (4th quartile).  Locale codes, district 
grades, and enrollment were given assigned codes to make categorical variables.  The locale 
codes, district grades, and enrollment data sets were then merged into a single data set.  The data 
set was entered into an Excel spreadsheet which was then uploaded into SPSS for analysis.     
Data Analysis 
The 66 contracts were analyzed inductively, meaning “immersion in the details and specifics of 
the data to discover important categories, dimensions, and interrelationships” (Frankel, Wallen, 
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& Hyun, 2015, p. 426).  The Florida contracts contents were analyzed to discover links between 
the eight (8) provisions and the contracts.  The researchers identified eight desirable provisions 
based on relevant extant research to identify from the 67 collective bargaining agreements 
(Goldhaber, Lavery, & Theobald, 2014).  That earlier study drew from the extant literature to 
identify 40 salient collective bargaining agreement provisions, grouped into eight (8) categories. 
These provisions reflect topics/issues receiving considerable attention in the press and teacher 
labor literature.  For the current project, eight (8) provisions were selected, representing six of 
the eight categories.  The researcher selected the provisions that teachers would be interested to 
learn about because of the importance and concern of the provisions in instructional collective 
bargaining agreements.  One category was a single question that did not lend itself to the planned 
analysis and, because maternity leave is regulated by Florida statutes, this category was not used.  
To determine the frequency of the provisions present in each collective bargaining agreement, an 
Excel chart was used to tally up the occurrence of 8 provisions in each of the 66 collective 
bargaining agreements.  The data was then looked at using the frequency statistics for the state as 
a whole and, via crosstabs, across district categories with the intent of identifying meaningful 
patterns. 
To answer research question one, eight desirable provisions were identified based on 
relevant extant research (Goldhaber, Lavery, & Theobald, 2014).  That earlier study drew from 
the extant literature to identify 40 salient collective bargaining agreement provisions, grouped 
into eight categories.  These eight categories created the eight provisions for this research study. 
For the current study, eight provisions were selected, representing six of the eight provision 
category groups found in the Goldhaber, Lavery and Theobald (2014) study.  The eight 
76 
 
categories in their study were: accessibility; association; hiring and transfers; workload; 
evaluations; grievance; layoffs; and leave (Goldhaber, Lavery, & Theobald, 2014).  The 
researcher selected the provisions that teachers should be interested in because of the importance 
and concern of these provisions in instructional collective bargaining agreements.  These 
provisions reflect topics/issues receiving considerable attention in the press and teacher labor 
literature. 
One category was a single question that did not lend itself to the planned analysis and 
because layoffs are regulated by Florida statutes, this category was not used.  The eight 
provisions that were selected for use in this study were as follows: 
1. Does the district pay for release time for negotiations for union members?    
2. Does CBA require that districts post all certificated vacancies/make them available to 
teachers in the district?  
3. Does the CBA specify a given length of the school day?  
4. Are there consequences for receiving a negative/unsatisfactory (needs improvement) 
performance evaluation?  
5. Does the CBA allow for teachers to rebut or appeal a negative evaluation?  
6. May the teacher grieve disciplinary action? 
7. Is seniority the primary factor that determines the order of layoffs? 
8. Do factors other than seniority determine the order of layoffs? 
 All of the collective bargaining agreements were downloaded and saved for analysis.  To 
determine the frequency of the provisions present in each collective bargaining agreement, an 
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Excel chart was used to tally up the occurrence of 8 provisions in each of the 66 collective 
bargaining agreements.  The eight provisions were placed across the top of the chart and the 67 
districts were placed along the side of the chart.  An identifiable marker of one (1) was given for 
collective bargaining items present while a value of zero (0) was given for items not present.  
Table 7 provides a matrix of the inclusion are non-inclusion of provisions of collective 
bargaining agreements.  Table 7 is as follows:     
Table 7: Matrix of District and Provisions 
District PRO 1 PRO2 PRO3 PRO4 PRO5 PRO6 PRO7 PRO8 
DIS 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 
DIS 2 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
DIS 3 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
DIS 4 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
DIS 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
DIS 6 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 
DIS 7 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
DIS 8 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 
DIS 9 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
DIS 10 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
DIS 11 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
DIS 12 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 
DIS 13 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 
DIS 14 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 
DIS 15 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
DIS 16 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
DIS 17 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
DIS 18 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
DIS 19 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 
DIS 20 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
DIS 21 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
DIS 22 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
DIS 23 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 
DIS 24 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
DIS 25 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
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District PRO 1 PRO2 PRO3 PRO4 PRO5 PRO6 PRO7 PRO8 
DIS 26 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
DIS 27 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
DIS 28 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
DIS 29 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
DIS 30 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 
DIS 31 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
DIS 32 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
DIS 33 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 
DIS 34 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
DIS 35 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
DIS 36 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
DIS 37 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
DIS 38 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
DIS 39 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
DIS 40   
       
DIS 41 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 
DIS 42 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
DIS 43 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 
DIS 44 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
DIS 45 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
DIS 46 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
DIS 47 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
DIS 48 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
DIS 49 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
DIS 50 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 
DIS 51 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
DIS 52 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
DIS 53 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
DIS 54 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
DIS 55 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
DIS 56 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
DIS 57 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
DIS 58 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
DIS 59 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
DIS 60 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
DIS 61 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
DIS 62 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
DIS 63 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
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District PRO 1 PRO2 PRO3 PRO4 PRO5 PRO6 PRO7 PRO8 
DIS 64 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
DIS 65 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
DIS 66 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 
DIS 67 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
 
Table 7 was used to determine the percentage of districts’ collective bargaining agreements that 
contained each of the eight (8) provisions.  The Excel chart was uploaded to SPSS for analysis.  
Such approach remained consistent with the Hsieh and Shannon (2005) summative content 
analysis process.   
To answer research question one, frequency statistics were calculated for all eight (8) 
desirable characteristics.  Information from the aforementioned table was inputted in the Excel 
chart and uploaded to SPSS analysis.  To answer research question two, crosstabulations were 
run to determine how the presences of desirable collective bargaining agreements provisions 
vary according to district size, district performance, and district locale.  Cross-tabulation is a 
matrix table that allows for descriptively presenting the relationship between two variables 
(Green & Salkind, 2008).  The same 8 provisions were disaggregated based on district size, 
performance, and locale. Each of the three charts were set up with the four categories placed 
across the top of the columns of the chart and with the percentage within district grade below the 
columns for present and not present collective bargaining items. 
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Summary of the Methods 
Chapter Three provided information about the background of the school districts, the 
research design, the research procedures, and data collection measures and analyses of the 
research and the research questions.  Florida’s 67 public school districts were chosen for the 
study population because of Florida’s unique enrollment characteristics.  The 67 collective 
bargaining agreements used were taken from each school district’s website.  The Florida 
contracts contents were analyzed to discover links between the eight (8) provisions and the 
contracts.  To determine the frequency of the provisions present in each collective bargaining 
agreement, an Excel chart was used to tally up the occurrence of eight (8) provisions in each of 
the 66 collective bargaining agreements.  All of these components of the research methods have 




CHAPTER FOUR:  RESEARCH FINDINGS 
This study investigated the prevalence among 67 Florida school district collective 
bargaining agreements (CBAs) of provisions identified in extant research as desirable for 
teachers, and to describe their distribution among different categories of school districts in 
Florida.  The purpose of this mixed-methods study is as follows: (1) determine the extent, if any, 
to which collective bargaining agreement provisions differ according to eight selected provisions 
among Florida public school district collective bargaining agreements, and (2) identify and 
describe how the presence or absence of these selected collective bargaining agreement 
provisions impact demographical indicators of Florida school districts (i.e. district size, district 
performance, district locale).  This chapter presents the results of the data analysis for these two 
stated research questions.   
Both frequency and crosstabulation have been reported.  The presentation of the findings 
is organized by the two research questions.  Frequency statistics were used to answer research 
question one: To what extent, if any, do collective bargaining agreement provisions differ 
according to eight selected provisions among Florida public school district collective bargaining 
agreements?  To answer research question two, crosstabulations were employed to determine 
how the presence of desirable collective bargaining agreement elements varies according to key 
variables of district size, district performance, and district locale. The eight selected CBA 
provisions were disaggregated based on those key aforementioned variables, resulting in three 
crosstabulation tables for each provision.  In all cases, the three crosstabulation tables illustrate 
provisions that are present and provisions that are not present in the collective bargaining 
agreements categorized by district grade, district locale, and district enrollment. 
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It is important to note that attempts were made in SPSS to determine whether or not 
relationships existed between the districts’ grade, locale, enrollment, and the eight provisions.  
The statistical tests of Pearson R Correlation, Regression, Spearman Correlation, Mann-Whitney 
U, Chi-Square, t-test were all utilized.  It was determined that because there were only two 
categories for the provisions, correlation testing would not work.  The distribution of the size 
was not normal for a t-test and the researcher violated the assumptions for a t-test; therefore, a 
Mann-Whitney U test was run in SPSS.  Mann-Whitney test was used to analyze the relationship 
between school grades and provisions since the dependent variables (provisions) are categorical, 
and the independent variable (grade) is ordinal.  The researcher reclassified the enrollment table 
to match the four categories of the other two tables (grade and locale) and ran a Mann-Whitney 
U test for the statistics based on the data in the table.  The Mann Whitney U test was run two 
different ways, continuous and classified; the results were the same using either method.  For 
testing local and provisions, the researcher used a Chi-squared test, since locale is a nominal 
variable.  The results of the aforementioned tests indicated that there were no significant or 
statistical differences between the districts’ grade, locale, and enrollment and the eight 
provisions.   
 Eight selected provisions were chosen from the identifed 40 collective barganing 
provisions reported by Goldhaber, Lavery, and Theobalds (2014).  They are as follows:  
1. Does the district pay for release time for negotiations for union members?    
2. Does CBA require that districts post all certificated vacancies/make them available to 
teachers in the district?  
3. Does the CBA specify a given length of the school day?  
4. Are there consequences for receiving a negative/unsatisfactory (needs improvement) 
performance evaluation?  
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5. Does the CBA allow for teachers to rebut or appeal a negative evaluation?  
6. May the teacher grieve disciplinary action? 
7. Is seniority the primary factor that determines the order of layoffs? 
8. Do factors other than seniority determine the order of layoffs? 
These aforementioned provisions provide a guided structure for examining data associated with 
this mixed-methods study.  To respond to the overall research questions, there are eight different 
frequency tables presented in response to question one and in response to each of the eight 
selected provisions.  There are 24 tables presented in response to question number two.  The 
tables provide a clear and comprehensive presentation of the results of the data analysis.  
Collective Bargaining Agreements and Florida Public School Districts 
The first research question in this study, to what extent, if any, do collective bargaining 
agreement provisions differ according to eight selected provisions among Florida public school 
district collective bargaining agreements, focuses on the presence of desirable CBA elements in 
CBAs for the state as whole.  Eight desirable provisions were selected for analysis in 66 of 67 
CBAs in Florida.  A categorical value of one was given for collective bargaining items present 
while a value of zero was given for items not present.  Analyses of qualitative data suggests the 
emerging themes of process-oriented approach and results-driven outcomes.   
The process-oriented approach themes indicate those provisions in which an action needs 
to take place because it is developmental to the organization.  Those processes are most evident 
in the sub-themes of time, opportunity, and politics.  These are all interactions that will take 
place in a school as part of the school’s function.   On the other hand, the results-driven 
outcomes themes are indicative of outcomes of what has already taken place based on the 
process-oriented provisions.  These processes are most evident in the sub-themes of economics, 
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performance, and equity.  These are all interactions that have taken place in a school as part of 
the school’s function.  The primary difference between these two approaches is with the process-
oriented approach, desirable changes have not yet occurred, but with the results-driven approach, 
these outcomes have already occurred in the past.  To that end, it is important to consider, both 
quantitatively and qualitatively, the implications of collective bargaining agreements for public 
school districts.  
Table 8 presents the results for the number of collective bargaining agreements that 
contained provision one, release time for negotiations.  Provision one asks, does the district pay 
for release time for negotiations for union members?  Table 8 is as follows:   
Table 8: Frequency Table for Provision Number One (Release Time for Negotiations) 




Valid Not Present  44 65.7 66.7 66.7 
Present in CBA 22 32.8 33.3 100.0 
Total 66 98.5 100.0  
Missing  System 1 1.5   
Total 67 100.0   
 
Frequency statistics were calculated to determine the presence and absence of provision one in 
all 66 collective bargaining agreements.  The majority do not pay for release time for 
negotiations.  The number of CBAs that did not contain provision one was 44 out of 66 or 
66.7%.  The number of CBAs that did contain provision one was 22 out of 66 or 33.3%.  Each of 
the 66 collective bargaining agreements were also reviewed qualitatively using a summative 
content analysis to determine if the district pays for release time for negotiations for union 
members.  As the 66 collective bargaining agreements were examined, six emerging themes 
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were developed and classified into shared categories.  Qualitatively, provision one’s emerging 
themes captured by the text were tied with the broader theme of the process-oriented approach 
(i.e. time, opportunity, politics) and the results-oriented outcomes (i.e. economic, equity).  The 
process-oriented approach consists of three sub-process actions that will take place.  Provision 
one raises the question of being equitable and allowing educators the opportunity to take the time 
to engage in a political process of negotiations and if the school will pay for the substitute 
teacher out of its own funds.   
Provision two asks, do collective bargaining agreements require that districts post all 
certificated vacancies/make them available to teachers in the district?  Table 9 presents the 
results showing the number of collective bargaining agreements containing provision two 
(posting of certificated vacancies).  Table 9 is as follows: 
Table 9: Frequency Table for Provision Number Two (Posting of Certificated Vacancies) 




Valid Not Present 2 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Present in CBA 64 95.5 97.0 100.0 
Total 66 98.5 100.0  
Missing System 1 1.5   
Total 67 100.0   
 
To determine the presence and absence of provision two in all 66 collective bargaining 
agreements frequency statistics was calculated.  As indicated by Table 9, most districts do 
require such notification/posting.  The number of contracts that did not contain provision two 
was recorded as only two out of 66 or 3% of CBAs. The number of CBAs which contained 
provision two was 64 out of 66, or 97%.  A qualitative method was used for each of the 66 
collective bargaining agreements, specifically, a summative content analysis to determine if 
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districts post all certificated vacancies, i.e., make them available to teachers in the district.  As 
the content of the 66 collective bargaining agreements were interpreted, six themed categories 
were formed.  Provision two fits into three of the six qualitative themed categories, opportunity, 
politics, and equity.  There are three emerging themes captured by the text for provision two 
which are tied to the broader theme of the process-oriented approach (i.e. opportunity, politics) 
and the results-oriented outcomes (i.e. equity).  Provision two asks if the district would be 
competitive by posting opportunities for educators.  The political influence is asserted when 
schools do not want to post or limit the duration of their posted opportunities to avoid losing 
teachers.  
 Table 10 presents the results for provision three in all 66 collective bargaining 
agreements.  Provision three asks, does the collective bargaining agreement specify a given 
length of the school day?  Table 10 is as follows: 
Table 10: Frequency Table for Provision Number Three (Length of School Day) 




Valid Not Present  4 6.0 6.1 6.1 
Present in CBA 62 92.5 93.9 100.0 
Total 66 98.5 100.0  
Missing  System 1 1.5   
Total 67 100.0   
 
  To determine the presence and absence of provision two in all 66 collective bargaining 
agreements, frequency statistics were calculated.  Almost all the CBAs specified the given length 
of the school day or teacher day.  Table 10 illustrates the results showing that 62 out of 66 or 
93.9% of the CBAs include a teacher work day or school day provision. Only four out of 66 or 
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6.1% of CBAs did not contain provision three.  A qualitative review of the 66 collective 
bargaining agreements were reviewed using a summative content analysis to determine if 
districts specify a given length of the school day.  As the 66 collective bargaining agreements 
were analyzed, six themed categories emerged.  Provision three’s qualitative emerging themes 
captured by the text was tied with the broader theme of the process-oriented approach (i.e. time) 
and the results-oriented outcomes (i.e. performance).  Provision three is concerned with posting 
the length of time a teacher is expected to perform in a school day. 
Table 11 presents the results for the number of collective bargaining agreements that 
contained provision four.  Provision four asks, are there consequences for receiving a 
negative/unsatisfactory, needs improvement, performance evaluation?  Table 11 is as follows: 
Table 11: Frequency Table for Provision Number Four (Consequences for Performance) 




Valid Not Present  28 41.8 42.4 42.4 
Present in CBA 38 56.7 57.6 100.0 
Total 66 98.5 100.0  
Missing  System 1 1.5   
Total 67 100.0   
 
Frequency statistics were calculated to determine the presence or absence of provision four in all 
66 collective bargaining agreements.  A total of 28 or 42.4% of CBAs did not contain this 
provision and 38 or 57.6% did. Table 11 illustrates the results for provision four. Each of the 66 
collective bargaining agreements were reviewed qualitatively using a summative content analysis 
to determine if districts have consequences for receiving a negative/unsatisfactory, needs 
improvement, performance evaluation.  Six themes emerged while reading the 66 collective 
bargaining agreements.  Qualitatively, provision four’s emerging themes, captured by the text, 
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was tied with the broader theme of the process-oriented approach (i.e. politics) and the results-
oriented outcomes (i.e. performance, equity).  Provision four is concerned with the handling of 
performance (equity) which ties in with the politics of why a school might or might not have this 
provision.   
Provision five asks, does the CBA allow for teachers to rebut or appeal a 
negative evaluation?  Table 12 presents the results for the number of collective bargaining 
agreements that contained provision five, appeal of negative evaluation.  Table 12 is as follows: 
Table 12: Frequency Table for Provision Number Five (Appeal of Negative Evaluation) 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Not Present  28 41.8 42.4 42.4 
Present in CBA 38 56.7 57.6 100.0 
Total 66 98.5 100.0  
Missing System 1 1.5   
Total 67 100.0   
 
  To determine the presence and absence of provision two in all 66 collective bargaining 
agreements frequency statistics were calculated.  Table 12 reports that 28 or 42.4% of collective 
bargaining agreements did not allow for teachers to rebut or appeal a negative evaluation and 38 
or 57.6% allowed it.  A summative content analysis was used for each of the 66 collective 
bargaining agreements to determine qualitatively if districts allow for teachers to rebut or 
appeal a negative evaluation.  As the collective bargaining agreements were examined, six 
emerging themes were developed and classified into shared categories.  There are three emerging 
themes captured by the text for provision five which was tied with the broader theme of the 
process-oriented approach (i.e. opportunity, politics) and the results-oriented outcomes (i.e. 
performance, equity).  Provision five asks if teachers would have the equitable opportunity to 
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appeal a negative performance evaluation.  Politics is again involved because challenges emerge 
whenever administration is approached in an adverse manor.       
Table 13 presents the results for the number of collective bargaining agreements that 
contained provision five, grieve disciplinary action.  Provision six asks, may the teacher grieve 
disciplinary action?  Table 13 is as follows: 
Table 13: Frequency Table for Provision Number Six (Grieve Disciplinary Action) 




Valid Not Present  29 43.3 43.9 43.9 
Present in CBA 37 55.2 56.1 100.0 
Total 66 98.5 100.0  
Missing  System 1 1.5   
Total 67 100.0   
  
  Frequency statistics was calculated to determine the presence and absence of provision six in all 
66 collective bargaining agreements.  Twenty-nine or 43.9% of CBAs did not allow teachers to 
grieve disciplinary action and 37 or 56.1% of CBAs allowed for grievances.  A summative 
content analysis was used as a qualitative method for each of the 66 collective bargaining 
agreements to determine if districts allow for teachers to grieve disciplinary action.  As the 66 
collective bargaining agreements were examined, six emerging themes were developed and 
classified into shared categories.  Provision six’s emerging themes captured by the text was tied 
with opportunity, politics, performance and equity.  The broader theme of the process-oriented 
approach (i.e. opportunity, politics) and the results-oriented outcomes (i.e. performance, equity).  
Provision six questions if a teacher would have the equitable opportunity to grieve disciplinary 
action that was based on their performance.  Politics is once again involved because a debate is 
involved challenging administration.     
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 Table 14 presents the results for the number of collective bargaining agreements that 
contained provision seven, order of layoffs.  Provision seven asks, is seniority the primary factor 
that determines the order of layoffs?  Table 14 is as follows: 
Table 14: Frequency Table for Provision Number Seven (Order of Layoffs) 




Valid Not Present  45 67.2 68.2 68.2 
Present in CBA 21 31.3 31.8 100.0 
Total 66 98.5 100.0  
Missing  System 1 1.5   
Total 67 100.0   
 
Frequency statistics were calculated to determine the presence and absence of provision seven in 
all 66 collective bargaining agreements.  Table 14 reports that, out of 66 CBAs, 45 or 68.2% of 
CBAs do not allow for seniority to be considered the number one factor in layoffs.  Each of the 
66 collective bargaining agreements were reviewed qualitatively using a summative content 
analysis to determine if seniority is the primary factor that determines the order of layoffs in a 
district.  As the content of the 66 collective bargaining agreements were interpreted, six 
categories were formed.  Provision seven fits into two of the six themed categories, time and 
politics.  Provision seven’s qualitative emerging themes captured by the text was tied with the 
broader theme of the process-oriented approach (i.e. time, politics) and results-oriented outcome 
(i.e. equity).  Provision seven is concerned with if a teacher’s time spent in the classroom 
determines the order of layoffs.  Politics is involved because it is debatable what the fair 
(equitable) way to determine layoffs is.     
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Provision eight asks, do factors other than seniority determine the order of layoffs?  Table 
14 presents the results for the number of collective bargaining agreements that contained 
provision eight, other order of layoffs.  Table 15 is as follows: 
Table 15: Frequency Table for Provision Number Eight (Other Order of Layoffs) 




Valid Not Present  18 26.9 27.3 27.3 
Present in CBA 48 71.6 72.7 100.0 
Total 66 98.5 100.0  
Missing  System 1 1.5   
Total 67 100.0   
 
To determine the presence and absence of provision two in all 66 collective bargaining 
agreements, frequency statistics was calculated.  Table 15 reports that out of 66 CBAs, 48 or 
72.7% of CBAs had factors other than seniority as the primary factor in determining the order of 
layoffs. Some CBAs had a list of other factors that were to be considered, with seniority being 
the most important factor in some.  Eighteen total or 27.3% of the CBAs did not include factors 
other than seniority to determine the order or layoffs.  A summative content analysis, a 
qualitative method was used for each of the 66 collective bargaining agreements to determine if 
districts post all certificated vacancies/make them available to teachers in the district.  As the 66 
collective bargaining agreements were examined, six emerging themes were developed and 
classified into shared categories.  Qualitatively, provision eight’s emerging themes, captured by 
the text was tied with the broader theme of the process-oriented approach (i.e. Politics) and the 
results-oriented outcomes (i.e. equity).  Provision eight asks what are other factors that determine 
the order of layoffs. Provision eight is political because the equitable way to deal with the topic 
of layoffs is debatable. 
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 Collectively, when considering the collective bargaining agreement provisions and their 
implications with the aforementioned themes and sub-themes, following below in Table 16 is the 
visual representation of those connections:  



































Time X  X    X  
Opportunity X X   X X   


















Economic X        
Performance    X X X X   
Equity X X  X X X X X 
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Most provisions tied in with the process-oriented approach with politics having the most 
connections with the eight provisions.  The only provision that did not tie in with politics was 
provision three (length of school day).  The theme with the least amount of provisions related 
was economics which only tied in with provision one (release time for negotiations).  The two 
broad categories of themes, (process-oriented approach and results driven outcomes) help 
categorize the eight provisions in this study and make sense of their categorization by 
recognizing their correlation and how they play off one another. 
Collective Bargaining Agreements and Demographical Indicators 
 Research question two asks, how does the presence or absence of the selected collective 
bargaining agreement provisions impact demographical indicators of Florida school districts (i.e. 
district size, district performance, district locale)?  Research question two focuses on the 
presence or absence of provisions in collective bargaining agreements according to district size, 
district performance, and district locale.    
 To answer research question two, crosstabulations were run to determine how the 
prevalence of the same eight desirable collective bargaining elements in question one vary 
according to district size, district performance, and district locale.  There are 24 crosstabulation 
charts, three charts (district size, district performance, and district locale) for each of the eight 
provisions.   
Provision one asks, does the district pay for release time for negotiations for union 
members?  Each of the 66 collective bargaining agreements were reviewed quantitively using the 
data derived from the qualitative analysis in question one, provision one.  Crosstabulations were 
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run to determine how the presence of provision one (release time for negotiations) vary 
according to district performance (grade).  Table 17 presents the results for the number of 
collective bargaining agreements that contained provision one (release time for negotiations) 
according to district grade.  Table 17 is as follows: 
Table 17: Crosstabulation for Provision One by District Rating (Grade) 
 D C B A Total 
Q1 Not present Count  











Present in CBA Count  











Total Count  












 For provision number one, 66 out of 67 CBAs were disaggregated based on district 
performance grade. Table 17 reports that there was one collective bargaining agreement for 
performance grade D districts which did not contain provision one in the agreement and zero that 
did.  There were 17 collective bargaining agreements for district performance grade C schools.  
For grade C, 11 out of 17 or 64.7% of the agreements did not contain provision one and six out 
of 17 or 35.3% of grade C agreements contained provision one.  For grade B, there were 37 
agreements.  Out of those 37 agreements, 23 or 62.2% agreements did not contain provision one 
and 14 or 37.8% of grade B agreements contained provision one.  Grade A had 11 agreements in 
which 9 out of 11 or 81.8% did not contain provision one and two out of 11 or 18.2% of grade A 
school agreements contained provision one.   
Table 18 presents the results for the number of 66 collective bargaining agreements that 
contained provision one (release time for negotiations) according to district locale.  Provision 
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one asks, does the district pay for release time for negotiation for union members?  Table 18 is as 
follows:      
 Table 18: LOCALE Crosstabulation for Provision One 
 City Suburb Town Rural Total 
Q1 Not present Count  











Present in CBA Count  











Total Count  












Question one, provision one data was used to analyze question two provision one by using 
quantitative data for each of the 66 collective bargaining agreements.  Crosstabulations were run 
to determine how the presence of provision one (release time for negotiations) vary according to 
district locale.  Table 18 records that for city CBAs there were four or 66.7% of CBAs that did 
not contained provision one and two or 33.3% of CBAs that did.  For suburban, 19 or 67.9% of 
CBAs contained did not contain provision one and nine or 32.1% of CBAs did.  For town, five or 
38.5% of CBAs did not contained provision one and eight or 61.5% of CBAs did.  For rural, 16 
or 84.2% of CBAs that did not contained provision one and three or 15.8% of CBAs that did.  
Town CBAs had the highest percentage of CBAs in which the district pays for release time for 
negotiation.  Rural had the highest percentage of CBAs that did not contain provision one.   
Table 19 presents the results for the number of collective bargaining agreements that 
contained provision one (release time for negotiations) according to district enrollment.  
Provision one asks, does the district pay for release time for negotiation for union members?  




Table 19: Enrollment 2016-17 Crosstabulation for Provision One 







Q1 Not present Count  











Present in CBA Count  











Total Count  












Question one, provision one data was used with quantitative data for each of the 66 collective 
bargaining agreements.  To determine how the presence of provision one (release time for 
negotiations) vary according to district enrollment, crosstabulations were run.  Table 19 records, 
66 out of 67 collective bargaining agreements were disaggregated based on enrollment for the 
2016-2017 year.  Table 19 records, for quartile one (1-4,905), there were 17 CBAs.  Out of those 
17 CBAs, nine or 52.9% did not contain provision one and eight or 47.1% did contain provision 
one.  There were 17 CBAs for quartile 2 (4,906-12,929).  Out of those 17 contracts, 14 or 82.4% 
did not contain provision one and 8 or 47.1% contained provision one.  There were 17 CBAs for 
quartile 3 (12,930-43,039).  Out of those 17 contracts, 14 or 82.4% did not contain provision one 
and 3 or 17.6% contained provision one.  There were 17 CBAs for quartile 4 (43,040-35,7311).  
Out of those 17 contracts, 10 or 58.8% did not contain provision one and 7 or 41.2% contained 
provision one. 
Provision two asks, does the collective bargaining agreement require that districts post all 
certified vacancies/make them available to teachers in the district?  Table 20 presents the results 
for the number of collective bargaining agreements that contained provision two (posting of 




Table 20: GRADE17 Crosstabulation for Provision Two 
 D C B A Total 
Q2 Not present Count  











Present in CBA Count  











Total Count  














All of the 66 collective bargaining agreements were reviewed quantitively using the data derived 
from the qualitative analysis in question one, provision two.  To determine how the presence of 
provision two (posting of certificated vacancies) vary according to district performance (grade), 
crosstabulations were run.  Table 20 records, 66 out of 67 CBAs were disaggregated based on 
district performance grades for the 2016-2017 school year.  Table 20 records, there was one 
collective bargaining agreement for performance grade D district that contained provision 
number two and zero that did not.  There were 17 CBAs for performance grade C districts that 
all contained provision number two.  There were 37 collective bargaining agreements for 
performance B districts.  Out of those 37 agreements, one or 2.7% did not contain provision two 
and 36 or 97.3% contained provision two.  There were 11 collective bargaining agreements for 
performance-based A districts.  Out of those 11, one or 9.1% did not contain provision number 
two and 10 or 90.9% contained provision two. 
Table 21 presents the results for the total number of collective bargaining agreements that 
contained provision two (posting of certificated vacancies) according to district locale.  Provision 
two asks, does the collective bargaining agreement require that districts post all certified 




Table 21: LOCALE Crosstabulation for Provision Two 
 City Suburb Town Rural Total 
Q2 Not present Count  

























Total Count  












The 66 collective bargaining agreements were all reviewed quantitively using the data derived 
from the qualitative analysis in question one, provision two.  Crosstabulations were run to 
determine how the presence of provision two, posting of certificated vacancies, vary according to 
district locale.  Table 21 records that for city CBAs all six contracts require vacancies to be 
posted.  For suburban CBAs, two or 7.1% of CBA do not require vacancies to be posted and 26 
or 92.9% of CBAs require vacancies to be posted.  For town, all 13 CBAs require vacancies to 
be posted.  For rural, all 19 CBAs require vacancies to be posted.  All the CBAs in city, town, 
and rural required vacancies to be posted and all but two CBAs in suburban contained provision 
two. 
Provision two asks, does the collective bargaining agreement require that districts post all 
certified vacancies/make them available to teachers in the district?  Table 22 presents the results 
for the number of collective bargaining agreements that contained provision two (posting of 








Table 22: Enrollment 2016-17 Crosstabulation for Provision Two 

















































Using the data derived from the qualitative analysis in question one, provision two, each of the 
66 collective bargaining agreements were reviewed quantitively.  To determine how the presence 
of provision two (posting of certificated vacancies) vary according to district enrollment, 
crosstabulations were run.  For provision number two, 66 out of 67 CBAs were disaggregated 
based on enrollment for the 2016-2017 year.  Table 22 records, for quartile one (1-4,905), there 
were 15 collective bargaining agreements and they all contained provision two.  There were 17 
CBAs for quartile 2 (4,906-12,929) that all contained provision two.  There were 17 CBAs for 
quartile 3 (12,930-43,039).  Out of those 17 contracts, one or 5.9% did not contain provision two 
and 16 or 94.1% contained provision two.  There were 17 CBAs for quartile 4 (43,040-35,7311).  
Out of those 17 contracts, 1 or 5.9% did not contain provision two and 16 or 94.1% contained 
provision two.  All of the CBAs in quartiles 1-2 and all but 2 contracts in quartiles 3-4 require 
districts to post vacancies. 
Table 23 presents the results for the number of collective bargaining agreements that 
contained provision three (length of school day) according to district performance (grade).  
100 
 
Provision three asks, Does the collective bargaining agreements specify a given length of the 
school day?  Table 23 is as follows: 
Table 23: GRADE17 Crosstabulation for Provision Three 
 D C B A Total 
Q3 Not present Count  











Present in CBA Count  











Total Count  












Each of the 66 collective bargaining agreements were reviewed quantitively using the data 
derived from the qualitative analysis in question one, provision three.  Crosstabulations were run 
to determine how the presence of provision three (length of school day) vary according to district 
performance (grade).  For provision number three, 66 out of 67 CBAs were disaggregated based 
on district performance grades for the 2016-2017 school year.  Table 23 records, there was one 
CBA for performance grade D district that contained provision number three and zero that did 
not.  There were 17 collective bargaining agreements for performance grade C districts.  Out of 
those 17 agreements, one or 5.9% did not contain provision three and 16 or 94.1% contained 
provision three.  There were 37 collective bargaining agreements for performance B districts.  
Out of those 37 contracts, 3 or 8.1% did not contain provision three and 34 or 91.9% contained 
provision three.  There were 11 CBAs for performance-based A districts which all contained 
provision three.  All of the CBAs in district grade D and A and all but one in district C and three 
in district B specify the given length of the school or teacher work day. 
Provision three asks, Does the collective bargaining agreements specify a given length of 
the school day?  Table 24 presents the results for the number of collective bargaining agreements 
101 
 
that contained provision three (length of school day) according to district performance (grade).  
Table 24 is as follows:   
Table 24: LOCALE Crosstabulation for Provision Three 
 City Suburb Town Rural Total 
Q3 Not present Count  











Present in CBA Count  











Total Count  












Using the data derived from question one, provision three, each of the 66 collective bargaining 
agreements were reviewed quantitively.  Crosstabulations were run to determine how the 
presence of provision three (length of school day) vary according to district locale.  For provision 
number three, 66 out of 67 CBAs were disaggregated based on locale code. Table 24 records that 
there are six city CBAs and all but one specifies the length of the school day.  For the 28 
suburban CBAs, all but two specifies the length of the school day.  All 13 town CBAs specifies 
the length of the school day.  For the 19 CBAs in rural, all but one contained provision three.  
Only town CBA had all of their CBAs contain provision three. 
Table 25 presents the results for the number of collective bargaining agreements that 
contained provision three according to district enrollment.  Provision three asks, Does the 
collective bargaining agreements specify a given length of the school day?  Table 25 is as 






Table 25: Enrollment 2016-17 Crosstabulation Provision Three 

















































Question one, provision one qualitative data was used to analyze question two, provision three, 
by using quantitative data for each of the 66 collective bargaining agreements.  To determine 
how the presence of provision three (length of school day) vary according to district enrollment, 
crosstabulations were run.  For provision number three, 66 out of 67 CBAs were disaggregated 
based on enrollment for the 2016-2017 year.  Table 25 records, for quartile one (1-4,905), there 
were 15 CBAs and they all contained provision three.  There were 17 CBAs for quartile 2 
(4,906-12,929).  Out of those 17, one or 5.9% did not contain provision three and 16 or 94.1% 
contained provision three.  There were 17 CBAs for quartile 3 (12,930-43,039).  Out of those 17 
contracts, 3 or 17.6% did not contain provision one and 14 or 82.4% contained provision three.  
There were 17 CBAs for quartile 4 (43,040-35,7311) and they all contained provision three. 
Quartile two had one CBA and quartile three had three CBAs that did not specify the length of 
the school day while all of the CBAs in quartile one and four specified the length of the school 
day. 
Provision four asks, are there consequences for receiving a negative/unsatisfactory 
performance evaluation?  Table 26 presents the results for the number of collective bargaining 
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agreements that contained provision four (consequences for performance) according to district 
performance (grade).  Table 26 is as follows: 
Table 26: GRADE17 Crosstabulation for Provision Four 
 D C B A Total 
Q4 Not present Count  











Present in CBA Count  











Total Count  












Each of the 66 collective bargaining agreements were reviewed quantitively using the data 
derived from the qualitative analysis in question one, provision four.  Crosstabulations were run 
to determine how the presence of provision four, consequences for performance, vary according 
to district performance (grade).  For provision number four, 66 out of 67 CBAs were 
disaggregated based on district performance grades for the 2016-2017 school year.  Table 26 
records, there was one collective bargaining agreement for performance grade D district that did 
not contained provision number four and zero that did.  There were 17 collective bargaining 
agreements for performance grade C districts.  Out of those 17 agreements, seven or 41.2% did 
not contain provision four and 10 or 58.8% contained provision four.  There were 37 collective 
bargaining agreements for performance B districts.  Out of those 37 contracts, 17 or 45.9% did 
not contain provision four and 20 or 54.1% contained provision four.  There were 11 CBAs for 
performance based A districts.  Out of those 11 agreements, three or 27.3% did not contain 
provision number four and eight or 72.7% contained provision four.  The results were rather 
even throughout with only one contract in grade D that did not have a consequence for a negative 
evaluation.    
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Table 27 presents the results for the number of collective bargaining agreements that 
contained provision four, consequences for performance according to district performance 
(grade).  Provision four asks, are there consequences for receiving a negative/unsatisfactory 
performance evaluation?  Table 27 is as follows: 
Table 27: LOCALE Crosstabulation for Provision Four 
 City Suburb Town Rural Total 
Q4 Not present Count  











Present in CBA Count  











Total Count  












Question one, provision four qualitative data was used to analyze question two provision one by 
using quantitative data for each of the 66 collective bargaining agreements.  To determine how 
the presence of provision four (consequences for performance) vary according to district locale, 
crosstabulations were run.  For provision number four, 66 out of 67 CBAs were disaggregated 
based on locale code.  Table 27 records, two or 33.3% of city CBAs did not contain provision 
four while four or 66.7% of CBAs did.  For suburban, 10 or 35.7% of CBAs did not contain 
provision four and 18 or 64.3% of CBAs did.  For town, 6 or 46.2% of CBAs did not contain 
provision four and 7 or 53.8% of CBAs did.  For rural, 10 or 52.6% of CBAs did not contain 
provision four and nine or 47.4% of CBAs did.  City had the highest percentage of CBAs that 
had consequences for receiving a negative evaluation.  Rural CBAs had the highest percentage of 
CBAs that did not contain provision four. 
Provision four asks, are there consequences for receiving a negative/unsatisfactory 
performance evaluation?  Table 28 presents the results for the number of collective bargaining 
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agreements that contained provision four (consequences for performance) according to district 
performance (grade).  Table 28 is as follows:     
Table 28: Enrollment 2016-17 Crosstabulation for Provision Four 


















































Using the data derived from the qualitative analysis in question one, provision four, each of the 
66 collective bargaining agreements were reviewed quantitatively.  Crosstabulations were run to 
determine how the presence of provision four, consequences for performance, vary according to 
district enrollment.  For provision number four, 66 out of 67 CBAs were disaggregated based on 
enrollment for the 2016-2017 year.  Table 28 lists, for quartile one (1-4,905), there were 15 
CBAs.  Out of those 15 agreements, 10 or 66.7% did not contain provision number four and five 
or 33.3% contained provision four.  There were 17 CBAs for quartile two (4,906-12,929).  Out 
of those 17 agreements, six or 35.3% did not contain provision number four and 11 or 64.7% 
contained provision four.  There were 17 CBAs for quartile 3 (12,930-43,039).  Out of those 17 
contracts, 7 or 41.2% did not contain provision four and 10 or 58.8% contained provision four.  
There were 17 CBAs for quartile 4 (43,040-35,7311).  Out of those 17 contracts, five or 29.4% 
did not contain provision four and 12 or 70.6% contained provision four.  Quartile four had the 
highest percentage of CBAs in a quartile that had consequences for a negative evaluation.  
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Quartile one had the highest percentage of CBAs that did not have a consequence for a negative 
evaluation. 
Table 29 presents the results for the number of collective bargaining agreements that 
contained provision five, appeal of negative evaluation, according to district performance 
(grade).  Provision five asks, does the collective bargaining agreement allow for teachers to rebut 
or appeal a negative evaluation?  Table 29 is as follows:     
Table 29: GRADE17 Crosstabulation for Provision Five 
 D C B A Total 
Q5 Not present Count  












Present in CBA Count  












Total Count  













Each of the 66 collective bargaining agreements were reviewed quantitively using the data 
derived from the qualitative analysis in question one, provision five.  To determine how the 
presence of provision five, appeal of negative evaluation, vary according to district performance 
(grade), crosstabulations were run.  For provision number five, 66 out of 67 CBAs were 
disaggregated based on district performance grades for the 2016-2017 school year.  Table 29 
lists, there was one CBA for performance grade D district that did not contained provision 
number five and zero that did.  There were 17 CBAs for performance grade C districts.  Out of 
those 17 agreements, five or 29.4% did not contain provision five and 12or 70.6% contained 
provision five.  There were 37 CBAs for performance B districts.  Out of those 37 contracts, 17 
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or 45.9% did not contain provision five and 20 or 54.1% contained provision five.  There were 
11 CBAs for performance-based A districts.  Out of those 11 agreements, five or 45.5% did not 
contain provision number five and 8 or 72.7% contained provision five.  C-grade district CBA 
had the highest percentage of CBAs that allows teacher to appeal a negative evaluation. 
Provision five asks, does the collective bargaining agreement allow for teachers to rebut 
or appeal a negative evaluation?  Table 30 presents the results for the number of collective 
bargaining agreements that contained provision five (appeal of negative evaluation), according to 
district locale.  Table 30 is as follows:     
Table 30: LOCALE Crosstabulation for Provision Five 
 City Suburb Town Rural Total 
Q5 Not present Count  











Present in CBA Count  











Total Count  












Using the data derived from the qualitative analysis in question one, provision five, each of the 
66 collective bargaining agreements were reviewed quantitively.  Crosstabulations were run to 
determine how the presence of provision five (appeal of negative evaluation) vary according to 
district locale.  For provision number five, 66 out of 67 CBAs were disaggregated based on 
locale code.  Table 30 lists, for city, three or 50% of CBAs did not contain provision five and 
three or 50% of CBAs did.  For suburban, 12 or 42.9% of CBAs did not contain provision five 
and 16 or 57.1% of CBAs did.  For town, six or 42.9% of CBAs did not contain provision five 
and seven or 53.8% of CBAs did.  For rural, seven or 36.8% of CBAs did not contain provision 
five and 12 or 63.2% of CBAs did.  Rural contained the highest percentage of CBAs that allows 
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teacher to appeal negative evaluations.  Town had the highest percentage of CBAs that did not 
contain provision five. 
Table 31 presents the results for the number of collective bargaining agreements that 
contained provision five according to district enrollment.  Provision five asks, does the collective 
bargaining agreement allow for teachers to rebut or appeal a negative evaluation?  Table 31 is as 
follows:         
Table 31: Enrollment 2016-17 Crosstabulation for Provision Five 

















































Each of the 66 collective bargaining agreements were reviewed quantitively using the data 
derived from the qualitative analysis in question one, provision five.  To determine how the 
presence of provision five (appeal of negative evaluation) vary according to district enrollment, 
crosstabulations were run.  For provision number five, 66 out of 67 CBAs were disaggregated 
based on enrollment for the 2016-2017 year.  Table 31 records, for quartile one (1-4,905), there 
were 15 collective bargaining agreements.  Out of those 15 agreements, four or 26.7% did not 
contain provision number five and 11 or 73.3% contained provision five.  There were 17 CBAs 
for quartile 2 (4,906-12,929).  Out of those 17 agreements, nine or 52.9% did not contain 
provision number five and 8 or 47.1% contained provision five.  There were 17 CBAs for 
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quartile 3 (12,930-43,039).  Out of those 17 contracts, eight or 47.1% did not contain provision 
five and 9 or 52.9% contained provision five.  There were 17 CBAs for quartile 4 (43,040-
35,7311).  Out of those 17 contracts, seven or 41.2% did not contain provision five and 10 or 
58.8% contained provision five.  Quartile one contained the highest percentage of CBAs that 
allowed teachers to appeal a negative evaluation. 
Provision six asks, may the teacher grieve disciplinary action?  Table 32 presents the 
results for the number of collective bargaining agreements that contained provision six (grieve 
disciplinary action) according to district performance (grade).  Table 32 is as follows:     
Table 32: GRADE17 Crosstabulation for Provision Six 
 D C B A Total 
Q6 Not present Count  











Present in CBA Count  











Total Count  












Question one, provision six, qualitative data was used to analyze question two provision six by 
using quantitative data for each of the 66 collective bargaining agreements.  Crosstabulations 
were run to determine how the presence of provision five (grieve disciplinary action) vary 
according to district performance (grade).  For provision number six, 66 out of 67 CBAs were 
disaggregated based on district performance grades for the 2016-2017 school year.  There was 
one CBA for performance grade D district that did not contained provision number six and zero 
that did.  Table 32 records, there were 17 collective bargaining agreements for performance 
grade C districts.  Out of those 17 agreements, 6 or 35.3% did not contain provision six and 11 or 
64.7% contained provision six.  There were 37 CBAs for performance B districts.  Out of those 
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37 contracts, 17 or 45.9% did not contain provision six and 20 or 54.1% contained provision six.  
There were 11 CBAs for performance-based A districts.  Out of those 11 agreements, 5 or 45.5% 
did not contain provision number six and six or 54.5% contained provision six.  Grade C had the 
highest percentage of CBAs that allows for teacher to grieve disciplinary action.  The only 
contract for grade D did not allow teacher to grieve disciplinary action making grade B the 
second highest percentage of contracts without provision six. 
Table 33 presents the results for the number of collective bargaining agreements that 
contained provision six according to district locale.  Provision six asks, may the teacher grieve 
disciplinary action?  Table 33 is as follows:      
Table 33: LOCALE Crosstabulation for Provision Six 
 City Suburb Town Rural Total 
Q6 Not present Count  











Present in CBA Count  











Total Count  












Each of the 66 collective bargaining agreements were reviewed quantitively using the data 
derived from the qualitative analysis in question one, provision six.  To determine how the 
presence of provision six (grieve disciplinary action) vary according to district locale, 
crosstabulations were run.  For provision number six, 66 out of 67 CBAs were disaggregated 
based on locale code.  Table 33 records, for city four or 66.7% of CBAs that did not allow for 
teachers to grieve disciplinary action and two or 33.3% of CBAs that did.  For suburban, nine or 
32.1% of CBAs that did not contain provision six and 19 or 67.9% of CBAs that did.  For town, 
five or 38.5% of CBAs that did not contained provision six and eight or 61.5% of CBAs that did.  
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For rural, 11 or 57.9% of CBAs that did not contain provision six and eight or 42.1% of CBAs 
that did.  Suburb CBAs had the highest percentage of CBAs that allows teacher to grieve 
disciplinary action.  City has the highest percentage of CBAs that does not contain provision six.    
Provision six asks, may the teacher grieve disciplinary action?  Table 34 presents the 
results for the number of collective bargaining agreements that contained provision six (grieve 
disciplinary action) according to district enrollment.  Table 34 is as follows:     
Table 34: Enrollment 2016-17 Crosstabulation for Provision Six 




















































Using the data derived from the qualitative analysis in question one, provision six, each of the 66 
collective bargaining agreements were reviewed quantitively.  Crosstabulations were run to 
determine how the presence of provision five (grieve disciplinary action) vary according to 
district enrollment.  For provision number six, 66 out of 67 CBAs were disaggregated based on 
enrollment for the 2016-2017 year.  Table 34 records, for quartile one (1-4,905), there were 15 
CBAs.  Out of those 15 agreements, 9 or 60.0% did not contain provision six and six or 40.0% 
contained provision six.  There were 17 collective bargaining agreements for quartile two (4,906-
12,929).  Out of those 17 agreements, seven or 41.2% did not contain provision six and 10 or 
58.8% contained provision six.  There were 17 CBAs for quartile 3 (12,930-43,039).  Out of 
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those 17 contracts, seven or 41.2% did not contain provision six and 10 or 58.8% contained 
provision six.  There were 17 CBAs for quartile 4 (43,040-35,7311).  Out of those 17 contracts, 6 
or 35.3% did not contain provision six and 11 or 64.7% contained provision six.   
Table 35 presents the results for the number of collective bargaining agreements that 
contained provision seven, order of layoffs according to district performance (grade).  Provision 
seven asks, is seniority the primary factor that determines the order of layoffs?  Table 35 is as 
follows:     
Table 35: GRADE17 Crosstabulation for Provision Seven 
 D C B A Total 
Q7 Not present Count  











Present in CBA Count  











Total Count  












Each of the 66 collective bargaining agreements were reviewed quantitively using the data 
derived from the qualitative analysis in question one, provision seven.  To determine how the 
presence of provision five (order of layoffs) vary according to district performance (grade), 
crosstabulations were run.  For provision number seven, 66 out of 67 CBAs were disaggregated 
based on district performance grades for the 2016-2017 school year.  Table 35 records, there was 
one CBA for performance grade D district that did not contained provision number seven and 
zero that did.  There were 17 collective bargaining agreements for performance grade C districts.  
Out of those 17 agreements, 10 or 58.8% did not contain provision seven and seven or 41.2% 
contained provision seven.  There were 37 CBAs for performance B districts.  Out of those 37 
contracts, 25 or 67.6% did not contain provision seven and 12 or 32.4% contained provision 
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seven.  There were 11 CBAs for performance-based A districts.  Out of those 11 agreements, 9 
or 81.8% did not contain provision number seven and two or 18.2% contained provision seven. 
Provision seven asks, is seniority the primary factor that determines the order of layoffs?  
Table 36 presents the results for the number of collective bargaining agreements that contained 
provision seven, order of layoffs according to district locale.  Table 36 is as follows:         
Table 36: LOCALE Crosstabulation for Provision Seven 
 City Suburb Town Rural Total 
Q7 Not present Count  











Present in CBA Count  











Total Count  












Using the data derived from the qualitative analysis in question one, provision seven, each of the 
66 collective bargaining agreements were reviewed quantitively.  Crosstabulations were run to 
determine how the presence of provision five (order of layoffs) vary according to district locale.  
For provision number seven, 66 out of 67 CBAs were disaggregated based on locale code.  Table 
36 recorded, for city, four or 66.7% of CBAs did not contain provision seven and two or 33.3% 
of CBAs did.  For suburban, 20 or 71.4% of CBAs did not contain provision seven and eight or 
28.6% of CBAs did.  For town, nine or 69.2% of CBAs did not contain provision seven and four 
or 30.8% of CBAs did.  For rural, 12 or 63.2% of CBAs did not contain provision seven and 
seven or 36.8% of CBAs did.  Rural CBAs has the highest percentage of CBAs that had seniority 




Table 37 presents the results for the number of collective bargaining agreements that 
contained provision seven (order of layoffs) according to district enrollment.  Provision seven 
asks, is seniority the primary factor that determines the order of layoffs?  Table 37 is as follows:        
Table 37: Enrollment 2016-17 Crosstabulation for Provision Seven 




















































Each of the 66 collective bargaining agreements were reviewed quantitively using the data 
derived from the qualitative analysis in question one, provision seven.  According to district 
enrollment, crosstabulations were run to determine how the presence of provision five, order of 
layoffs, vary.  For provision number seven, 66 out of 67 CBAs were disaggregated based on 
enrollment for the 2016-2017 year.  Table 37 recorded, for quartile one (1-4,905), there were 15 
collective bargaining agreements.  Out of the 15 agreements, 8 or 53.3% did not contain 
provision seven and seven or 46.7% contained provision seven.  There were 17 CBAs for 
quartile 2 (4,906-12,929).  Out of the 17 agreements, 14 or 82.4% did not contain provision 
seven and 3 or 17.6 % did contain provision seven.  There were 17 CBAs for quartile 3 (12,930-
43,039).  Out of those 17 contracts, 12 or 70.6% did not contain provision seven and 5 or 29.4% 
did contain provision seven.  There were 17 CBAs for quartile 4 (43,040-35,7311).  Out of those 
17 contracts, 11 or 64.7% did not contain provision seven and 6 or 35.3% contained provision 
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seven.  Quartile four contained the highest percentage of CBAs that did not have seniority as the 
primary factor in layoffs. 
Provision eight asks, do factors other than seniority determine the order or layoffs?  Table 
38 presents the results for the number of collective bargaining agreements that contained 
provision eight, other order of layoffs, according to district performance (grade).  Table 38 is as 
follows:     
Table 38: GRADE17 Crosstabulation for Provision Eight 
 D C B A Total 
Q8 Not present Count  











Present in CBA Count  











Total Count  












Question one, provision one, qualitative data was used to analyze question two provision one by 
using quantitative data for each of the 66 collective bargaining agreements.  Crosstabulations 
were run to determine how the presence of provision five (other order of layoffs) vary according 
to district performance (grade).  For provision number eight, 66 out of 67 CBAs were 
disaggregated based on district performance grades for the 2016-2017 school year.  Table 38 
records, there was one CBA for performance grade D district that contained provision number 
eight and zero that did not.  There were 17 CBAs for performance grade C districts.  Out of those 
17 agreements, 4 or 23.5% did not contain provision eight and 13 or 76.5% contained provision 
eight.  There were 37 CBAs for performance B districts.  Out of those 37 contracts, 14 or 37.8% 
did not contain provision eight and 23 or 62.2% contained provision eight.  There were 11 CBAs 
for performance-based A districts, and they all contained provision eight.  Grade A has the 
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highest percentage of CBAs that ha factors other than seniority as the primary factor in layoffs as 
well as the one CBA for grade D. 
Provision eight asks, do factors other than seniority determine the order or layoffs?  Table 
39 presents the results for the number of collective bargaining agreements that contained 
provision eight, other order of layoffs, according to district locale.  Table 39 is as follows:     
Table 39: LOCALE Crosstabulation for Provision Eight 
 City Suburb Town Rural Total 








































Each of the 66 collective bargaining agreements were reviewed quantitively using the data 
derived from the qualitative analysis in question one, provision seven.  To determine how the 
presence of provision five (other order of layoffs) vary according to district locale, 
crosstabulations were run.  For provision number eight, 66 out of 67 CBAs were disaggregated 
based on locale code.  Table 39 recorded, for city, one or 16.7% of CBAs did not contain 
provision five and five or 83.3% of CBAs did.  For suburban, seven or 25% of CBAs did not 
contain provision eight and 21 or 75% of CBAs did.  For town, six or 46.2% of CBAs did not 
contain provision eight and seven or 53.8% did.  For rural, four or 21.1% of CBAs did not 
contain provision eight and 15 or 78.9% of CBAs did.  City CBAs had the highest percentage of 
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CBAs that had factors other than seniority determine the order or layoffs.  Town CBAs had the 
highest percentage of CBAs that did not contain provision eight. 
Table 40 presents the results for the number of collective bargaining agreements that 
contained provision eight, other order of layoffs, according to district enrollment.  Provision 
eight asks, do factors other than seniority determine the order or layoffs?  Table 40 is as follows:     
Table 40: Enrollment 2016-17 Crosstabulation for Provision Eight 


















































Using the data derived from the qualitative analysis in question one, provision, eight, each of the 
66 collective bargaining agreements were reviewed quantitively.  Crosstabulations were run to 
determine how the presence of provision five (other order of layoffs) vary according to district 
enrollment.  For provision number eight, 66 out of 67 CBAs were disaggregated based on 
enrollment for the 2016-2017 year.  For quartile one (1-4,905), there were 15 CBAs.  Table 40 
recorded, out of the 15 agreements, 5 or 33.3% did not contain provision eight and 10 or 66.7% 
contained provision eight.  There were 17 CBAs for quartile 2 (4,906-12,929).  Out of the 17 
agreements, 4 or 23.5% did not contain provision eight and 13 or 76.5% did contain provision 
eight. There were 17 CBAs for quartile three (12,930-43,039).  Out of those 17 contracts, 4 or 
23.5% did not contain provision eight and 13 or 76.5% did contain provision eight.  There were 
118 
 
17 CBAs for quartile 4 (43,040-35,7311).  Out of those 17 contracts, 5 or 29.4% did not contain 
provision eight and 12 or 70.6% contained provision eight. 
Summary of Chapter Four 
Chapter Four provides a report of the data analysis methods used for the two stated 
research questions.  In this chapter, an introduction was given explaining the purpose of the 
study and analysis and statistical tests that were to be discussed and in which order they would 
be addressed.  This was followed by a report on the attempts made in SPSS by the researcher to 
determine whether relationships existed between the districts’ grade, locale, enrollment, and the 
eight provisions.  The results of the aforementioned tests indicated that there were no significant 
differences between the districts’ grade, locale, and enrollment and the eight provisions. 
Research question one, to what extent, if any, do collective bargaining agreement 
provisions differ according to eight selected provisions among Florida public school district 
collective bargaining agreements, focused on the presence of eight desirable collective 
bargaining agreement elements in CBAs for the state of Florida as a whole.  Eight desirable 
provisions were analyzed in 66 of 67 collective bargaining agreements in Florida. The results 
were presented using frequency statistic tables to show calculations and determine the presence 
and absence of provisions in all 66 collective bargaining agreements.   
Research question two, how does the presence or absence of the selected collective 
bargaining agreement provisions impact demographical indicators of Florida school districts (i.e. 
district size, district performance, district locale), focused on how the presence of desirable 
collective bargaining agreement elements varied according to the key variables of district size, 
119 
 
district performance, and district locale.  The results were presented with three crosstabulation 
tables for each of the eight provisions.  These tables illustrated the provisions that were present 
and provisions that were not present in the collective bargaining agreements categorized by 
district grade, district locale, and district enrollment. 
The following chapter presents a discussion of the findings, implications, and 





CHAPTER FIVE:  
SUMMARY, DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS 
Chapter Five consists of a summary of the study, discussion of the findings, implications 
for practice, recommendations for further research, and conclusions.  This chapter begins with a 
summary of the study discussing the problem and purpose of this study, conceptual framework, 
research questions, methodology, and major findings.  Then a discussion of the findings 
evaluates what the results of the study means.  Finally, implications for practice, and 
recommendations for future research are presented and discussed.  Chapter Five provides 
demonstrated analyses of public-school collective bargaining agreements, understanding of the 
distribution among different categories of school districts in Florida, and their impact on public 
school collective bargaining agreements.   
Summary of the Study 
To date, there has been limited information on Florida public school collective bargaining 
agreements (CBAs), specifically regarding their similarities and unique aspects and content. 
Research has overlooked what influences the provisions that end up in collective bargaining 
agreements considering what research says about the influence collective bargaining agreements 
have on a district. The impact that collective bargaining has may not be clear but what is clear is 
that collective bargaining agreement provisions shape district policy (Strunk, 2011).  Because of 
the influence that collective bargaining agreements have on a district, unions need to ensure that 
necessary steps are taken toward improving the process of collective bargaining.    
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 The purpose of this study was: 1) to determine the extent to which CBA provisions exist 
within the master contracts of Florida teachers (2016-2017) and, 2) to determine the extent to 
which, if any, collective bargaining provisions varies according to the school district (i.e. district 
size, district performance, district locale).  The understanding gained through this investigation 
provides useful information for policymakers and practitioners in the state of Florida and offers 
ways to more effectively generate collective bargaining agreement provisions. 
 Goldhaber, Lavery, & Theobald (2014) provisions involving the collective bargaining 
agreements were used as the conceptual framework for examining the data in this study.  
Goldhaber, Lavery, & Theobald’s (2014) 40 provisions which have received considerable 
amount of attention by teacher or media literature were narrowed down into 8 selected provisions 
from the identified 40 collective bargaining provisions.  Those questions are as follows:  
1. Does the district pay for release time for negotiations for union members? 
2. Does CBA require that districts post all certificated vacancies/make them available to 
teachers in the district?  
3. Does the CBA specify a given length of the school day?  
4. Are there consequences for receiving a negative/unsatisfactory (needs improvement) 
performance evaluation?  
5. Does the CBA allow for teachers to rebut or appeal a negative evaluation?  
6. May the teacher grieve disciplinary action? 
7. Is seniority the primary factor that determines the order of layoffs? 
8. Do factors other than seniority determine the order of layoffs? 
These selected provisions are used to guide the analysis related to selected provisions and 
demographical indicators affecting Florida school districts.  
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 The study included 66 out of the 67 regular4 collective bargaining agreements from each 
public school district in the state of Florida from 2015-2016. Sixty-one of the 67 collective 
bargaining agreements were available on either the school districts’ website or the school 
districts’ local teacher association website.  Five of the 67 collective bargaining agreements were 
obtained by calling and/or e-mailing either local teacher associations or school boards.  
Surprisingly, one of the 67 collective bargaining agreements was not able to be obtained for this 
study through any means.  This study sought to answer the following research questions:  
1. To what extent, if any, do collective bargaining agreement provisions differ according 
to eight selected provisions among Florida public school district collective bargaining 
agreements?  
2. How does the presence or absence of the selected collective bargaining agreement 
provisions impact demographical indicators of Florida school districts (i.e. district size, 
district performance, district locale)?   
This study uses both qualitative and quantitative approaches in the study making this study 
mixed-method.  The research design most closely resembles a QUAL-quan, mixed-method 
model because qualitative data is considered more deeply and collected first, then quantitative 
data is collected (Gay, Mills, & Airasian, 2009).  For the qualitative aspect of the research 
design, content analysis was used to classify text into shared categories by extend beyond 
counting words, comparing text and examining language intensely (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005).   
                                                 
4 There are seven additional schools not governed by traditional CBAs: Four lab schools (operated by, Florida A & 
M University, Florida Atlantic University, Florida State University, and the University of Florida), the Florida 
School for the Death and Blind, Florida Virtual School, and Okeechobee Youth Development Center    
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The type of content analysis specifically used is a summative content analysis which involves 
counting and comparison of text (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005).    
From a broad perspective, to answer the research questions, eight desirable provisions 
were identified based on Goldhaber, Lavery, & Theobald’s 2014 reserarch.  The researcher 
selected provisions that teachers possibly would be interested in because of their importance in 
instructional collective bargaining agreements.  More specifically, to answer research question 
one, frequency statistics were computed for all eight desirable characteristics and reported to 
identify the number and percentage of districts in which each respective contract provision was 
present in the district’s CBAs.  To answer research question two, crosstabulations were 
conducted to determine how the presence of eight desirable collective bargaining agreement 
elements varies according to the key variables of district size, district performance, and district 
locale. The selected eight CBA provisions were disaggregated based on those key 
aforementioned variables, resulting in three crosstabulation tables for each provision. 
Discussion on Collective Bargaining Agreements and Florida Public School Districts 
The first research question, to what extent are desirable collective bargaining agreement 
elements present in Florida collective bargaining agreements, offers a qualitative insight into the 
findings of this study.  The findings from research question one indicates that collective 
bargaining agreements vary in terms of the inclusion of desirable provisions for teachers.  The 
results show that none of the eight desirable provisions were present in all 66 collective 
bargaining agreements.  Even though bargaining varies widely from school district to school 
district, local unions, school boards, and teachers will often compare their own contracts to other 
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local union contracts (Lieberman, 1997). When unions set contract goals, they usually consider 
what other local unions have achieved (Lieberman, 2000).  The school board takes the union’s 
proposal and then compares it to other school districts’ benefits.  While none of the eight 
provisions were present in all 66 CBAs, provision two (posting of certified vacancies) was 
present in all but two CBAs and provision three (length of school day) was present in all but four 
CBAs. Based on the data, these two provisions seemed to be the most commonly found ones 
among the CBAs studied. Provisions two (posting of certificated vacancies) and three (length of 
school day) show that there are some commonalties within the district CBAs. 
Vachon and Ma (2015) multilevel intercept model places all collective bargaining items 
into two main categories, economic and noneconomic based items.  Provision one (release time 
for negotiations) falls into the economic based category because allocation of funding is 
involved.  Provisions two through seven falls under the professional or noneconomic models of 
unionism, which deal with issues such as job postings, teacher work day, evaluations, grievance, 
and seniority which can affect the learning environment created by teachers (Vachon & Ma, 
2015).    
The first provision, does the district pay for release time for negotiations for union 
members, is bargained through distributive bargaining.  Distributive bargaining calls for 
competitive negotiation between groups in hopes of obtaining limited resources by use of 
persuasion (Walton & McKersie, 1991).  The limited resource in provision one is funding and 
the conflict is that both the union and the school board are trying to conserve their funding.  The 
conflict involved here is one of allocation of economic resource.  Paying for release time can be 
a disadvantage for the school district and can lead to pressure to settle contracts to avoid the cost 
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of paying for additional time for substitute teachers to allow for a full bargaining team.  The data 
shows that the majority of districts (n=44, or 65.7%) do not pay for release time for negotiations.  
It is interesting out of the eight provisions used in this study, the only economic-based one, this 
first provision, was not included in such a high percentage of district CBAs.  Looking at the 
provision one from the perspective of the school board, granting release time to teachers would 
mean loss of instructional time for students with their primary teacher (Lieberman, 2000).  The 
school boards that do agree to include provision one might do this because they would rather not 
negotiate after school hours or on the weekend (Lieberman, 2000).  Provision one contains all 
but one collective bargaining theme (performance) making it is a complex issue.  Provision one 
raises the issue of being equitable and allowing educators the opportunity to take the time to 
engage in a political process of negotiations and if the school will pay for the funds of the 
substitute teacher.  The decision to include provision one means taking away instructional time 
from students.  This may or may not be beneficial to students given the needed expertise of their 
primary teacher.  To that end, it may not be most appropriate to not allow the opportunity for 
teachers to be involved in the political process of negotiation.  Allowing provision one further 
impacts the school’s economic resource by requiring a substitute teacher.  
Provision two (posting of certified vacancies) was not present in only two out of the 66 
CBAs, District 13 and District 14.  In 2015,  district 13 superintendent was working on a formula 
for improving the school district’s grade by improving failing schools (Florida Department of 
Education releases 2015 school grades, 2016).  The superintendent replaced 80 percent of all 
principals in the school district and recruited the best teachers (Florida Department of Education 
releases 2015 school grades, 2016).  It may be that district 13 required posting of certified 
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vacancies but did not include provision two in the contract.  District 14 presented their first ever 
success plan for the 2015-2016 school year (Success Plan, 2015).  District’s 14 success plan 
identified four work projects, student success, employee success, culture of collaboration, and 
financial stability (Success Plan, 2015).  It seemed that District 14 was not concerned with new 
employment but rather with current employee improvement which can be a reason that provision 
two was not included in their CBAs.  These may not be definitive reasons but may be used as 
informed set of perspectives as to why it may not be. 
Provision two fits into three of the six qualitative themed categories of opportunity, 
politics, and equity.  There are three emerging themes captured by the text for provision two 
which are tied with the broader theme of the process-oriented approach (i.e. opportunity, politics) 
and the results-oriented outcomes (i.e. equity).  Provision two asks if the district will become 
competitive by posting opportunities for educators.  The political influence is used when schools 
are not wanting to post or limit their duration of the posted opportunities to avoid losing teachers.  
Additionally, all of the collective bargaining agreements should have a system in place 
for posting vacancies based on Florida law.  Florida Statute §1012.05, teacher recruitment and 
retention, states that a system shall be put in place for posting teacher vacancies.  The amount of 
days that a vacancy will be posted, mentioned in CBAs, ranged from three to seven days.  
Almost all (98.3%) of CBAs contained provision three (Length of school day).  One CBA 
specified the “work week” as opposed to a “work day”.   
Provision three (length of the school day) contains only two themes, time (process-
oriented approach) and performance (results-driven approach) because of the expectation set to 
teachers for their work day.  The length of time that is expected of the work day may or may not 
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affect the performance of the teachers.  Provision three contains the least amount of collective 
bargaining themes.   
Provision four, are there consequences for receiving a negative/unsatisfactory evaluation, 
was almost even in the data set with (n=28 or 42.4%) not containing provision four and (n=38, or 
57.6%) containing provision four.  This result is particularly interesting considering that Florida 
Statute §1012.34 (Personnel Evaluation and Procedure) states that an employee rated as 
unsatisfactory shall be placed on performance probation for 90 calendar days.  Senate Bill 736 
brought about a new annual evaluation system for all teachers using four distinct levels of 
effectiveness:  highly effective, effective, needs improvement, and unsatisfactory (Senate Bill 
736: How will it affect me?, 2016).  Teachers rated as needs improvement or unsatisfactory will 
receive no salary increase (§1012.22). Tenured teachers rated unsatisfactory two consecutive or 
two of three years will be placed on an annual contact and then dismissed if not rated higher 
(Senate Bill 736, 20 16).  The Florida CBAs that mentioned consequences for receiving a 
negative evaluation ranged from teachers needing immediate help to termination after continuous 
ratings of unsatisfactory.   
Provision four’s emerging themes, captured by the text, was tied with the broader theme 
of the process-oriented approach (i.e. politics) and the results-oriented outcomes (i.e. 
performance, equity).  Provision four is concerned with the handling of performance (equity) 
which ties into the politics of why a school might or might not have this provision.  Provision 
four is political because administration might question whether or not to issue a negative 
evaluation out of fear of the conflict that may arise with the teacher.  That political factor could 
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potentially affect the performance of teachers if they are upset over the consequences for the 
negative evaluation.      
As for provision five, allowing for teacher to rebut or appeal a negative evaluation, the 
data shows that the majority (n= 39 or 57.6%) do not allow teacher to rebut a negative 
evaluation.  There are three emerging themes captured by the text for provision five which was 
tied with the broader theme of the process-oriented approach (i.e. opportunity, politics) and the 
results-oriented outcomes (i.e. performance, equity).  Provision five asks if teachers would have 
the equitable opportunity to appeal a negative performance evaluation.  Politics is again involved 
because challenges emerge whenever administration is approached in an adverse manor.  The 
opportunity to appeal and the politics involved to appeal can potentially affect the teacher’s 
performance and feelings of equity depending on the outcome of the appeal.  Provisions two 
through seven are all noneconomic items with Provision five being present in the smallest 
number of CBAs.    The school board perspective is that administration will be more reluctant to 
file a negative evaluation which would mean more time devoted to appeals (Lieberman, 2000).  
One solution could be to allow teachers to append their own comments to a negative evaluation 
rather than allowing provision five (Lieberman, 2000).  Some CBAs states that the teacher has a 
right to submit a written rebuttal which would become part of the evaluation records.  However, 
because a negative evaluation can lead to probation, salary stipend, and possible dismissal under 
Senate Bill 736, it might only be equitable to allow for an appeal.  Also, a negative evaluation 
can affect a teacher’s chances of receiving a promotion.    
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There are Florida Statutes for provision four, six, and seven yet none of those three 
provisions are contained in all of the collective bargaining agreements.  The data for provision 
six, may a teacher grieve disciplinary action, is mixed with more CBAs containing provision six 
(n= 37 or 56.1%) than not.  Florida Statute § 1012.34 (Personnel Evaluation and Procedure) 
states that an employee who wishes to contest the district’s school recommendation may request 
for a hearing.  Florida Statute § 1012.33 (Contracts with Instructional Staff) also states that any 
such decision adverse to the employee may be appealed by the employee pursuant to § 120.68 
(Judicial Review).  Although Florida has these relevant statutes, only about half of the CBAs 
mention that teachers may grieve disciplinary action.  Provision six’s emerging themes captured 
by the text was tied with opportunity, politics, performance and equity.  The broader theme of 
the process-oriented approach (i.e. opportunity, politics) and the results-oriented outcomes (i.e. 
performance, equity) are involved. Provision six questions if a teacher would have the equitable 
opportunity to grieve disciplinary action that was based on their performance.  Politics is 
involved because a debate is involved challenging administration.     
Provision seven is concerned with whether seniority is the primary factor that determines 
the order of layoffs.  The data shows that (n=21 or 31.3%) use seniority as their primary factory 
to determine layoffs.  This is interesting considering Florida Statute §1012.33 states that if a 
workforce reduction is needed, a district school board must retain employees at a school or in the 
school district based upon education program needs and the performance evaluations of 
employees within the affect program area.  Per law, the employee with the lowest performance 
evaluation must be the first to be released.  Provision seven fits into two of the six themed 
categories, time and politics.  Provision seven’s qualitative emerging themes captured by the text 
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was tied with the broader theme of the process-oriented approach (i.e. time, politics) and results-
oriented outcome (i.e. equity).  Provision seven is concerned with if a teacher’s time spent in the 
classroom determines the order of layoffs.  Politics is involved because fair (equitable) way to 
determine layoffs is debatable.     
Provision eight is concerned with whether factors other than seniority determine the order 
of layoffs.  While seniority can be the primary factor and sometimes the only factor in 
determining the order of layoffs, other factors can be considered.  The researcher 
noticed in the contracts that sometimes seniority is the only factor that matters while other 
contracts have a list of factors that they consider with seniority being the most important factor. 
The data shows that the majority of the districts (n=48 or 72.7%) have factors other than 
seniority to determine the order of layoffs.  Provision eight’s emerging themes, captured by the 
text, were tied to the broader theme of the process-oriented approach (i.e. Politics) and the 
results-oriented outcomes (i.e. equity).  Provision eight asks what are other factors that determine 
the order of layoffs. Provision eight is inherently political because the equitable way to deal with 
the topic of layoffs is itself debatable. 
Discussion on Collective Bargaining Agreements and Demographical Indicators  
 Research question number two, how does the presence of desirable collective bargaining 
agreement elements vary according to district size, district performance, and district locale, 
offers a quantitative insight into the findings of this study.  As with Goldhaber and Theobald’s 
(2014) study, the data in this study supports the authors research which found that spatial 
relationship plays a major role in determining bargaining outcomes.  The data illustrates that 
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town locale CBAs contained the highest frequencies of desirable provisions.  Districts with 
lowest frequencies of desirable provisions were characterized by city and suburb locale.  Strunk 
and Reardon (2010) conclude that one district’s collective bargaining agreement influences the 
terms and conditions in other districts bargaining especially when the districts have proximity to 
each other.  Districts with lowest frequencies of desirable provisions were characterized by 
district grade D and the lowest enrollment quartile (1-4905 students). Districts with the highest 
frequencies of desirable provisions were characterized by district grade C and enrollment 
quartiles two (4,906-12,929 students) and three (12,930-43,039 students).   
Provision one is concerned with whether the district pays for release time for negotiation 
for union members.  The data shows that Grade B district (n=14 or 37.8%) had the highest 
percentage of CBAs that pay for release time for negotiation for union members.  Grade D 
districts had the highest percentage (n=1 or 100.0%) of CBAs that does not pay for release time 
for negotiation.  Florida Statute § 1008.36, Florida School Recognition Program, provides a 
performance incentive for school receiving a grade of “A”, by demonstrating exemplary 
improvement of at least one letter grade, or by sustaining the improvement the following year.  
Performance grade D districts do not receive performance incentives which may be one of the 
reasons why district grade D schools have the highest percentage of CBAs that do not pay for 
release time for negotiation for union members. 
Town CBAs had the highest percentage of CBAs (n=8 or 61.5%) where the district pays 
for release time for negotiation. Rural locale had the highest percentage of CBAs (n=16 or 
84.2%) that did not contain provision one.  The U.S. Census Bureau reported that nationally, 
rural Americans had a 4% lower median household income in 2015 than urban households 
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(USCB, 2015).  Schools located in lower socioeconomic status (SES) locations such as a rural 
locale may be one of the reasons why rural locale districts has the highest percentage of CBAs 
that do not pay for release time for negotiation for union members.  Schools in lower SES 
locations may be underfunded because of lack of funding coming in from taxes (Silvers, 2008).      
Quartile two (4,906-12,929) had the highest percentage of CBAs (N=8 or 47.1%) that 
does pay for release time for negotiation for union members (provision one).  Quartile three 
(12,930-43,039) contained the highest percentage of CBAs (N=14 or 82.4%) that does not pay 
for release time for negotiation for union members.  The data does not necessarily agree with 
what research tells us about district size.  Larger districts typically have more money than 
smaller unions (Moe, 2011), yet the data shows that quartile two has the highest percentage of 
CBAs that pays for release time for union members.  Smaller districts are more expensive to run 
per capita than larger districts because usually small districts often have small schools, and small 
schools can have higher overhead costs (Boser, 2013).  Running a school for example with only 
100 students is more expensive than one with 600 students because of overhead (Boser, 2013).   
Provision two asks, do the CBAs require that districts post all certified vacancies/make 
them available to teachers in the district?  Districts with A and B grades contain the only two 
CBAs that do not require the district to post all certified vacancies.  Except for only two (7.1%) 
suburban CBAs, all the locale CBAs require the district to post all certified vacancies.  Quartile 
three (12,930-43,039) and four (43,040-35,7311) contain the only two CBAs that do not require 
the district to post all certified vacancies.  Investment in human capital by attracting and 
developing strong employees can improve organizational performance (Crook, 2011).  Strategic 
133 
 
recruitment increases overall teacher quality yet on average, 94% of districts post job openings 
on their district website (Konoske-Graf, Partelow, & Benner, 2016).   
Provision three asks, does the CBAs specify the given length of the school day?  The B-
grade district (n=3 or 8.1%) and C-grade district (n=1 or 5.9%) contained the only 4 CBAs that 
did not specify the given length of the school or teacher work day.  For locale, town had 100% of 
CBAs that contained provision three.  For enrollment, quartile two and three had the only four 
CBAs that did not contain provision three.      
For provision four, the results were rather uniform throughout with only one contract in 
grade D (n=1, 100%) not having a consequence for receiving a negative/unsatisfactory 
evaluation.  As far as locale, city (n= 4, 66.7%) had the highest percentage of CBAs containing 
provision four.  For enrollment, fourth quartile (n=12, 70.6%) contained the highest percentage 
of CBAs containing provision four. 
Provision five asks, does the collective bargaining agreement allow for teachers to rebut 
or appeal a negative evaluation?  According to district grade, grade C had the most CBAs (n=12, 
70.6%) that contained provision five.  District grade D had only one contract (100%) that did not 
contain provision five.  For enrollment, Quartile one (73.3%) had the highest percentage of 
CBAs and quartile two (52.9%) had the least CBAs that contained provision five.   
Regarding Provision six, may a teacher grieve disciplinary action, grade C school 
districts (n=11, 64.7%) had the highest percentage of CBAs that contained this provision.  
School district grade D  (n=1, 100%) had one CBA that did not have provision six making it the 
highest percentage of CBAs that did not contain provision six.  Suburban locale (n=19, 67.9%) 
had the highest percentage of CBAs that contained provision six.  City (n=4, 66.7%) had the 
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highest percentage that did not contain provision six.  For enrollment, the 4th quartile (n=11, 
64.7%) had the highest percentage of CBAs containing provision six.  Quartile one (n=9, 60%) 
had the highest percentage that did not contain provision six.   
Provision seven is concerned with whether seniority is the primary factor that determines 
the order of layoffs.  The data shows that grade C districts (n=11, 64.7%) CBAs had the highest 
percentage of CBAs that contain provision seven.  The one and only D school district CBA did 
not contain provision seven giving it the highest percentage of CBAs that did not contain 
provision seven.  Rural school district (n=1, 36.8%) and quartile three (n=10, 58.8%) contained 
the highest percentage of CBAs that contain provision seven.  Suburban (n=20, 71.4%) and 
second quartile (n=14, 82.4%) contained the highest percentage of CBAs that do not contain 
provision seven.   
Provision eight asks, do factors other than seniority determine the order of layoffs?  
CBAs in school district grade A (n=11, 100%) and D (n=1, 100%) have all of their CBAs  
containing provision eight.  For locale, rural (n=15, 76.9%) CBAs contain the highest percentage 
of CBAs that contain provision eight.  For enrollment, quartile two (n=13, 76.5%) contains the 
highest percentage of CBA’s that contain provision eight.   
Implications for Practice 
Collective bargaining in education has a profound impact on schools because of the 
difference that collective bargaining agreements can make with teachers regarding the conditions 
of their employment, which subsequently impacts the school culture and relationships between 
the school and school district.  Collective bargaining in education has a profound impact on 
135 
 
schools.  Regarding the conditions of their employment, the difference that collective bargaining 
agreements make with teachers is found within the school culture and the types of relationships 
that emerge within schools and between school districts. Collective bargaining has served as a 
powerful tool used by teacher unions to create better working conditions for their members by 
allowing working salaries, working conditions, benefits, and other aspects of rights for workers 
to be improved through negotiation (Hornick-Lockard, 2015; Lieberman, 1997). From a 
qualitative perspective, contractual terminology used in collective bargaining agreements varies 
widely.  It is important to determine the different patterns of wording for each contractual issue.  
For example, provision one (release time for negotiation) in a CBA can be categorized under 
“released time”, “union rights,” “leave of absence,” “grievance procedure,” or “miscellaneous” 
to cite just a few examples.  Content analysis classifies a CBA’s text into shared categories 
making it easier to find contractual provisions.  From a quantitative perspective, once the data 
was analyzed qualitatively, correlations were formed between the CBA’s characteristics (i.e. 
district size, district performance, and district locale) and the provisions.  This information 
allows persons interested in CBAs to study districts that contain the most desirable CBA 
provisions in their contracts in order to understand the dynamics of these contracts. 
Persons interested in researching collective bargaining agreements find the evidence of 
links between collective bargaining agreements and school district characteristics and CBA 
themes useful.  People who might be interested include CBA negotiating parties (i.e. school 
board, teacher unions), policymakers, politicians, teachers, researchers, and parents.  Also, those 
interested in school reform and would like more information on the similarities and unique 
aspects and content of Florida CBAs would find this study useful.  The research examined what 
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influenced the provisions that are found in CBAs and will guide interested persons to examine 
CBAs with desirable provisions using the results of this study. 
The results of this study provide insight into the terms and conditions of collective 
bargaining agreements in Florida, thereby providing Florida school districts with information to 
construct the best possible competitive contracts in the future, which would then attract top talent 
as well as to protect the best interests of their districts and all parties.  
Recommendation for Further Research 
Collective bargaining is a newer topic of research of which we know little about (Anzia 
& Moe, 2014; Lewin, Keefe, & Kochan, 2012).  The recommendations for further study 
presented in this section can expand upon the current study.   
One possible future study could be to research the impact that collective bargaining has 
on Florida public school education.  This research could potentially improve education for 
students, and working conditions for teachers, by giving recommendations on additional items to 
include in a collective bargaining agreement.  The study could be replicated using different 
provisions than the eight selected and/or using charter schools.    
Another possible future study could answer the question, what factors influence the 
provisions that end up in these Florida collective bargaining agreements?  Goldhaber and 
Theobald (2014) asked this question with their study on collective bargaining agreements but it 
would be useful to replicate this study in Florida.  It is less common to find literature that 
questions union members’ strengths in impacting important decisions which affect collective 
bargaining agreements.   
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A possible future study could use Strunk and Reardon’s (2010) measure of contract 
restrictiveness to study Florida union member’s strength.  This study could help in understanding 
provision frequencies in Florida collective bargaining agreements.  Strunk and Reardon (2010) 
use collective bargaining agreements negotiated between unions and school boards to determine 
union strength compared to the employer.  Contracts that contain outcomes that are more union-
friendly indicated that those unions are stronger than management (Strunk & Reardon, 2010). An 
understanding of the mind frame that the school board and the union have when coming to the 
negotiation table helps in understanding how negotiations are handled.  Other studies might 
consider the role of the legislative-funded schools (i.e. school choice and the legislative funded, 
Florida Virtual Schools) and how collective bargaining agreements influence the administrative 
and governance within those state funded efforts.  
Continuous research on this new literature will help bring clarity and consistency to 
collective bargaining studies.  Further research on teacher collective bargaining can only provide 
more information for unions interested in improving schools (Vachon & Ma, 2015).   
Conclusions from the Research Study 
The findings of this study expanded upon the work of Goldhaber, Lavery, and Theobald 
(2014).  As with Goldhaber and Theobald (2014) study, the data in this study supports the 
author’s research which found that spatial relationship plays a role in determining bargaining 
outcomes.  The data from research question two illustrates that town locale CBAs contained the 
highest frequencies of desirable provisions.  Districts with lowest frequencies of desirable 
provisions were characterized by city and suburb locale.   
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The findings resulting from research question one indicates that collective bargaining 
agreements vary in terms of the inclusion of desirable provisions for teachers.  The results show 
that none of the eight desirable provisions were present in all 66 collective bargaining 
agreements.  This shows that state teachers association do not have a great deal of influence on 
local unions to implement a state-wide provision.  The unions and school districts seem to have 
negotiated contracts to address their own local needs and interests.  The most agreed upon 
provisions seemed to be provision two (posting of certificated vacancies) and three (length of 
school day), showing that there are some commonalties within the district CBAs.  The provisions 
that had a corresponding Florida State Statute did not necessarily have provision listed in the 
collective bargaining agreements.   
The process-oriented approach theme of politics was present in all but one CBA making 
politics the theme with the most CBAs.  The results-driven outcome theme of equity was present 
in all but two collective bargaining agreements making equity the theme with the most CBAs for 
results-driven outcomes.  Provision one contained the most themes, having all but one theme 
(performance).  Provision seven contained the least number of themes having only time and 
politics, two process-oriented approach themes.  
In order to construct the best possible competitive contracts in the future, more 
consistency among the CBAs is needed. The provisions that have a Florida State statute should 
be included in all of the CBAs or, at least have a reference to the Florida Statute number as some 
contracts provided.  The evidence of the links between collective bargaining agreements and 
school district characteristics can be used as a reference for exploring how to construct the best 





Alexander, K., & Alexander, D. M. (2012). American public school law (8th ed.). Belmont: 
Wadsworth. 
Anzia, S. F., & Moe, M. T. (2014). Collective bargaining, transfer rights, and disadvantaged 
schools. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 36(1), 83-111. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.3102/0162373713500524  
Aud, S. (2006). Florida's public education spending. School choice issues in the state. Retrieved 
from http://www.eric.ed.gov/contentdelivery/servlet/ERICServlet?accno=ED520200  




Bascia, N., & Osmond, P. (2012). Teacher unions and educational reform: A research review.  
National Education Association Center for Great Public Schools Research Department 
[PDF file]. Retrevied from 
https://feaweb.org/_data/files/ED_Reform/Teacher_Unions_and_Educational_Reform.pd
f 
Bormna, K. M., & Dorn, S. (2007). Education reform in Florida. Albany: State University of 
New York Press. 
140 
 
Boser, U. (2013). Size matters: A look at school-district consolidation. Center for American 
Progress. Retrieved from 
https://eric.ed.gov/contentdelivery/servlet/ERICServlet?accno=ED561073  
Canedy, D. (2003, Feb 11). Florida struggles to find a way to acheive smaller classes. New York 
Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/11/us/florida-struggles-to-find-
a-way-to-achieve-smaller-classes.html 
Carlo, M. D. (2015). The evidence on the "Florida Formula" for education reform. Albert 
Shanker Institute.  Retrieved 
from  https://eric.ed.gov/contentdelivery/servlet/ERICServlet?accno=ED563782  
Carni, R. M. (2008). Is collective bargaining detrimental to student achievement?: Evidence from 
a national study. Collective Negotiations, 32(3), 215-235. doi: 10.2190/CN.32.3.d 
Chalk, S. (2015). Quality counts introduces new state report card; U.S. earns C, and 
Massachusetts ranks first in nation. Education Week. Retrieved from 
https://www.edweek.org/media/qualitycounts2015_release.pdf 
Cohen-Vogel, L., & Osborne-Lampkin, L. (2007). Allocating quality: Collective bargaining 
agreements and administrative discretion over teacher assignment. Educational 
Administration Quarterly, 43(4), 433-461. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0013161X07306450  
Cohen-Vogel, L., Li Feng, & Osborne-Lampkin, L. (2013). Seniority provisions in collective 
bargaining agreements and the "teacher quality gap". Educational Evaluation and Policy 
Analysis, 35(3), 324-343. http://dx.doi.org/10.3102/0162373713482765  
141 
 
Crook, R. T. (2011). Does human capital matter? A meta-analysis of the relationship between 
human capital and firm performance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 3(96), 443-456. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0022147  
Florida Department of Education. (2018). Course Enrollment [Data file]. Retrieved from 
http://www.fldoe.org/accountability/data-sys/edu-info-accountability-services/pk-12-
public-school-data-pubs-reports/students.stml 
Florida Department of Education. (2017). Florida School Accountability Reports: School Grades 
[Data file]. Retrieved from http://schoolgrades.fldoe.org/ 
Florida Department of Education. (2018). Florida School Grades [Data file]. Retrieved from 
http://schoolgrades.fldoe.org/ 
Ford, M., & Ihrke, D. (2018). The impact of Wisconsin’s Act 10 on municipal management in 
smaller municipalities: Views from local elected officials. Public Policy and 
Administration, 33(2), 170-189. doi: 10.1177/0952076716683763 
Frankel, J. R., Wallen, N. E., & Hyun, H. H. (2015). How to design and evaulate research (9th 
ed.). New York: McGraw Hill Education. 
Freeman, K. W. (2012). The impact of traditional bargaining vs interest-based bargaining on 
faculty salaries and administrative and faculty relationships. Retrieved from 
https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy.net.ucf.edu/docview/1033624901 
Funding for Florida School Districs Statistical Report. (2013-14). Retrieved from 
http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/3/urlt/fefpdist.pdf 




Gay, L. R., Mills, G. E., & Airasian, G. (2009). Educational research: Competencies for analysis 
and applications (9th ed.). Boston: Pearson. 
Goldhaber, D., Lavery, L., & Theobald, R. (2014). My end of the bargaining: Are there cross-
district effects in teacher contract provisions?. ILR Review, 67(4), 1274-1305. doi: 
10.1177/0019793914546305 
Green, S., & Salkind, N. (2008). Using SPSS for Windows and Macintosh: Analyzing and 
understanding data. Uppersaddle River, NJ: Pearson. 
Guggenheim (Director). (2010). Waiting for Superman [Motion Picture]. 
Hannaway, J., & Rotherham, A. J. (2010). Collective bargaining in education: Negotiating 
change in today's schools. Cambridge: Harvard Education Press. 
Hauer, S. (2018, Feb 24). Wisconsin labor unions file lawsuit over Act 10, saying it violates free 
speech. Milwaukee Journal Sentinel. Retrieved from 
https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/education/2018/02/24/wisconsin-labor-unions-file-
lawsuit-act-10/370280002/ 
Horne, J. (Ed.). (2004). Assessment and accountability briefing book: FCAT school and 
accountability. Retrieved from Florida Department of Education: 
https://www.floridaschoolleaders.org/general/content/NEFEC/dafil/resources/fcataabb.pd
f 
Hornick-Lockard, B. (2015). Collective bargaining and teachers' unions. Research Starters: 
Education. Retrieved from https://library.ucf.edu/ 
143 
 
Hoxby, C. M. (1996). How teachers' unions affect education production. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 111(3), 671-718. Retrieved from https://www-jstor-
org.ezproxy.net.ucf.edu/stable/2946669  
Hsieh, H.-F., & Shannon, S. E. (2005). Three approaches to qualitative content analysis. 
Qualitative Health Research, 15(9), 1277-1288. doi: 10.1177/1049732305276687 
Johnson, J. A., Musial, D., Hall, G. E., Gollnick, D. M., & Dupuis, V. L. (2008). Foundations of 
American Education (14th ed.). Boston: Pearson. 
Konoske-Graf, A., Partelow, L., & Benner, M. (2016). To attract great teachers, school districts 
must improve their human capital systems. Retrieved from 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education-k-12/reports/2016/12/22/295574/to-
attract-great-teachers-school-districts-must-improve-their-human-capital-systems/ 
Koski, W. S., & Horng, E. (2007). Facilitating the teacher quality gap? Collective bargaining 
agreements, teacher hiring and transfer rules, and teacher assignment among schools in 
California. Education Finance and Policy, 2, 262-300. Retrieved from https://www-jstor-
org.ezproxy.net.ucf.edu/stable/educfinapoli.2.3.262  
Levine, D., Lowe, R., Peterson, B., & Tenorio, R. (1995). Rethinking schools: An agenda for 
change. New York: The New York Press. 
Levine, J., & Quinn, M. (2003). Missed opportunities: How we keep high-quality teachers out of 
urban classrooms. The New Teacher Project. Retrieved from 
https://eric.ed.gov/contentdelivery/servlet/ERICServlet?accno=ED481608  
Lewin, D., Keefe, J. H., & Kochan, T. A. (2012). The new great debate about unionism and 
collective bargaining in U.S. state and local governments. Industrial and Labor Relations 
144 
 
Review, 65(4), 749-78. Retrieved from 
https://eric.ed.gov/contentdelivery/servlet/ERICServlet?accno=ED481608  
Lieberman, M. (1997). The teacher unions: How the NEA and AFT sabotage reform and hold 
students, parents, teachers, and taxpayers hostage to bureaucracy. New York: The Free 
Press. 
Lieberman, M. (2000). Understanding the teacher union contract. New Brunswick: Transcation 
Publishers. 
Lunenburg, F. C., & Irby, B. J. (2008). Writing a successful thesis or dissertation: Tips and 
strategies for students in the social and behavioral sciences. Thousan Oaks, California: 
Corwin. 
Mackenzie, R. (2015, January 30). Brevard teachers protest for raises, recognition. Florida 
Today. Retrieved from http://www.floridatoday.com 
Mann, D., & Calabro, D. M. (2017). Improving taxpayers value, citizen understanding, and 
government accountability. Retrieved from https://floridataxwatch.org 
Moe, T. M. (2006). Bottom-Up structure: Collective bargaining, transfer rights, and the plight of 
disadvantaged schools. Department of Education Reform. Retrieved from 
https://eric.ed.gov/contentdelivery/servlet/ERICServlet?accno=ED508944   
Moe, T. M. (2011). Special Interest: Teachers Unions and America's Public Education. 
Washiongton: Brookings Institution Press. 
Munk, L. G. (1998). Collective bargaining: Bringing education to the table. Government Union 




Murray, K. T., & Murray, B. A. (2014). School law for the Florida educator (5th ed.). Merritt 
Island: IntraCoastal Publishing. 
National Center for Education Statistics. (2017, September 01). Education Demographic and 
Geographic Estimates. Retrieved from: 
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/edge/geographicLocale.aspx 
National Labor Relations Act. (1935). Retrieved from https://www.nlrb.gov/resources/national-
labor-relations-act-nlra 
NCES 2016. (2016, September 01). Common Core of Data. Retrieved from https://nces.ed.gov/ 
NCES Locale Classifications and Criteria. (2018, September 01). Retrieved from 
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/edge/docs/LOCALE_CLASSIFICATIONS.pdf 
Nelson, H. F., & Rosen, M. (1996). Are teacher's unions hurting American education? A state-
by-state analysis of the impact of collective bargaining among teachers on student 
performance. Milwaukee: The Institute for Wisconsin's Future. Retreived from 
https://eric.ed.gov/contentdelivery/servlet/ERICServlet?accno=ED404746  
Normore, H. A., & Ilon, L. (2006). Cost-effective school inputs: Is class size reduction the best 
educational expenditure for Florida?. Educational Policy, 20(2), 429-454. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0895904805284053  
Ravitch, D. (2006). Why teacher unions are good for teahcers and the public. American 




Silvers, D. (2008). How we got into this mess: Trade, the war on unions, and underfunded 
schools all lowered wages. The American Prospect, 19(5), 23-26. Retrieved from 
https://library.ucf.edu/ 
Smith, S. K., & Rayer, S. (2013). Projections of Florida population by county, 2015-2040, with 
estimates for 2012. Bureau of Liberal Arts and Science, 46(165), 1-4. Retrieved from 
https://www-jstor-org.ezproxy.net.ucf.edu/stable/26159772  
State board of education 2015-16 legislative budget request. (2014, December 05). [PowerPoint 
slides]. Retrieved from Florida Department of Education: 
http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/7601/urlt/AgencyPresent2015-
16BudgetRequest.pdf 
Steele, J. L., Murnane, R. J., & Willett, J. B. (2009). Do financial incentives help low-performing 
schools attract and keep academically talented teachers? Evidence from California. 
Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research. Retrieved from 
https://library.ucf.edu/ 
Steelman, L. C., Powell, B., & Carini, R. M. (2000). Do teachers union hinder educational 
performance?. Harvard Educuational Review, 70(4), 437-466. Retrieved from 
https://library.ucf.edu/ 
Strunk, K. O. (2011). Are teachers' unions really to blame? Bargaining agreements and their 
relationships with district resource allocation and student performance in California. 




Strunk, K. O., & Grissom, J. A. (2010). Do strong unions shape district policies? Collective 
bargaining, teacher contract restrictiveness, and the political power of teachers' unions. 
Educational Evaulation and Policy Analysis, 32(3), 386-406. doi: 
10.3102/0162373710376665 
Strunk, K. O., & Reardon, S. F. (2010). Measuring the strength of teachers' unions: An empirical 
application of the partial independence item response approach. Educational and 
Behavioral Statistics, 35(6), 629-670. doi:10.3102/1076998609359790 
Student enrollment. (2017, March 01). Florida Department of Education [Data file]. Retrieved 
from 
https://edstats.fldoe.org/SASWebReportStudio/gotoReportSection.do?sectionNumber=1 
The 2016 Florida Statute. (2016). Retrieved from OnlineSunshine: 
http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_Strin
g=&URL=1000-1099/1012/Sections/1012.56.html 
The Florida Legislator office of Economic and Demographic Research (2017). Demographic 
Overview & Population Trends [Data file]. Retrieved from http://edr.state.fl.us/Content/ 
United States Census Bureau (2014). Florida Passes New York to Become the Nation’s Third 
Most Populous State, Census Bureau Reports. Retrieved from 
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2014/cb14-232.html 
United States Census Bureau. (2015). A comparison of rural and urban american: Household 




Vachon, T. E., & Ma, J. (2015). Bargaining for success: Examining the relationship between 
teacher unions and student achievement. Sociological Forum, 30(2), 391-413. doi: 
10.1111/socf.12168 
Vollmer, J. (2010). Schools cannot do it alone. Fairfield, IA: Enlightment Press. 
Walton, R. E., & McKersie, R. B. (1991). A behavioral theory of labor negotiations: An analysis 
of a social interaction system (2nd ed.). Ithaca: ILR Press. 
Weaver-Dunne, D. (2000, March 1). Education World. Retrieved from Florida fails children of 
Miami-Dade County: http://www.educationworld.com/a_issues/issues107.shtml 
 
 
 
